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ABSTRACT
Many Third World countries appear to have
suffered in the past from over-centralised development
efforts. More recently, many countries have attempted
to reverse these trends through a policy of
decentralisation. The hope has been that this would
overcome institutional weaknesses, enable development
to be administered at the local level, and bring
greater popular participation. Democratic structures
have been prescribed as means of ensuring greater
involvement in development, particularly for the rural
poor. They should also make local administration more
accountable to the people.
Since 1982, Bangladesh has favoured
decentralisation, devolving increased power and
authority to a democratic local government unit, the
"Upazila Administration". The policy has shifted power
and authority in local matters, from the traditional
district administration, to the lower levels.
In evaluating the impact of decentralisation on
development, this thesis concludes that hitherto
decentralisation in Bangladesh has not been altogether
xix
effective. It has not been able for example to iiiiprove
the delivery of basic needs to the rural people,
particularly to those who live under extreme poverty.
There are reasons to believe, however, that given the
oppotunity to continue democratic local institutions
over a longer period, and following the constitutional
route, decentralisation will gradually bring about
better results.
INTRODUCTION
Objectives of Thesis
Outline of Research
An Overview of Conclusion
2Oblectives of Thesis
Over the last three decades many developing
countries have adopted a policy of decentralisation, in
planning and administering national development.
Initially in the 1940's and 1950's countries tended to
follow a centralised policy in national development.
Decentralisation was later attempted as an alternative
approach, in the face of apparent failures in
development policy.
From recent studies of decentralisation, it is
possible to deduce that decentralisation has both
positive and negative connotations. No Third World
country has achieved complete success in
decentralisation. The experience of decentralisation
has been mixed, bringing successes as well as
failures.1
Complete devolution of power to lower levels of
the administrative structure has never been possible in
Third World countries. For a variety of reasons,
including the desire to retain administrative and
political control over the entire geographical area of
the nation, central governments, in their policies of
decentralisation, have always kept a large degree of
3power. National leaders and policymakers, strongly
backed by central bureaucrats, tend to favour partial
decentralisation of development administration. 2 At
local community level, it is difficult for
decentralisation policies to break through the
traditional political and social structures which have
historically benefitted the rich, the powerful and the
influential.
Bangladesh is a typical example. Since 1982,
local institutions at the lower levels of -the
administrative hierarchy, have been given greater power
and authority in an attempt to - involve the rural
population, and to integrate administrative structures,
in order to promote rural development. Rural peoples
are enjoined to embrace the decision-making process, to
bring about development. Rules have been set up to
make the administration accountable to the people.
	 -
It is argued in this thesis, however, that
long-standing weaknesses in local administrative and
political structures have been a serious obstacle to
achieving the development objective of satisfying the
"basic needs" of the people, especially those of the
rural poor. The major problem has been in puttin g the
last first (Robert Chambers, 1983) . Reforms have
failed to tackle this issue. The rural poor, as
4Chambers argues, are in a deprivation tra p . They are
poor, powerless, isolated, physically weak and
vulnerable to other difficulties. The diagram below
illustrates how these problems are interrelated.
The "Deprivation Trap"4
Poverty is at the heart of all these problems.
There are two broad explanations of rural poverty.5
Political Economists see it as the consequence of a
process which concentrates wealth and power. 6 Physical
Ecologists interpret rural poverty in terms of what is
5physical, visible, technical and statistical. 7 Food
shortages and environmental degradation, the population
explosion, and poor resource management appear as
pricipal causes in this latter explanation of rural
poverty. Chambers (1983) argues that the prescriptions
for rural development drawn up by both groups are
partial, because they concentrate on one, or at the
most a few, explanations. Professional reorientation is
necessary in re-thinking and researching rural poverty.
The focus must be on "putting the last first."
Poverty makes the rural poor physically weak
and lowers their economic productivity. They become
vulnerable to economic losses in their struggle for
survival. Power is held by traditional elites in the
rural areas. A breakthrough is difficult to achieve.
The powerlessness of the poor deprives them of the
opportunities of obtaining their legitimate share of
benefits from rural/local development efforts.
Isolation rules out the poor from contact with the
means of development, and the provision of basic needs.
Facilities for development, such as rural credit,
health care, and education, do not reach them in the
way they should, in a democratic society. Chambers
maintains that many forces centralise not only power,
but also the professionals themselves and development
resources in the urban cores. He maintains that the
6centra].isation tendency in development is encouraged by
national, urban and class interests; by communications,
markets and facilities; by distrust of the periphery
and of those lower in the political and administrative
hierarchies; by personal interests of convenience, the
availability of services and promotion; and by the
sheer weight of political and administrative influence.
He argues that :
"New investments, buildings, industries, and even
agricultural processing are sited centrally, and scale,
capital-intensity, and high cost correspond with the
size and importance of the core where they are placed.
Rural goods, taxes and people are sucked inwards,
drained from the rural periphery more strongly and
consistently than the opposite flow of goods and
services is pushed or drawn outwards. If the economy
falters, or goods are scarce, it is the periphery and
the poorer people at the periphery who go short and pay
more."
In theory, decentralisation should help to
overcome these problems of development. It should
benefit the rural poor, ensuring their legitimate
shares. For Chambers decentralisation is key to
spatial reversals necessary for development. He argues
that :
"With strong leadership or strong local demands, it is
possible, though difficult, to force funds outwards, to
give more local discretion, to decentralise
agricultural processing and small-scale non-
agricultural production, to disperse, in short, parts
of the cores towards the peripheries."
7I will show in this thesis, however, that in
the experience of different countries, both the
concept and the practice of decentralisation vary.
Evaluation of decentralisation policy, therefore, is a
complicated problem for the researcher.8
This thesis focuses on the impact of
decentralisation on development, with special reference
to the experience of Bangladesh since 1982. The
specific objectives of thesis are :
i) to examine decentralisation and its impact
on democratic institution-building at the local level.
Can it bridge the gap between the administrative
structures and the people?
ii) to examine the impact of decentralisation
on the satisfaction of "basic needs" of the rural poor.
Can decentralisation help deliver "basic needs" to the
poor?
To achieve the specific objectives of thesis, a
field survey at local (village) level has been carried
out in Bangladesh, with the aim of exploring the
benefits, if any, of decentralisation for the last, the
rural poor. The fieldwork is set in the general
context of the theory and practice of decentralisation,
and the broader experience of Bangladesh.
8Outline of Research
The thesis is presented in three parts. Part I
consists of four chapters. Chalter 3. is devoted to a
discussion of the scope and definitions of
decentralisation,	 necessary	 when	 viewing
decentralisation as a reseach problem. Chapter 2 looks
at some theoretical aspects of the concept of
decentralisation. Chapter 3 discusses certain pertinent
examples of decentralisation policies as they have
functioned in practice, in a number of developing
countries. Chapter 4 discusses the criteria which can
be developed for evaluating decentralisation policy.
Part II which looks at the broad experience of
Bangladesh, and comprises four chapters. Chapter 5
provides a historical account of decentralisation in
the Indian sub-continent before the Independence of
Bangladesh in 1971. Chapter 6 discusses in detail the
evolution of "Upazila Administration" as a
decentralised local democratic institution in
Bangladesh. It considers current changes in the
administrative and political structures, at the Upazila
level. Chapter 7 opens the debate about the
relationship between political structures and economic
issues.
9Part III of thesis consists of two chapters.
Chapter 8 presents and analyses the fieldwork results
of the impact of decentralisation on
	 institution-
building process at local level. Chapter 9 evaluates
the impact of decentra].jsatjon, and the "Upazila
Administration", on the satisfaction of the "basic
needs" of the rural people.
The concluding summary and remarks on
principles, method and practice, are provided in
chapter 10.
10
An Overview of Conclusion
Given the circumstances of the Third World, it
is tempting to regard decentralisation as being of
enormous help in creating democratic institutions at
the local levels. In practice, however,
decentra].isation does not ensure participation, or
bridge the huge gap between the administration, and the
people.	 Current efforts at decentralisation in
Bangladesh are no exception, at least in the short-run.
Given that experience in the Third World has
shown that rural development tends to benefit the rich,
the powerful, and the influential, it is unlikely that
institutional decentralisation of itself will deliver
"basic needs" to those who need them most. The current
practice of decentralisation, involving "Upazila
Administration" in Bangladesh, has not helped deliver
"basic needs" to the rural poor, at least in the short-
run. There are signs, however, that in the long-run, if
continuous efforts are made to establish links with
the rural poor within the local political-
administrative structures, greater tartici pation may
result, with all that this promises for improved
delivery of goods and services to the poor.
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NOTES
1. For more	 information on the experience of
decentralisation, see, Rondinelli, D.A., J.R.
Nellis and G.S. Cheeina : Decentralisation in
Developing Countries : A Review of Recent
Experience, World Bank Staff Working Paper No.
581 (Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 1984).
2. Partial decentralisation is considered primarily
to retain some control at the centre.
Practically, recentralisation is sometimes done
by the national government. For details, read,
Apthorpe, R. and Conyers, D. : "Decentralisation,
Recentralisation, and Popular Participation :
Towards a Framework for Analysis" Development and
Peace Vol. 3 (Budapest, 1982), p. 50.
3. For a detailed study of the forces leading to the
deprivation of the rural poor (the last), see,
Chambers, R. : Rural Development : Putting the
Last First (London : Longman, 1983).
4. Chambers (1983), ibid. pp. 111-114.
5. For details, see Chambers, ibid. pp. 145-148.
6. Political economists form a broad group of
political scientists,	 economists,	 public
administrationists,	 sociologists,	 social
anthropologists, human geographers.
7. Physical ecologists include environmentalists,
soil scientists, physical geographers, experts on
water resource management, and those who are
involved in life science disciplines and health
services.
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8. Difficulties in evaluation also arise due to
the diversified meaning and dimensions of
decental isation.
Conyers maintains that there are three aspects
relating to discussions of decentralisation by
topic : (1) the disciplinary origin, (2) the
orientation and variety of authorship, and (3)
the meaning and forms of decentralisation. For
detail, see, Conyers, D. : "Decentralisation and
Development : A Review of the Literature", Public
Administration and Development, Vol. 4, (London :
John Wiley, 1984).
The relationship between central and local
governments in respect of decentralisation can be
analysed with reference to four dimensions : (1)
the organizational problem, (2) the economic
problem, (3) the political problem, and (4) the
ideological problem. For more information, read,
Saunders, P. : "Rethinking Local Politics", in
Boddy, M. and Fudge, C. (eds.) : Local Socialism,
(London : Macmillan, 1984).
PART I
DECENTRALISATION : ThEORY. PRACTICE AD EVALUATION
Chapter 1
SCOPE ?.ND DEFINITIONS
1.1	 Decentralisation : Definitions and Scope
1.2	 A Working Definition of Decentralisation
for Purposes of the Present Research
15
1.1 Decentralisation : Definitions and Score
it is necessary to have a clear understanding
of the different forms decentralisation may take,
before undertaking a detailed discussion of the
theoretical issues and practices of decentralisation.
This chapter covers definitions appropriate to a study
of decentralisation, and discusses the scope of the
various concepts.
Definitions Appromriate to Decentralisation
(1) Deconcentration is the handing over of
some amount of administrative authority or
responsibility to lower levels within central
government ministries or agencies (Rondinelli,Nellis
and Cheema, 1984; Mawhood, 1983). It redistributes
administrative power within the central government.
Objectives of deconcentration are :
a) to shift the workload from centrally-located
officials, to staff or offices outside of the national
capital.
16
b) to give discretion to field agents to plan
and implement programmes and projects, or to adjust
central directives to local conditions, within
guidelines set by central ministries or agencies.
Centralisation concentrate experience in the
national capital, and contribute little to developing
local leadership and initiative (USAID, 1979).
Deconcentration is argued to give opposite results.
Decentralisation in the form of deconcentration has
been practised in many Third World countries in the
past decades.
(2) Delegation is the transfer of managerial
responsibilities for specifically defined functions, to
organizations that are outside the regular bureaucratic
structure and that are only indirectly controlled by
the central government (Roridinelli, Nellis and Cheema,
1984). Although the delegated agent is given broad
discretion to carry out certain specific functions, the
ultimate responsibility lies with the sovereign
authority at the centre. In developing countries,
responsibilities are delegated to different authorities
such as public corporations, regional development
agencies, special function authorities, semi-autonomous
project implementation units and a variety of
parastatal organizations. Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema
17
(1984) observe that the delegation of responsibilities
to these organizations is usually viewed in three ways:
a) In some countries, delegation is looked upon
as a way of removing important functions from
inefficient government bureaucracies;
b) In some countries, delegation has been
viewed as a way for the government to provide
indirectly, goods and services which are not
effectively provided by the civil service; and
c) In some countries delegation is used as a
means of maintaining public control over highly
profitable or valuable resources.
(3) Privatization means transfering functions
	 -
from the government to voluntary organizations or
private enterprises. The characteristic features of
privatization in developing countries are :
a) Governments may transfer responsibility to
organisations such as national industrial and trade
associations, professional. groups, religious
organisations, political parties, or cooperatives; and
18
b) Governments may shift the responsibility for
producing goods and supplying services that were
previously offered by parastatal or public
corporations, to privately owned or controlled
enterprises.
An important aspect of privatization in
developing countries is that governments may transfer
responsibilities to organisations that represent
various interests in society (Rondinelli, Nellis and
Cheema, 1984). Ralston, Anderson and Colson (1981)
observe that in developing countries, a number of
organizations which include farmers' cooperatives,
credit associations, mutual aid societies, village
development organizations, trade unions or women's and
youth clubs, do respond to privatisation programmes by
the government. Decentralisation can be found in this
context, implicit in the concept of
debureaucratisation)
(4) Devolution is the creation or
strengthening, financially or legally, of subnational
units of governments, the activities of which are
substantially outside the direct control of the central
government (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984).
Sherwood argues that :
19
"... the strong association between devolution and
economic and technological factors tends to validate
the generally held position that diverse structures
within a system can be tolerated only when the
integrity of the system itself is not in question. That
is, national unity seems to be a necessary precondition
for devolution." (Sherwood, 1979, p. 75).
Degree of devolution, however, depends on the
range of services to be decentralised, the kind of
activities to be undertaken by local authority staff,
and the political organization and life to be developed
in the local authority area.2
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1.2	 A Working Definition of Decentralisation for
purposes of the Present Research
Given the diverse meaning and definitions of
decentralisation, it is necessary to have a working
definition of decentralisation for the present
research. The primary focus of decentralisation in this
study is devolution. The other forms of
decentralisation, especially privatization, have been
considered only to a limited extent. Local government
is a local institution which has at least some degree
of independent authority for development. This
corresponds to devolution, arid the intention of this
research is to examine the possibility of local
government being given greater power and authority for
development administration.
Tordoff (1987) argues that pressures to
decentralise stem from a variety of causes, including
the need to disperse the management of state functions
throughout a network of local and regional offices, and
to accommodate the different demands of different areas
within the territory of the state. Under devolution of
administration, local administrative units are
autonomous or independent and their legal status makes
21
them separate and distinct from the central government.
Examples from the Third World, however, suggest that
the central government frequently exercises indirect or
supervisory control over these units of administration.
Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) and Smith (1985) maintain
that devolution of authority at local level, requires :
1) a clear and legally recognised geographical
area to exercise an exclusive authority, to perform
explicitly-granted or served functions;
2) a corporate or statutory authority to raise
revenues and expenditures;
3) an organisation perceived by local citizens
as providing services and satisfying their needs and
aspirations over which they have some influence; and
4) a reciprocal and mutually benefiting
relationship with the central government.3
The policy of devolution is important and quite
pertinent, in that it empowers the local level
administration with the capacity to interact
reciprocally with other units of government in the
political system of which they are a part. Rhodes
(1981) maintains that the 'partnership model' of
central-local relations of government entails that
local authorities and central government are co-equals
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under parliament. 4 Such inter-governmental relationship
apears to be prominent in the process of devolution of
power to local level administration.
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NOTES
1. On bureaucratisation and decentralisation, see
Alford, R.R. and Friedland, R. : Power of Theory
:Capitalism, the State and Democracy (Cambridge
: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
2. Decentralisation being pursued in one local
authority area and the form it takes may be
considerably different from that being pursued in
another. For more information, see, Fudge, C. :
"Decentralisation : Socialism Goes Local", in
Boddy, M. and Fudge, C. (eds.) : Local Socialism,
(London : Macmillan, 1984).
3. For a devolution policy to work effectively, a
cordial central-local relationship is the
principal political objective.
4. For more information on the "Partnership Model",
see, Rhodes, R.A.W. : Control and Power in
Central-Local Government Relations (London :
Gower, 1981).
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2.1 A General Discussion of Theoretical Considerations
Apiropriate to Decentralisation
Decentralisation is an alternative to
centralised and bureaucratic forms of government.1
Decentralised institutions, which broadly speaking
practise development administration through democratic
norms, are the central focus of this study.
In the context of political theory, it is
assumed that decentralisation is of the political
variety, and that decentralised government, for those
concerned with the normative evaluation of forms of
political authority, involves two fundamental
conditions (Smith, 1985):
i) that the territorial subdivisions of the
state have a measure of autonomy; and
ii) that those institutions are democratically
constituted.
It does not follow that the first condition
implies the second condition. A community might well be
self-governing through hereditary kingship, feudal
institutions or other forms of government. This was the
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case with the forms of indirect rule practised by
imperial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries, in
their colonies in different continents. 2 In practice
local government was defined in such a way as to make
it incompatible with democratic processes. This was
influenced by some proponents of local self- government
who specifically rejected democracy as a way of
governing local affairs. Notable were Von Gneist, the
nineteenth century Prussian idealist and Toulmin Smith
in England in the mid-nineteenth-century (Smith, 1985).
Von Gneist believed in local government as a necessary
condition of the ideal state, but rejected
representative institutions and political equality in
favour of the appointed members of the propertied
classes. Toulmin Smith also rejected democracy in
preference to an earlier tradition of parochial
government by selected officials (Hill, 1974, p.26).
Modern views of local government, however,
differ greatly from the earlier traditions. It is
generally accepted that self-governing territories
within the nation-state should be democratically
organized, though there is clearly room for differences
of opinion as to how far a given set of institutions
and procedures fulfil democratic requirements. There
are too, differences of opinion as to how necessary
democratic, local, self-government is to the political
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health of the modern democratic state. Mawhood (1984)
in studying the development impact of decentralisation
in the Third World countries observes that :
"... the national governments incorporate various
arrangements to secure local representations in the
decision-making process, but are never, or virtually
never, left to run the local administration by
themselves. A generalist civil servant plays broadly a
political role, representing the state and is
ultimately responsible for law and order in his area."
Smith	 (1985)	 offers an insight into
theoretical issues of decentralisation based on social
theorists' views of the modern state. He has identified
three major approaches to decentralisation :
i) Those which interpret local government in
terms of liberal democratic principles;
ii) Those approaches which offer "economic"
interpretations of local government; and
iii) Approaches which are based on Marxist
interpretations of the state at the
local level.
iv) Approach which stress intergovernmental
relations.
The analytical underpinnings of this thesis
fall largely in the first category, though it is
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important to be aware of other theoretical bases, and
indeed, the insights offered by them, can be reflected
in the overall liberal democratic approach adopted in
the thesis.
2.1.1	 "Economic" Interiretations
The neoclassical economic theory of induced
institutional innovation, emphasizes the fact that
institutions can be induced to increase the impetus for
development. 3 Institutions are thus endogenous to the
development process.
Decentralisation is said to improve the
efficiency with which demands for locally provided
services are expressed and public goods
provided(Shepard,1975). Decentralisation is also said
to reduce costs, increase output and more efficiently
utilise human resources (Hart, 1972). If approached
from the perspective of theories of public choice and
collective goods, decentralisation becomes an important
medium for increasing personal welfare. Since the
public choice approach proceeds from the assumption
that a diversity of individual preferences needs to be
matched by a diversity of goods and services, it is
assumed that the citizen is informed of the alternative
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packages available. In a purely competitive market
organization, the interests of the individuals and
society would be attained by making use of profit and
loss incentives based on the price mechanism, and by
suitably selected means for income distribution
(Lefeber,l975, p.286). In political systems, it has to
be expressed through voting and other political
activities - lobbying, petitions, public inquiries,
opinion polls, demonstrations and so on.
The "economic" approach to decentralisation,
has on the face of it a number of attractions. In
particular, it may be seen as being strongly linked to
the issue of economic development, in two important
respects. First, there is the well-known argument put
forward a number of years ago by the economist H.
Myint, that LDCS are simply "too poor to put up with
any preventable waste of resources". Any system which
promises increased efficiency in this respect, and a
reduction in bureaucratic wastages, will be seen as
having a number of advantages in the present-day
economic and political climate, Secondly, the emphasis
in the economic approach, on providing people with
information, improved choice, and hence a higher level
of welfare, may be seen as offering a counterbalance to
development approaches from the top downwards, which
have not in the past always delivered what people want,
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at the right time, place, and price. I have not in this
thesis, however, looked in detail at the economic
approach in terms of fieldwork, or from a broader
philosophical viewpoint. This is because on closer
examination, the economic issues discussed above are
complex and difficult to evaluate. In particular in a
poor Third World nation where the market system
operates imperfectly, it is not easy to apply the
economic approach. Some of the ideas implicit in the
approach, however, may produce results, such as the
need to improve local planning skills and the stress on
participation and choice in development. These aspects
are important for economic management at the local
level, and can be incorporated within the liberal
approach to local administration, which is the one used
in this thesis. For example, some economists have used
fiscal figures as a measure of the degree of
centralisation/decentralisation. This approach was used
by Oates in the early 1970's (Oates, 1972). Local and
municipal expenditures have been measured in relation
to central government expenditures to assess the degree
of centralisation. The extent to which local government
revenue is independent of central government transfers
is also important in this respect. Simple measures of
this type, associated with an economic approach, can be
brought into the liberal democratic approach which is
the underlying analytical framework of this thesis.
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2.1.2 Marxist Interpretations
In recent times, Marxist writers have offered
increasingly more complex explanations of the state at
subnational levels. They have concentrated efforts on
aspects such as capital reproduction, collective
consumption and the interests of the working class in
local government. In my opinion these interpretations
are more related to industrialised and urban western
societies. It is not easy to assess their relevance to
peasant communities in the Third World.
The Marxist approach argues that democratic
ideology requires majoritarian government at the local
level. Theoretically this should place local power in
the hands of the numerically predominant class, and
local authorities should come under the control of
political parties representing this class interest. In
theory this should increase the responsiveness of the
government to local problems, like the basic needs
requrements of the poor, and issues of increased income
and employment. These same issues can be addressed in
the liberal democratic approach. In this thesis, too,
Marxist influences are reflected in that we have tried
to assess the degree to which powerful classes and
elites may attempt to capture the benefits of
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decentralisation. This is a line of thought which
follows directly on from Marxist philosophy.
However, as Smith (1985, p.37) argues that the
main theoretical advances associated with the Marxist
approach have resulted from the attempts to identify
the specific roles of the local state, and to integrate
these into a dialectic of intergovernmental relations.
This is a large theoretical area and may be considered
as a separate approach for purposes of the study of
decentralisation. It is discussed briefly in the next
section.
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2.1.3 Intergovernmental Relations
The local state cannot be separated from the
national economy. In the case of decentralisation
policy the functional relations between central and
local governments, therefore, become important. Rhodes
maintains in his "Partnership Model" of
intergovernmental relationships, that central and
local governments are co-equals. He empasizes the role
of joint actions in national development. Smith argues
that the local state, acting as the political agent in
the provision of roads, water supplies, energy,
communications, physical planning and urban
redevelopment, blurs the dual-state distinction. In
practice, state functions take place in a central -
local continuum. The degree of decentralisation varies
in this continuum (Vieira, 1966; Smith, 1980).
Decentralisation relates to functions and powers.
Legislation and constitutional measures change the
level of decentralisation in the state. Smith (p.40)
maintains that this perspective on the state at the
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local level, requires a new interpretation of
intergovernmental relations, one that offers an
explanation of centralisation in terms of class
interests and conflicts and moves away from seeing
different levels of government as cohesive forms of
authority in conflict with each other, independently of
the interests represented and in conflict at each
level. Centralisation has been interpreted as a
reflection within the state apparatus of the needs of
monopoly capitalism.
In his later work (1986), Rhodes modified his
earlier view that local governments are field agents or
equal partners with central government, and suggested
that governmental organizations are in fact
interdependent. He maintains that there is a set of
organizations at the national level serving the
interests of local government and it is as important to
understand the relationships between those
organizations as it is to explore the role of any
particular organization. Local government professions
have close ties with their appropriate central service
department, for example, education, health, and fire.
These networks are the channels of communication.
Changing relationships within the local government
system are moulded by central intervention. The
relationship between the central and local government
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is not so much a variety of relationships, but
rather relationships between a constitutionally
superior and its subordinate, in which the centre has
differential disposition and ability accross different
services and activities, to set parameters which vary
in their tightness and consequently varying in the
discretion they permit (Rhodes,1986 quoting Page, E.,
1983). When levels of local government are embedded in
complex networks, the scope for unilateral influence
upon the policy process is limited.
Dunleavy maintains the pluralist's view of
national and local politics, that governmental
institutions are responsive to the wishes of citizens
through the mechanisms of representative government,
such as electoral competition an extensive interest
group process, and the safeguards built into the
recruitment and socialisation of political leaders.
Political power is concentrated in the 	 hands of
elected officials, who themselves operate in legally
defined contexts (Dunleavy, 1980, p. 116). He argues
that the survival of local government is an unintended
by-product of the development of liberal democracy,
which	 retains the potential for furthering social
change favourable to working class interests.
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There are, however, methodological problems
in measuring decentralisation within the state
machinery with a high degree of precision (Fesler,
1965). The first is linguistic - the definition of
centralisation and decentralisation tends to
dichotomize our thinking. The second is a problem of
measurement and the inherent weakness of indices of
decentralisation. The third is the problem of
differentiating in terms of decentralisation between
the regions of a single country. An obvious test of
decentralisation relates to the functions and powers
of subordinate governments. Delegation of authority,
revenue-raising power, economic dependency, the size of
the area under jurisdiction, and party politics may
form some interesting areas in which to consider the
extent of decentralisation in a state. In this context,
grants dependency may not always be contradictory to
decentral isation.
This thesis has not aimed for an indepth study
of the issue of intergovernmental relations. Emphasis
has been placed in this research, on the study of a
particular level of local government which has already
been given, in theory, substantial power and authority.
The main objective of the thesis was to see whether in
practice the local administration which emerged has
helped to build participatory institutions, to the
37
benefit of the disadvantaged people in the rural areas.
The liberal democratic approach was felt to be both a
more appropriate theoretical basis, and an approach in
which the empirical demands were more manageable. It
was not possible to carry out the type of detailed
investigation of the workings of the central and local
administrations, required for a full study of
intergovernmental relations. Nevertheless the
intergovernment approach is one which has merits, and
could be incorporated in a future wider programme of
research on decentralisation.
2.2	 Local Government and Liberal Democracy
For policymakers, perhaps the most
straightforward and democratic manner of making public
policy is to follow public opinion. Edward and
Sharkansky argued that the policyinakers:
twould base their decisions on the preferences of the
majority. This would require that the public actually
have policy preferences and that its preferences be
discernible to policyinakers; it would also require that
policymakers be willing to follow public opinion and
that the views held by the public not be moulded by
policymakers" (Edward & Sharkansky, 1978, p.17).
Decentralisation works only if individual
private and institutional decision-makers can be
induced to behave voluntarily in a way that is
consistent with social welfare criteria (Lefeber,1975).
In other words, conditions must be created to make it
desirable for participants to act in the social
interest. The aims of participatory organizational
democracy are to enlarge the roles that individuals can
play and extend the degree of autonomy that they can
enjoy (Smith, 1988, p.192). Greater control over and
responsibility for one's work is assumed to enhance
satisfaction and develop the capacities of the
individual. Haynes (1987, p.13) argues that
accountability is associated with democratic control.4
Control by locally elected representatives is central
to the concept of local self-government. Local self-
government in that sense, implies some degree of local
autonomy and local responsibility.
There are two major categories of opinion in
respect of local government through a liberal
democratic system - (a) that which claims local
government is good for national democracy, and (b) that
which emphasizes the benefits of local democracy to the
economic and socio-political well-being of the people
within the local government area. These categories are
interrelated. Some see local government and local
democracy as the appropriate means of administration
under a democratic national government. Indeed those
who believe in stronger local government regard it as a
necessary condition for a healthy national democracy.
These views date back to the l940s, l950s and early
1960s, and are reflected in present trends and
practices, despite mixed results in practice.
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2.2.1 Training for Political Leadership
The traditional arguments for local government
can be summarised as i) local knowledge for local
affairs ii) ready contacts between representatives,
administrators and people iii) the development of a
training ground for representatives.and electors alike
in • the realities of democratic government (Maddick,
1963, p.58). Maddick observes that for the benefits of
development to accrue to a large number of people, the
real requirement is ittO develop citizenship in economic
and administrative sub-states as a condition of
ensuring that the conduct of the states within the
state will work approximately in public interest."5
Smith (1985, pp.20-23) sees that local elections and
the continuing process of local politics between
elections, as generating political information. Local
government provides a valuable training ground for
national legislators. Democratic decentralisation of
national administration thus contribute to 'the
• breeding of better societies' and the establishment of
social harmony, community spirit and political
stability.
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2.2.2 Citizen Participation and Political Equality
Local democracy contributes to political
equality and greater participation, which means greater
political equality. Participation at the local level
secures a greater measure of political equality than
politics at the national level. Local government is
said to reflect and be a continuation of a prior and
more natural form of democracy than national democracy.
Studies of local government, however, suggest
that decentralisation too often stresses its virtues as
a training ground in democracy and representative
government, and too rarely indicate how privilege and
exploitation can be maintained and strengthened through
local politics. Decentralisation is too readily
transformed into a value in its own right by romantic
idealization.6
2.2.3 Democratic Accountability
There is some truth in the proposition that
local democracy provides for greater accountability and
control than field administration, public corporations
or appointed agencies. The processes involved in local
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government make accountability more meaningful because
of the elective element linking bureaucrat and citizen.
The political activities inherent in local government -
elections, rule making, political pressure, publicity
and public debate close the gap between the citizen and
the administration and provide opportunities for
grievances to be aired and wrongs remedied.
2.2.4 Government Responsiveness to Local Demands
Local government is responsive to what people
demand. In this sense, it is an efficient way of
managing local affairs and providing local services.
Local opinion acts "more forcibly" on local
administrators when their authority depends on the will
of the local public.
Local knowledge and information are seen as
prerequisite of responsiveness and flexibility in the
determination of local priorities. Central government
is generally based on functional specialization and
departinentalism. Sectorally based development is often
followed, which lacks inter-departmental or inter-
sectoral functional coordination. In contrast to this,
the mixture of services and functions required at local
or sub-state levels varies from community to community.
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The democratic practice of decentralisation accelerates
a two-way flow of information between the local
government and the local people, and thus favours the
local development process.
44
2.3	 Some Comments on the Ap plicability of Liberal
Democracy in Third World
In the context of Third World nations the
argument is that democracy, as an alternative to
bureaucracy, will provide better results. International
bodies have stressed the need for greater democratic
reforms in the Third World to make public
administrators directly accountable to the people.
Democratic decentralisation is viewed as an alternative
to bureaucracy. It is sought as a remedy for the
congested, ponderous and inflexible decision-making
characteristics of large, centralised bureaucracies in
the states of the Third World (Smith, 1988, p. 214).
This leads on to questions about the forms of
democracy and democratic institutions to be adopted at
national and local levels. Direct democracy in
practice, is to be found virtually nowhere in the Third
World at present, whereas representative democracy is
well-accepted in western developed nations. 7 The norm
of democratic practice is to rely on inajoritarian
consent but the practice of democracy in poor Third
World nations, varies greatly, according to the
character of the national leaders. Democracy, it is
argued, does not always correspond with the concept of
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the nation state. There are differences of opinion as
to democratic consent translates into the actions of
the public administrators and representatives.8
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2.4 A Working Hypothesis for the Present Research
Decentralisation cannot work in isolation. It
performs in the continuum of centralisation -
decentralisation. In this continuum, the degree of
decentralisation varies depending on different
factors. 9 Drawing up a working hypothesis on
decentralisation is not easy, because of the
diversification which charaterises the concept and
practice of decentralisation in development
administration.
The real world situation, however, suggests
that decentralisation works better in nanaging the
local problems, because of the closeness of the
government to the people. The benefits of
decentralisation, however, may not be perceptible in a
short period. Moreover the success of decentralisation
is likely to depend more on the political will of the
national government, than on the decentralised
institution itself. The hypothesis which inforiis the
work of this thesis is that given political will in
the national government, decentralisation will help
create more democratic/participatory local
institutions. The benefits of such local institutions,
however, may well be difficult to attain in the short
run.
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3.1	 Introduction
Empirical studies of developing nations suggest
that the experience of decentralisation in the Third
World is diverse. In the last two decades, many Third
World countries have adopted different forms of
decentralisation :- deconcentration, delegation,
privatisation and devolution.
Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984) found that:
"Some governments have used all four types,
simultaneously or at different times. Some began with
one approach and later shifted to another after
assesing initial results. Other governments have used
various combinations of the four. A number of countries
have devolved development management responsibilities
to local governments but have maintained strong
indirect controls over them. Privatization has usually
evolved from situations in which private sector firms
began offering goods and services that government
provided poorly, or not at all, or only in some parts
of the country, rather than from deliberate efforts by
governments to divest themselves of public functions."
Relatively few developing nations, in practice,
have regarded a decentralised administration as a way
of achieving national development goals. Few prefer
democratic local institutions. Glynn Cochrane (1983)
argues that most developing countries have instead
highly centralised governments, that concentrate on
their role in development, in isolation from local
government.1
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Decentralisation became a policy objective
particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, as governments
in LDC5 sought to create more socially equitable
patterns of economic growth, to meet the basic needs of
the poor (Rondinelli 1983, World Bank 1983). The
international donor agencies have also argued that the
ability of rural communities to influence the
priorities of public agencies and to obtain efficient
services, depends on effective local organisation. 2 The
former World Bank President Robert S. McNamara3
 noted
in this context that:
"If governments are serious about distributing the
benefits of development more equitably, then experience
shows that there is a greater chance of success if
institutions provide for popular participation, local
leadership and decentralisation of authority."
But the degree to which power and
responsibility for planning and administering
development activities has in practice been transferred
from central government agencies to other
organisations, is limited. This chapter examines
briefly	 some	 Third	 World	 experiences	 of
decentralisation policies.
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3.2	 Some Third World Experiences of Decentralisation
Policies
3.2.1 East and North African Ex,eriences
In East Africa, decentralistion policies were
promulgated widely during the 1970s, most notably in
Kenya, Tanzania and Sudan. Nevertheless the development
planning and administrative system of these countries
remains in practice highly centralised (Rondinelli,
Nellis and Cheema, 1984). Rondinelli (1983) claims that
the success of decentralisation in East Africa depends
on finding ways of increasing local resources, through
intergovernmental transfers, or by assisting
communities at the local level to raise the revenues
needed to carry out their new responsibilities.
The East African case also illustrates the
importance of creating environmental conditions
conducive to decentralised governance. Improvements in
the physical infrastructure are essential for effective
participation in the developmental process through
decentralised institutions.
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During the l970s, there was also a growing
realization in North African countries that
centralised policies had not brought any improvement
in output or distribution, and had not contributed to
administrative efficiency (Nellis, 1983, p.140). By the
end of the 1970s, the international aid agencies, North
African intellectuals, opposition politicians, and
middle - and low - level field bureaucrats in Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, had coalesced informally
into an increasingly vocal lobby for the presumed
benefits of decentralisation. However, this lobby has
nowhere succeeded in overcoming the forces supporting
centralised rule.
Nellis (1983) maintains that it would be unwise
to	 discount	 entirely	 the	 prospects	 for
decentralisation. Empirical study by Rondinelli, Nellis
and Cheema (1984, p.34) shows in the case of Algeria,
Libya and Tunisia that :
"... the performance and impact of decentralised
administrative units have been positive in some cases,
but have not always matched the goals of
decentralisation policies. Control over financial
resources continues to be centralised; local and
regional organizations continue to have severe
shortages of qualified personnel, and they lack the
capacity to carry out the responsibilities transferred
to them."
Their empirical study, however, shows that
despite the slowness with which it has come about,
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decentralisation has increased the access of local
communities to centrally controlled resources in
Morocco.
Other countries have also
	 attempted
decentralisation in national development
administration. In Ghana, neither central nor regional
bureaucrats have given decentralisation full political
support : those at the centre evidently are reluctant
to accept any diminution in their decision making
powers, while regional officials show signs of wanting
to retain control over their own field officers
(Tordoff, 1980 p.387).
Long delays in setting up local government may
be the result of a lack of political commitment to new
structures. Cautiousness in implementation, staff
shortages, the uncertainty of benefits, and retention
of central control over finances are found in many
countries in Africa. In Nigeria, local governments have
been able to undertake a large number of projects.
Inadequate release of allocated funds, however, has
ultimately been a major problem. Often the funds that
are allocated to local governments are not all
distributed. And constant delays in delivering those
funds force local governments to slow down construction
or to cancel some projects entirely (Idode,1980).
54
3.2;2. Tanzania's Experience of Regionalism
Since 1967, Tanzania has attempted a complete
break with the institutional legacies it inherited at
Independence. Most important in this context has been
the attempt to create an extensive, disciplined, and
ideologically committed political party from the apex
of the political system down to the grass roots, for
the purpose of mobilising the country's population to
achieve socialist development, thus increasing their
participation in the governance of their society. 4 This
has resulted in the sub-ordination of all other
institutions, especially the administrative agencies of
the Tanzanian government, to the authority of the
party; and the public takeover and constriction of the
private sector of the economy (Barkan,l984, pp. 10-13).
The country has sought to reduce systematically and
eventually to :eliminate, inequalities between
individuals of different soc jo-economic status or
class, and between the residents of those rural areas 	 -
that are already moderately developed and integrated
into the national economic system, and resident of
those that are not, in order to achieve a classless and
less exploitative society.
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Tanzania is divided into 20 administrative
Regions, of which 19 are rural and only one, Dar es
salam, is urban. A Region is divided into Districts,
which are further divided into Divisions and Wards. The
Ward is the smallest administrative unit, usually
comprising of 3-5 villages. Dodoma is the capital, but
Dar es Salaam is the chief commercial and industrial
centre of the country.
In 1972, an administrative reorganization took
place and under this policy, the decentralisation of
administration created a strong impetus to regional and
rural development planning in Tanzania. The new
administrative changes aimed at giving the local people
more power in decision-making in matters affecting
their welfare. 5 Planning offices were established both
in the regions and districts. This entailed posting
senior officers in the regions and districts to speed
up decision-making and improve local representation.
In the mid-seventies, however, it became clear
that the decision-making power in the local
representative bodies was severely limited. There was
too much centralisation of power in the regions, as
opposed to the districts. As a result, in 1982, an Act
of Parliament was passed reintroducing local government
institutions. These had greater decision-making power
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at the local level, including that of revenue
collection. In the same year, another Act was passed,
reintroducing cooperative unions. It has been evident
that the role of cooperative unions in popular
participatory decision-making, has been very
significant indeed.
As a result of decentralisation policy,
regional rural integrated development plans (RIDEP)
have become a common annual feature of rural
development in Tanzania. The Prime Minister's office
(PMO) is the coordinating and supervising office of all
rural development activities in the regions. The RIDEP
strategy was designed to overcome the tendency to treat
regional development as secondary to centrally-
initiated and managed development. In the past,
Ministries had a clear advantage over the regions, in
securing funds from donor agencies and countries for
regional projects. Donor agencies and countries
prefered working with national institutions, rather
than with regional authorities. Regional projects,
which were usually small, had little appeal for them.
With the RIDEP policy, however, PMO hoped that donors
would be interested in financing development projects
which were identified and implemented by the regional
authorities in collaboration with the rural people. The
RIDEP strategy was designed to enable regions to secure
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funds for large-scale, multisectoral development
projects which would bring about the improvement of the
quality of life of the rural people.
At the time of the launching of the
decentralisation programmes, the govermnent committed
itself to the recommendation of the management
consultants, McKinsey Inc., that Regions should be
allocated 40 percent of the national development
budget. 6
 But in practice that target was never
achieved. The highest expenditure ever attained by the
Regions was 17.2 percent in 1975/76. Although some
commentators on Tanzanian development blame the
national leadership's lack of commitment to the
original Mckinsey recommendation, or even their
commitment to rural development for this poor
performance, one plausible explanation is that the
original target was too high (Ngasongwa, 1988). It can
be argued that this target was arrived at somewhat
arbitrarily, since there were no useful data on which
to gauge past expenditure trends in the Regions.
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3.2.3.	 Development from the Middle : The Unhappy
Experience of Paua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea inherited at Independence, a
strong centralised bureaucracy. The designation
'bureaucratic polity' was apt (Tordoff, 1987). After
Independence in 1975, the national government adopted
some objectives which emphasized increased self-
reliance, greater inter-regional and inter-personal
equality, and a decentralisation policy in government
decision-making.
Between 1976 and 1978, Papua New Guinea
devolved to provincial governments full legislative and
management responsibilities, for a wide range of local
functions, and considerable responsibility for others
that were concurrent local-national functions.
(Rondinelli and Nellis,1986, p.8). In each province an
elected assembly and executive council, headed by a
Premier, were given control over a wide range of
matters. Under the new system, the provincial
governments could levy and collect taxes. In addition,
they received refunded revenues from licenses, fees and
royalties collected by the national government in the
provinces, and a 'derivative grant' equivalent to 1.25
percent of the value of export goods produced in the
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province. Moreover, provincial governments received an
annual unconditional grant from the national government
to offset administration costs of functions devolved to
them (unconditional grants are mainly used to construct
and maintain public works). Conditional grants were
also available for the functions which were previously
the jurisdiction of the national government, such as
the general hospitals, now managed by the provincial
governments. Since 1979, sectoral programmes in health
and education have been added to provincial
responsibilities.
Devolution in Papua New Guinea indicates that
the introduction of provincial government has increased
participation in government and provided a much greater
opportunity for people to participate in decision-
making in their own areas (Conyers,l98l, p.223). The
policy of devolution created 19 provincial governments,
which improved the planning, management and
coordination capacity of provincial
administrators and also attracted skilled professionals
to return to work in their provinces.
Devolution has been, however, less successful
in ameliorating provincial inequalities and disparities
in levels of development (Hinchliffe, 1980).
Decentralisation has weakened the central government's
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ability to stimulate the country's economic growth. The
provinces lack local sources of revenue, and per capita
administrative costs are high because of the need to
create new public services. Tordoff (1987) found that
there had been financial mismanagement in the
provinces. For these reasons provincial governments
have been suspended on a number of occasions. Tordoff
maintains that the present arrangements are
unsatisfactory, both in monitoring provincial
performance, and in helping provinces to improve their
financial management capacity, the planning and
preparation of projects, and general administration.
National agencies have often failed to consult
provincial governments about projects to be undertaken
in the provinces. Audit reports have been delayed
because of staff shortages in the Auditor General's
department, and provincial annual reports have not been
analysed by the Department of Provincial Affairs at the
centre.
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3.2.4. Devolution in Latin America
Experts suggest that decentralisation of
government administration in Latin America is a complex
and multifaceted issue. Harris (1983) indicates that
the proliferation of public corporations, and quasi-
public institutes in Latin America have in practice
expanded the power and control of the national
government, at the expense of local governments. He
argues that the concentration of decision-making within
central government ministries, often referred to as
overcentralisation, is a fundamental characteristics of
Latin American governments. The study by Harris
indicates that contradictory forces work within the
political system, particularly in the bureaucracies,
and strong centralising tendencies coexist with certain
forms of bureaucratic decentralisation.
The tendency of national bureaucrats in
developing countries is to retain power in their own
hands. They prefer central decision-making. Subnational
and local units of administration either become
powerless, or have only partial authority in
governmental decision-making. In the case of Latin
America, an inflexible bureaucratic structure has
required the creation of more flexible forms of
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organization and management, modelled quite often on
those of the private sector, particularly for
government activities that parallel or substitute for
private enterprise.
In recent time, nearly all larger countries in
Latin America, and in particular Argentina, Brazil and
Venezuela, have emphasized regional deconcentration of
traditional ministries and autonomous administrative
entities. Venezuela's regionalization reforms are the
most ambitious. They seek to establish a new level of
government that can plan and coordinate the activities
of all government units within each region. Argentina
offers an interesting example of the devolution of
functions to provincial governments. It has transferred
the responsibilities of public health, education,
public utilities and public works to the provincial
governments. It is also in the process of transferring
federal personnel, facilities and equipments to the
provinces. Bolivia has adopted the policy of delegation
in its development administration (Rondinelli & Nellis,
1986, p.8).
Whatever form of decentralisation policy is
adopted, Harris (1983) maintains that because of the
dominant centralising tendency and premature
bureaucratization of the Latin American political
63
systems, the prospects in general are not very
favourable for successful implementation. It is
expected, however, that the influence of the
international agencies, and recent efforts to promote
integrated rural development, may pave the way for
greater political and administrative decentralisation.
There is also the possibility of more rapid transition
to democratic forms of governance.
In Latin America, Mexico probably has the
largest number of autonomous government agencies. The
Mexican federal government has created an expanding
array of public corporations, mixed enterprises with
both state and private capital, marketing boards,
credit and loan institutions, research organizations,
state holding companies, social service agencies,
educational institutions, and regional development
commissions. These agencies widely vary in size. The
federal government groups them into two categories :
decentralised organizations and parastatal enterprises.
There are over 100 decentralised organizations
including the giant state petroleum corporation,
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and over 400 parastatal
enterprises which include banks, hotels, industries,
airlines, mines, insurance companies, construction
companies, the national telephone company, newspapers,
television channels, and so on (Harris, 1983). The
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parastatal enterprises operate under commercial law
much like private corporations, except that they have
government representatives on their governing boards.
The decentralised organizations have their own legal
personality, property, funds and special governing
boards, but they fall under special provisions of
administrative law. However, current administrative
reforms in Mexico are attempting to consolidate and
reduce the number of autonomous agencies and to place
them under the supervision of a federal ministry.
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3.2.5.	 Decentralisation as Bureaucratic Instruments :
the Experience of Asia
In most Asian countries, local governments
still function as bureaucratic instruments of the
central government, rather than as generators of
alternative values, preferences, and aspirations. Local
organizations cannot easily nurture political or
administrative goals. They act merely to extend
centrally established priorities and controls. Friedman
(1983) argues that local leaders are seen by central
government officials as communicators and solicitors of
support for national policies, rather than as channels
through which the conditions and needs of local
communities are made known to central planners and
policy makers, or as mobilizers of local resources for
promoting development from the 'bottom up'.
Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984) observe
that despite the apparent concern for decentralisation
in South and South-East Asia, the results have often
led to greater dependence of local administrative units
on the centre. They maintain that innovative
decentralisation programmes have been centrally
created,	 and not linked to established local
organizations and sources of political and financial
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support. Authority is commonly delegated to local
organizations, but they are not given the resources to
perform their new functions.
In Malaysia, nearly all extension, irrigation,
health, education, and land development activities and
some credit processing and marketing functions are
provided in rural areas through the staff of central
and state departments at district level. Similar
functions are performed by field officers of central
ministries or by subnational. units of the central
administration in the Phillii,ines, Sri Lanka and
Turkey . Provincial administrators in Indonesia help
develop subnational programmes for agriculture, public
works, and rural finance; formulate district
development plans; play a major role in setting local
tax rates; and provide irrigation and extension
services. In Thailand, the Rural Employment Generation
Programme (REGP) was found to be very successful in the
province of Lampang, but not as successful elsewhere
(Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984, p.36).
In Pakistan, the Integrated Rural Development
Programme (IRDP) in Manwala Markaz and Harrappa Markaz
was found to be very successful (Rondinelli, Nellis and
Cheema, 1984). In both areas, the Markaz Councils were
active and they formulated and carried out local
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development projects. The number of Markaz increased
over the years. The provincial governments provided
much of the financing for local projects, but in each
Markaz the people themselves made a contributions.
However, local representatives of the national
ministries lacked the capacity to coordinate their
agencies' activities and received little encouragement
from their national headquarters to do so. Khan (1982)
maintains that much of the success of the IRDP
programme was attributable to the project managers'
extraordinary personal ability to get local leaders to
work together on self-help projects for which
guidelines were clear and funds were readily available.
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3.3 Comments on Decentralisation in Practice
While decentralisation is often justified as a
way of effectively managing national economic
development, Third World nations rarely embark on a
course of decentralisation primarily for economic
reasons. Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984) observe
that decentralisation is ultimately an ideological
principle, associated with objectives of self-reliance,
democratic decision-making, popular participation in
government activities and accountability of public
officials to citizens. As such it is pursued as a
desirable political objective in itself.
Although a policy of decentralisation aims to
solve problems at both national and local levels, there
are difficulties in designing and implementing such a
policy. Empirical studies indicate that even where
programmes have been relatively successful, not all of
the anticipated benefits have accrued either to central
or to local administrative units. Difficulties
originate in national political objectives, and
recurrent political conditions. The policy of
decentralisation is ultimately a reflection of
country's political process.
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The constraints of decentralisation in
developing countries may also be viewed in the light of
complexities in the process of implementing
decentralisation policies, such as:
- the perspective from which a particular programme
or process is viewed (political objectives
often lead to economic failure);
- the relationship between the formulation of
policies or plans, and their implementation;
- the characteristics of the substantive area in
question ( the geographical area of a
decentralised administrative unit, may not
form a rational basis for successful operation of
decentralised functions);
- the nature of the functions which may or may not
be decentralised; and
- the structure of the institutions to be
considered for decentralised functions.
There are other complexities, such as the
relationships between centralisation, decentralisation
and political power, and their implications for popular
participation. Apthorpe and Conyers (1982) argue that:
".. the strong tend to centralise in their own hands as
much power as they can; they then delegate to the weak
only as much power as they must. In this perspective,
centralisation and power of the key agent are assumed
to coincide, and concentration of information flow and
decision-making responsibilities means both power and
central isat ion."
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They further maintain that :
".. although power can affect central control, the
reverse holds to a much lesser extent. Thus
centralisation does not necessarily enhance or even
maintain the key agents in power. Increased
centralisation will not necessarily help the decision-
makers to get more."
The implementation of a successful policy
requires the interaction and coordination of a large
number of public organisations at different levels of
government, complementary actions by nongoverninent
organisations and groups of intended beneficiaries
(Rondinelli and Cheeina, 1983 p.27). The effectiveness
in the implementation of decentralisation policies,
depends, they maintain on :
- the clarity and consistency of policy objectives,
and the degree to which they give
implementing agencies clear direction to pursue
activities that will lead to their achievement;
- the appropriate allocation of functions among
agencies, based on their capacities and
resources;
- the degree to which planning, budgeting, and
implementation procedures are standardised and
thereby minimise conflicting interpretations that
make programmes and policies difficult to
coordinate;
- the accuracy, consistency, and quality of
interorganisational communications that enable
organisations involved in policy implementation
to understand their roles and tasks and to
complement the activities of others; and
- the effectiveness of linkages among decentralised
administrative units that ensure interaction
among organisations and allow coordination of
activities.
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These conditions indicate that the successful
implementation of a decentralisation programme, depends
on the resolution of many conflicting issues between
the central and local governments. The impact of
decentralisation policy on development is weakened
where there is no strong national policy on
decentralisation, supported by political will and
commitment.
Despite its problems, the policy of
decentralisation has been in popular demand, both in
developed and developing nations. Rondinelli and Cheema
(1983, p.14) argue that :
".. the growing interest in decentralised planning and
administration is attributable not only to the
disillusionment with the results of central planning
and the shift of emphasis to growth-with-equity
policies, but also to the realisation that development
is a complex and uncertain process that cannot be
easily planned and controlled from the centre."
Smith (1985 p.2) argues in his work that the
need for some form of decentralisation appears to be
universal, and that even the smallest states have some
kind of local government with some degree of autonomy.
As the pressures f or larger organisational units,
national minimum standards and central planning
capabilities mount, so the concern for local autonomy
grows (Kuroda, 1975). We can presume that local needs
often outstretch local resources in both developed and
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developing societies, and that these needs are best met
through strengthening functional operation by local
institutions.
The attraction of decentralisation is not
merely that it is opposite to centralisation and thus
makes it possible to overcome the local problems.
Rather it is due to a the fact that decentralisation
has a positive side, and its values seem to have a wide
range of appeal, regardless of ideology and political
theory. It is associated with a wide range of economic,
social and political objectives in both developed and
developing societies. This includes the views of modern
institutionalists and Marxist intellectuals who
emphasize the role of state in administering
development through structural and procedural changes
in government administration.
The national governments in the Third World are
often accused of being psychologically and physically
remote from their people. A policy of decentralisation
it is claimed can bridge this gap and strengthen
national integration, political skills and
accountability. It can promote liberty, equality and
welfare (Hill, 1974), and therefore can be elevated to
the role of guardian of basic human values (Van Putten,
1971).
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Thus the popularity of a policy of
decentralisation among the national leaders in
developing countries, is influenced both by political
and non-political factors. In most cases, however, the
outcome of decentralisation policies has not been very
satisfactory. As Nellis (1983) observes,
decentralisation will continue to be seen as an
attractive goal, since it is an alternative
sufficiently vast and vague to appeal to everybody who
is dissatisfied with present events.
74
NOTES
1. See Cochrane, G. : policies for Strengthening
Local Government Policies in Developing
Countries, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 582
(Washington D.C. : The World Bank, 1983).
2. See USAID : Managing Decentralisation, Project
Paper (Washington D.C. : USAID, 1979).
3. See Rondinelli, D.A. : "Decentralisation of
Development Administration in East Africa" in
Cheeina, G.S. and Rondinelli, D.A. (eds.)
Decentralisation and Development (Beverly Hills :
SAGE, 1983).
4. For details, See Barkan, J.D. (ed.) : Politics
and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania (New York	 L
Praeger, 1984).
5. See Lundqvist, J. : "Tanzania : Socialist
Ideology, Bureaucratic Reality and Development
from Below" in Stohr, W.B. and Taylor, D.R.F.
(eds.) : Development from Above or Below? (London
: John Wiley, 1981).
6. See Thiele, G. : "The State and Rural
Development in Tanzania : The Village
Administration as a Political Field" in The
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 22 No. 3,
1986.
Chapter 4
EVALUATION OF DECENTRALISATION POLICIES
4.1 Criteria for Evaluating Decentralisation Policies
4.1.1 Achievement of Political Objectives
4 • 1 • 2 Administrative Effectiveness
4.1.3 Efficiency of Economic Management
4.1.4 Government Responsiveness to Local Needs
and Demands
4.2 Methodology Adopted in This Research to Evaluate
the Impact of the Current Practices of
Decentralisation Policy in Bangladesh
76
4.1 Criteria for Evaluating Decentralisation Policies
Evaluation of decentralisation is not an easy
task. There may be wide variations in evaluation
criteria, and in the methodology of evaluation) Vieira
has claimed that small scale community-based case
studies of specific countries, provide the best way of
evaluating the impact of decentralisation. This thesis
aims in this direction, with the field work which can
be found in Part III.
Nevertheless, the relationship between policy-
setting and policy implementation at the macro-level is
an important one. In particular, we may look at the
overall effects of decentralisation in four respects :-
a. the achievement of political objectives;
b. its administrative effectiveness;
c. its efficiency in terms of economic management; and
d. government responsiveness to local needs and
demands.
Self-determination, self-reliance, and the
appropriateness of the means by which policies and
programmes are designed and carried out, are further
criteria which could be adopted in evaluating
decent'ralisation policies. These are not, however,
given specific attention in this study, though in a
broader context they do illuminate the other aspects.
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4.1.1	 Achievement of Political Obiectives
One of the broad political objectives of
decentralisation policies in Third World is to gain the
people's support for policies and programmes undertaken
by the national government. In a politically turbulent
society, achievement of political stability becomes
a prime concern.
Politicians in Third World are aware that
centralisation frustrates the distribution of benefits
to the rural ivasses,and a good number of them consider
it politically expedient to strengthen local government
and thereby increase the ability of the centre to meet
rural needs. Cochrane (1983) maintains that local
governments are not included in national development
plans because politicians of the centre do not wish to
share their power or may even be anxious to avoid
empowering entrenched local elites. But interestingly,
even the most authoritarian military regimes, for
example, Nigeria and Pakistan that have guarded power
jealously, have also promoted local government reform.
When the national government looks to achieve
political support for-its policies and programmes,
through a local government system, the institutional
structure at local level must be assumed powerful and
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efficient, enough to carry-out political objectives.
Local institutions must also be democratic in order to
effect public participation. The logic of democratic
participation is that the state is subjected to popular
demands for public programmes and benefits. The more
social relations are democratised, the more rights of
participation are extended into different institutions.
Alford and Friedland	 (1985) maintain that citizens
come to demand participation not only in the selection. -
of candidates for public office but also in the
internal decision of public agencies.
It is difficult to evaluate how far
decentralisation achieves political support of the
population for the national government. The study of
public opinions and attitudes may be useful in this
respect. Mass communication media, such as newspapers,
television and radio programmes, political leaflets,
etc. may be effective in an evaluation. Participation
in elections launched for national and local
representation, opinion polls, referenda, public
debates and meetings form some useful ways of measuring
popular participation. A Study by Rogers describes
politicising developments in the village of Sungai Raja
in Malaysia, in the period 1966 and 1978.2 He examined
the continuity and change in the Malays' political
awareness, their concern about politics, their
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political participation and their political opinions.
It is, however, difficult to predict how much
political participation tells us about support for
national policies and strategies. Rogers' (1985) study
provides insights into the changing pattern of
political involvement in the rural Malay community. It
indicated that growing political participation of the
villagers increased their level of expectations. The
study showed that with the political support of the
population, the political party, the United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO), achieved political
dominance by institutionalising the party's control of
the government, and promoting programmes to raise the
Malays' standard of living. The UNNO endeavoured to
increase its political support by encouraging mass
membership, establishing the party as the key channel
for securing government aid, and by promoting political
participation within carefully prescribed and
controlled limits. It appears to have used its
extensive grass-roots organisations to develop a
subjective sense of participation, whilst in practice
denying the population any substantial influence on
public policy and administration.
Political participation does not always mean
support for national economic and social policies and
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objectives. In the Third World context, where among
other problems, large sections of the population are
not educated and culturally advanced, mere political
participation in limited political activities cannot be
justified as the support for complex national issues.
However, it is generally believed that a strong
institutional framework at local level, together with
policies for mass education, will create an environment
for better public knowledge and understanding on a
variety of national issues. "Democratic
decentralisation is said to contribute to the breeding
of better societies" (Sharpe, 1981).
Smith (1985) maintains that democratic
decentralisation contributes to the establishment of
social harmony, community spirit and political
stability. This embodies a vision of local government
as a political educator. Experience of local politics
enables people to choose leaders they can trust. Trust
in government is a necessary condition for stable
democracy.
Thus democratic decentralisation is generally
believed to contribute to political stability. Many
countries, however, can be identified that have
experienced political instability after a period of
active local government. It may be argued that their
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systems of local democracy were not functioning
properly. Had they done so, instability would have been
less likely to occur. Smith's observation in this case
is that we do not know what constitutes 'proper' local
government, and in what sense one system of local
government be said to be better than other system of
local government. He further argues that it is probably
impossible to single out the effect of local government
on national political stability, from the multitude of
other pertinent factors. The relationship between local
democracy and national stability can be only a matter
of faith.
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4.1 • 2	 Administrative Effectiveness
Third World countries often take it for
granted that the existing institutional capacity is
enough to administer new development programmes at the
local level. They take no steps to ascertain the
strength of institutional capacity. In many cases,
persons lacking even basic managerial skills, are
placed in very senior administrative positions, with
responsibilities for development. Berg (1971) argues
that :
"... a large increase in the size and character of the
tasks imposed on a weak administrative system does not
simply mean that the capacity to perform declines
marginally. Rather it tends to set into motion forces
that erode the whole decision-making machinery and
destroy the capacity to execute and control."
Nathur (1986) argues that	 funds meant for
various development schemes often remain unutilised,
simply because of administrative weakness to undertake
the required initiatives within the time available. The
United Nations adds in this context, that :
"the importance of public administration for
national development has been frequently stressed by
national and international entities, the measures taken
and resources available to effect improvement have
seldom been commensurate with what was needed and
possible ... The erroneous notion persists that the
cost of administration and even of administrative
improvement is intrinsically unproductive and
wasteful." 3
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There are those who would argue that the
effective constraint on development in Third World is
not technological or indeed even financial, but is
essentially organisational and administrative.
Emphasising the critical importance of management for
development, Ramphal declares that "development is all
management". Toulmin and Chandradhat (1967) maintain a
similar view. They argue that:
"Good public management ... is vital to development. If
other prerequisites are present to a sufficient degree,
and public management is generally good, then there
will be developmental progress. If, however, other
prerequisites are present but public management is
poor, there will be less progress and perhaps none at
all."
People communicate better with local officers,
than they do with visitors from the centre. 	 The man
on the spot can talk, can explain, can discuss, can
invite questions on government policies and clear up
difficulties. Devolution provides an opportunity to
have such officials available within local
institutions.
A clear job description for each person
involved in local administration is an important
prerequisite. Education and training are essential in
order to make staffs in local administration fully
aware and capable of their duties. In poor nations,
where the political situation is not stable, they
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require leadership qualities, moral courage and a clear
vision on rural/local development. Strong motivation
and commitment are required of local government staffs
working in local situations.
It is not easy to evaluate the impact of
decentralisation on administrative efficiency, in the
context of development. In the present research,
attention is largely focused on major issues such as
structural change, conflicts and corruption, and co-
ordination and co-operation in local administration.
Other related issues of administration may, however,
appear by way of discussion.
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4.1.3 Efficiency of Economic Management
The central rather than the local government,
has always been important for decision-making and
development planning within the nation-state in the
Third World. Cochrane (1983) argues that "much of the
literature on local government has little to say about
the development role of local authorities in the
achievement of national objectives or about the
prospects for expanding that role". One of the
serious threats to the successful reform of local
governments in developing countries is the politically-
motivated and too often poorly-planned decentralisation
exercises, that fail to provide sufficient resources to
enable local governments to meet local needs and fulfil
their aspirations.
Though governments in most Third World
countries, actively promote development, and while much
has been written on planning methods for development,
the administrative dimension for economic management
has remained until comparatively recently a neglected
area. But the issue of administration for development
has now begun to attract attention.
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Decentralisation offers the hope of opening up
the central bureaucracy, and giving more access for
the people to the government. It could even stimulate
the whole nation to participate in national development
plans. Mawhood (1984), however, points a different
picture :
"... experiments with local government that end in
chaos and bankruptcy; 'decentralised' structures of
administration that only act as a more effective tool
for centralising power; regional and district
committees in which government officials make decisions
while the local representatives sit silent; village
councils where local people participate but have no
resources to allocate. Too often the word seems to
convey only what the public relations department wants
it to mean".
!4awhood stresses that a decentralised local
body should have, among other characteristics, its
budget and the authority to allocate substantial
resources to carry out its functions. Along with
financial resources, the decentralised local
institutions also require staff resources for
diversified functions.
Writing from the donor perspective, on
institutional capacity-building at local level through
the Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP),
(Hanthantota district in Sri Lanka) Dale (1988) has
said that "a basic consideration behind all efforts at
promoting institutional capacity and competence has
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been to obtain the best possible fit between capacity
and competence and the work tasks at hand." It is
believed that this would increase the relevance and
efficiency of the institution building measures.
Conyers and Warren (1988) argue that "it is very
difficult, if not impossible, for IRDP5 to develop an
institutional base for local multi-sectorial planning
and implementation unless there is "meaningful"
decentralisation of government to the local level".
"Meaningful" decentralisation apparently encompasses
devolution of power to local bodies for controlling
financial resources,	 authority for 1Dolicy-makin on
local issues.	 -
Participatory decision-making produces a better
fit between what people want and what the development
agencies offer, and thus is more effective in
accomplishing the project goals. A study by Samuel Paul
(1983) showed that :	 -
"It is not uncommon that facilities and services are
created and offered to the people, who then fail to use
them satisfactorily. Drinking water supply schemes have
been set up, but the women, the traditional water
carriers, do not use the costly pumps installed by the
programme agency. Rural housing is often built which
people refuse to live in... This happens when decision-
making processes exclude the participation of those
affected".	 -
Mathur (1986) argues that the objective of
development, in the Third World context, is not just to
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expand material wealth; it must emphasise the
development of all men and women to their full
potential. 5 He indicates that the West is in no
position to provide an example of development to the
Third World. In the Third World even the undernourished
people still live by socio-cultural values which
technologically advanced societies have tended to
discard. Development goals should be defined by the
developing countries themselves.
Devolution favours a better distribution of
development over the national geographical area. An
integrated approach in development planning can
arguably be carried out through a decentralised
framework. Johnston and Clark (1982) maintain that
effective development strategies emerge from practical
knowledge of the problem situation.
Though it can be argued that decentralisation
is appropriate for economic management, and cost-
effective for development, this is difficult to
measure, especially where development programmes are
heavily dependent on public spending and subsidies, and
where public money is deliberately misused by the
dishonest and professionally unskilled civil officials.
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Quantitative analysis of the economic effects
of decentralisation is beyond the scope of most
researches. Instead the impact of local economic
management is evaluated in qualitative ways. These tend
to include the availability and allocation of resources
for development, the degree of inobilisation of local
resources for development, the identification and
distribution of development projects and schemes, and
the scope of villagers, particularly the rural poor, to
participate in the planning process.
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4.1.4	 Government Responsiveness to Local Needs and
Demands
Decentralisation means looking at local
problems more closely, and with a deeper understanding
of the needs and demands of the people. This study
assumes that in the Third World context, the needs and
demands of the people, particularly those of the rural
poor, can be seen in terms of "basic needs", food,
housing, clothing, primary health care, literacy and
access to the institutional process of development.
Theorists emphasise that crucial social objectives
(e.g., health care, education, safe water and
sanitation) are more likely to be met by government
investment in public goods which are targeted for poor
communities. 6 Weigel (1986) states that :
"the rationale behind the public goods approach is
based on the fact that the poor do not have sufficient
effective demand to stimulate the supply of these goods
through the market system."
Despite many problems associated with the basic
needs approach, many Third World nations have adopted
it as a major objective in their development programmes
over the years, and particularly in the last decade.
It is also significant to note that the policy of
administrative decentralisation in Third World nations
has frequently been targeted towards achieving such an
objective.
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The evaluation of decentralisation in relation
to such an approach is a difficult task because of
BNA's multiple objectives of public welfare. The
typology of basic human needs, shown in table 4.1
below, demonstrates the complexities of Basic Needs
Approach (BNA). 7 There is also no agreement regarding
minimum basic human needs, and of how to measure the
impact of BNA in a particular situation.
Despite many criticisms, however, BNA has a
special appeal to decision-makers and to political
leaders and administrators of Third World nations. Such
needs, in poor Third World countries, are perceived as
being mainly related to rural problems. It is also
likely that problems in congested and overcrowded urban
areas are also increasing because of the growing
pressure of migrants from rural areas, seeking
employment in urban areas.
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Table 4.1 : A typology of Basic Human Needs.
Core attributes Universal set of 	 Time-relative
of human life	 basic needs (BN)
	
BN bundle
Existence	 food,water, air, reten-
tion of body heat,
sleep,iuechanisiu for
coimnunal protection
Intelligenc communication,
informal education
Sociality freedom of expre-
ssion,freedoxn of
association
minimum nutrition,
safe water! sewerage,
primary health care,
shelter, clothing,
energy, transporta-
tion, municipal
protection,
national defence
basic education/
literacy, access to
uncensored infor-
mation media,
access to
contraceptive
technologies
absence of politi-
cal repression
Source :
	
Wiegel, 1986.8
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Many basic needs appear more urgent in periods
of crisis, from floods, cyclones, drought, and
political disturbances. There may be an economic
depression due to large-scale natural calamities, or in
consequence of some national or international crisis.
There are other issues, such as employment for men and
women in gainful activities, and welfare for the aged,
disabled and children. A balanced society also has
cultural needs to be met.
This study looks at how decentralisation can
respond to different local needs and demands. How can
local people influence local institutions, and
undertake measures to meet these needs? This is another
way of looking at the problem. By so doing we examine
the impact of decentralisation on the "satisfaction of
basic needs." This is, however, a vast area for
research. The present study selects some major aspects,
food, housing, clothing, health care, literacy, and
access for the rural people to information.
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4.2 Methodology Adopted in this Thesis to Evaluate
the Impact of the Current Practice of
Decentralisation Policy in Bangladesh
A holistic approach in social science
research, assumes that an understanding of a
programme's social and political context is essential.
for evaluation. Evaluators using qualitative methods
strive to understand programmes and situations as a
whole, and search for the totality, the unifying nature
of particular settings.9
The present research aims at a holistic
approach in dealing with the various issues of
decentralisation. It takes into account a wide range
of issues of local administration, socio-political
structures, and planning and decision-making for
economic management. The aim is to address diversified
local issues, solutions for which are sought in the
current decentralisation policy in Bangladesh.
Fieldwork was carried out in Bangladesh for a
period of five months, between November 1988 and April
1989. In Bangladesh, the winter months are generally
most suitable for fieldwork, though we remember the
warning by Chambers, that this may not be the season in
which rural deprivation will be most apparent.
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The research methodology adopted for Bangladesh
was as follows :
(a) A critical examination of available
literature on issues of decentralisation in Bangladesh.
(b) Documentary evidence from different sources
such as daily newspapers, weekly magazines, and
official reports. This helped in conceptualising
different issues associated with decentralisation
policy in Bangladesh.
(C) Personal interviews were conducted, in an
attempt to understand the complexities, performance,
problems and potential of the decentralised
institutions at Upazila level. The interviewees
included academics, bureaucrats at central and local
levels, reseachers in related fields, and many people
at local level. In addition, in order to find out about
the practice of planning and decision-making in the
"Upazila Parishad", regular monthly meetins of the
"Upazila Parishad" were attended by the researcher.
(d)	 Field data were collected through 2
questionnaires (Questionnaire A and Questionnaire B).
Questionnaires were pre-tested and edited before
preparing them for the final survey.
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It is important to note that care needs to be
taken in fieldwork to avoid what is called by Robert
Chambers, "survey slavery". It must be admitted that
there were difficulties in carrying out the fieldwork.
The research covered diversified issues, and answers
from the respondents were sometimes ambiguous. But in
the fieldwork, particular care was taken to avoid two
eventualities :- (a) the better off, influential and
corrupt-minded people might manipulate information in
their favour; and (b) the poor and less influential
might not freely express their views on their problems,
for fear of any unforeseen consequences.
Respondents were interviewed individually for
both Questionnaires. The interviewers who were employed
were all University-graduates, who were aware of the
problems. They were directed and supervised personally
by the researcher. The Questionnaires were administered
in Bengali, and the answers recorded in English. Copies
of the Questionnaires are in the Appendix.
Interviewers were expected to take time with the
respondents - half a day per respondent was not
unusual, and were instructed to avoid in terms of
appearance and attitude, the "urban" bias which
developmentalists have warned against.
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Our approach has been the sample survey
approach. We recognize that there are alternatives. For
example, we could have focussed on the detailed
workings of one or two local government units,
attending meetings, interviewing participants, and
evaluating outcomes. This methodology is particularly
suited to the approach outlined in Chapter 2, which
focuses on inter-organizational aspects of
decentralisation. It is a methodology with many
advantages, in particular in focusing on the practice
of decentralisation. It was not, however, the research
methodology adopted in this thesis - although the
researcher did attend Upazila meetings. The reasons why
it was not adopted are :
i) Because of the demands it makes on the
reseachers time and resources;
ii) Because of the wish to cover a wide
geographical area for research; and
iii) Because of the decision to canvass opinion
on decentralisation, as being a valid objective of
itself. The researcher was particularly interested in
distinguishing what the participants themselves felt
about decentralisation, in view of the controversy
surrounding the policy at the present time in
Bangladesh.
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With the above qualifications, I have
reasonable confidence in the empirical analysis, and
the findings of the fieldwork. It is prudent, however,
to be aware of the problems and potential pitfalls.
Questionnaire A
This survey was conducted among three major
categories of respondents :
(1)	 Administrators, i.e. the officers of
various	 government departments in the "Upazila
Administration";
(ii) Representatives, i.e. the Upazila
Chairmen, the Union Chairmen (elected representatives
to the "Upazila Parishad"), the nominated members of
the "Upazila Parishad" and the village members who
represent the "Union Council"; and
(iii) Local educated elites : political
leaders, lawyers, businessmen, contractors, doctors,
college and school teachers.
These respondents were interviewed at the
Upazila headquarters. The Questionnaire aimed to find
out if current decentralisation policy has favoured
institution-building at local level. The Questionnaire
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included questions on political, administrative, and
development planning aspects. The representatives from
different unions and villages were available at Upazila
headquarters on most the weekdays. The set of
Questionnaires was filled in by the researcher himself,
in view of the many complex issues of "Upazila
Administration".
questionnaire B
A similar approach was followed, with a
different set of Questionnaires, to study the impact of
decentralisation through "Upazila Administration", on
the satisfaction of basic needs in rural areas. The
respondents for this survey were different, and
included different income groups of village people. The
Questionnaire had questions on major "basic needs" -
food, housing and clothing; health care; literacy and
access to information on government policies, and
assistance during the natural disasters.
More information on the fieldwork is provided
in Part III of the thesis. It is necessary at this
stage to explain to the readers why this research has
not made more use of published data and documented
records. As a general explanation, in poor Third World
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nations like Bangladesh, there is an acute shortage of
relevant data for that type of research methodology.
There is also the problem of data reliability.
Moreover, decentralisation has been operational for a
relatively short duration, little detailed information
is available. These problems have been recognized by
other reseachers. For example, Huque's Ph.D. thesis on
local government reforms in Bangladesh was also obliged
to adopt a case study methodology in view of data
problems. However, in the present research, where
relevant data from secondary and documentary sources
were available, they have been used.
Finally, there is the question of research
methodologies which involve participant observation,
such as those associated with the study of inter-
governmental relations. It has already been argued that
the time and data demands of this approach, and the
desire for a wide geographical coverage ruled out its
use in the case of this thesis. There is, however,
another consideration. In the context of Third World
countries, it is difficult to retain objectivity,
reliability and neutrality. This has also been argued
by Mahbubullah (1987) in relation to village studies.
He does not support participant observation and
conscientization as a research methodology for village
studies. He argues that there is a tendency for the
101
researcher to interpret actions according to his or her
vision, notion and meaning. These research
methodologies suffer from subjectivity, and I have
concluded, would not be appropriate in this study of
decentralisation.
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5.1	 Local Self-Government in Ancient India
The concept of 'local self-government' is not a
new one for the people of the Indian Sub-continent.
From time immemorial, it was practised in different
regions of India, primarily to foster and perpetuate a
self-contained rural administration, but also for the
purpose of administrative convenience. Mukerjee (1974)
argues that :
tiThe ancient institutions when compared to the self-
governing institutions that existed in the British
period, and even in some respects when compared to the
institutions now obtaining in India, were more
widespread, more real and more successful.lt
A number of studies have provided elaborate
historical accounts of local self-government in India.
Included are those of Tinker (1968), Maddick (1970) and
Mukerjee (1974).1 Mukerjee maintains that in the
ancient past, because of the absence of good
communication systems, these institutions were self-
contained. They enjoyed power and authority in
resolving diversified local issues, with minimum state
interference. It is remarkable in this context that in
the distant past, when political conciousness was not
sufficiently developed, people living in isolated rural
areas could exercise their rights and privileges. In
spite of the existence of the caste system, the sense
of community was real and the village institutions
106
could function with the participation of the entire
village population. Certain duties and obligations
towards society, were recognised. Schools, water tanks,
charitable dispensaries and prayer places were
constructed and maintained, either by individual
efforts or by trusts (created by endowments of
religious minded people).
In ancient India people were organised into
village communities. Residents assembled at a village
meeting and transacted all affairs of administration.
The headman of the "village assembly" or "council of
elders" governed the administration with the consent of
the people. This village "panchayat" (Assembly) was
supreme in village administration as early as 400 A.D.
in the Maurya and Gupta periods. 2 It can be traced in
Bihar, Rajputana, Central India, Maharastra and
Karnatak. In the Maurya period in the 4th century, when
powerful empires were organised and the tendency was
for strong central governments, these village
institutions, particularly the system of rural justice
through village elders, was allowed to remain and
operate without interference.
In the Chola period (850-1200 A.D.), improved
methods of administration evolved in the light of
previous experiences. Justice was administered by
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regularly constituted royal courts, in addition to the
village courts and caste panchayats. The Cambridge
History of India confirms that in the Maratha period:
Despite its primitive character and its liability to
be improperly influenced, the panchayat was a popular
institution, and the absence of a decision by a
panchayat in any suit was almost regarded as complete
justification for a retrial of the issues. The fact
must be admitted that among themselves, within the
confines of the self-contained ancestral village, the
peasantry did obtain a fair modicum of rude justice
from the village panchayat".3
Elphinstone's Report, submitted to the Governor
General in October 1819, mentioned the "village system"
that existed in the Deccan during the 18th century :
"From whatever point of view we examine the Native
Government in the Deccan, the first and most important
feature is the division into villages or townships.
These communities contain in miniature all the
materials of state within themselves and are almost
sufficient to protect their members, if all other
governments are withdrawn".
The Report further mentioned that each village
had a portion of land exclusively set apart for the use
of the villagers. Land and cultivation were under the
management of the village and plots were clearly
marked. There were traders and artisans who supplied
necessities to the village people. There were also
certain village officers. The head of the village was
the most important functionary in the village. He was
the head of the police, of the administration, and of
justice. The headman allocated lands to the
108
cultivators, including those who had no landed
property. He fixed the rent and collected revenue on
behalf of the government. He also looked to the
improvement of cultivation and the prosperity of the
village.
The traditional self-government system,
however, was not free of problems. There was domination
in the system by the influential and elderly village
leaders. Mukerjee argues, nevertheless, that these
village institutions were able to maintain their
existence and even continued their activities until the
end of Mughal rule. 5 These indigenous institutions
gradually went into decay, side by side with the
consolidation of the British empire in India.
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5.2	 Decay of the Ancient Village Institutions During
the British Period
Why did village institutions, that had been
operating in many parts of India over hundreds of
years, start to decay after the establishment of the
colonial administration? There are four possibilities.6
First, the establishment of a well-organised
administration by the British brought even the remotest
village under its comprehensive machinery. The
provincial government, through its field officials,
controlled the entire region, and activities which were
formerly carried on by the villagers came to be
administered by the agents of government. Second, the
establishment of civil and criminal courts, with their
jurisdictions extending through the country, struck a
fatal blow at the most important function of the
village assemblies. Third, there was a rapid
improvement of communications which hastened the
transition. Fourth, the development of western
education slowly and almost imperceptibly, fostered an
individualistic tendency among the educated classes.
Over and above these factors, a major blow to
the village communities was the increasing demands for
revenues, by the central administration. And there were
urgent economic problems. No satisfactory industrial
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development took place until the middle. of the
nineteenth century, yet there was steady growth of
population. Agriculture was overburdened. Eventually
village industries were slowly extinguished in the face
of rising industrialisation. The self-contained rural
economy no longer existed. A large section of the
rural elite left the villages, and migrated in search
of employment. Rural health and sanitation were
neglected. The Zaminders (feudal lords) mostly lived in
the towns and rarely visited their ancestral homes.7
They were anxious only about their "annual booty", and
did nothing to improve village life.8
In these circumstances, village people depended
more and more on central governmental machinery.
Village life was dull, cheerless and a sense of
frustration prevailed. In Bengal, a large migration of
rural population took place, begining in the early part
of the present century, resulting in high
concentration of population in the industrial town of
Calcutta. The cumulative effect of these factors led to
the virtual collapse of the village system.
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5.3	 Attempts at Decentralisation During the British
Period
British colonial rule in India started with the
grant of the 'Dewani' of Bengal, Behar and Orissa to
the East India Company by Emperor Shah Alain II in
l765. Until 1793, however, there was no established
administrative system in India. Collection of land
revenue formed the chief, if not the only
administrative business during this period. In the
initial period of colonial rule, there was no
initiative to link village level communities through an
administrative mechanism. The indigenous forms of self-
government of the rural communities were left
unaltered. Blair maintains that :
"Hierarchical, top-down administrations sufficed in
pre-modern times, when rural life was for all practical
purposes autonomous and self-sufficient, and the
government's only interest in the countryside was to
collect revenue, prevent insurrection, and hold rural
banditry down to an acceptable minimum. Such was the
situation in the Mughal era and throughout most of the
British period." (1985, p. 1238).
As M. Ali (1983) argues, however, the major
factor during this period, bringing about the decay of
the rural self-contained communities, was the creation
of a feudal class (the Zaminders) by Lord Cornowallis
in 1793 by the Permanent Settlement Act.'° This Act
made increasing demands for revenue collection from
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rural areas. The self-governing nature of traditional
rural institutions was, therefore, no longer to remain
unaffected.
The first attempt to make the local authority
more capable of directing civic affairs, came in the
1840s, when the principle of election was introduced to
a very limited extent in the municipal administration
in Bombay. Tinker's (1968) study recorded that in the
late 1880s, every town of importance in India became a
municipality. Over time, the head of the municipalities
became elected persons. But the rural areas remained
far behind.
The most remarkable innovation proposed by Lord
Ripon in 1882 was the establishment of a network of
rural local bodies - six years before there were any
rural councils in England (Tinker, 1968). Ripon's
Resolution stated that the sub-district should form the
maximum area to be placed under a local board, the
district board was envisaged as a supervisory or co-
ordinating authority only. The Resolution outlined the
general principles which were to govern the future
development of local representative institutions :
"It is not primarily with a view to improvement in
administration that this measure is put forward and
supported. It is chiefly designed as an instrument of
political and popular education" (Tinker, 1968).
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The Resolution of 1882 also observed that as
education advances there is rapidly growing up all over
the country an intelligent class of public spirited men
who it is not only bad policy, but sheer waste of power
to fail to utilise. Tinker (1968) maintains in this
context that :
"It was necessary to provide an outlet for the
ambitions and aspirations which had been created by the
education, civilisation and material progress
introduced by the British."
Following the Ripon Resolution on local self-
government in India in 1882, some other Acts were
introduced by the British administration. In the
context of Bengal, the Bengal Local Self-Government Act
of 1885, the Bengal Local Self-Government (Amendment)
Act of 1908 and the Bengal Village Self-Government Act
of 1919 were the milestones for developing a local
administration, composed of publicly elected
representatives. M. Au (1983) observes that some basic
laws framed by the British administration gradually
helped the expansion of the administrative network down
towards the local level.
Until 1935, however, the central influence in
administrative decisions was still dominant. The Act of
1935 for the first time created a federal government in
India, at least in form, and distinguished between
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federal subjects, provincial subjects and concurrent
subjects. But, although in the provincial
administration (for transferred subjects), the central
government had no legal involvement, the Governor
General retained under this Act the special
discretionary power which foiled the formal
decentralisation of political and administrative
powers. M. Ali maintains that the conflicts between the
central and provincial authorities were perhaps a major
reason for a slow pace in administrative
decentralisation in the face of increased societal
demands from the growing population. He further argues
that local governments, which were popularly elected,
had no effective power. But as Tinker (1968) observes,
the Resolution of 1882 provided a wide scope for
democratic local government systems in India up to the
district level, and claims that it was the native
leaders and bureaucracy which failed to utilise that
opportunity.-1 In most of the provinces, the
bureaucrats retained the chairinenships of the district
and sub-district councils. Besides, there were communal
conflicts over the issue of representation in local
authorities. The situation was, however, better in
Bengal.
In local administration, the creation of
"divisional administration" by Lord William Bentick,
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was to supervise revenue administration, but it was
also given some discretionary power to control local
authorities. This disturbed the district level
authorities. Some argue that the functions of the
division could well be distributed between the central
and the district level authorities.
During the colonial period, the district
administration was the most powerful authority at local
level. The District Magistrate and the Collector were
symbols of awe and authority, and became institutions.
Although there was legal provision for elected chairmen
of both district and sub-district councils, in most
cases, the District Magistrate and the Collector took
the chair. The district administration had so much work
that there were hardly any meetings of the councils.
Also, the district officers hardly visited any villages
to observe village level activities. The Zaminders were
not sufficiently aware or interested to attend the
meetings of these councils, although they were
representative members.
Given the colonial context, however, some
aspects of the process of decentralisation during the
British administration may be better appreciated.
Colonial rule in India, at least in its latter stages,
was not intended to be permanent. Administrators were,
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therefore, motivated to retain some degree of
centralisation in administration. Perhaps too,
decentralisation in administration was not in high
demand at that time among the population. The concept
of popular participation in development administration,
for the benefit of the people, in the sense that we
understand it today, was not a strong consideration
during the British period. The major weakness of the
administrative network during this period was lack of
any linkage between the rural communities and the
administration. The district and sub-district
administrations had no meaningful communication with
village people. The major governmental activities at
village level were the administration of the police and
the collection of revenue. After the end of colonial
rule, the major emphasis in local administration in
India was to devolve power to people for development
decisions.
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5. 4	 Participatory Local Institutional Structures in
the Post-Colonial India
India offers a model of democracy for the Third
World. Patience, tolerance and perseverance, through
various phases and political difficulties since
Independence, have characterized the Indian case.
Vidyarthi maintains that :
"The great traditions of Indian civilisation, i.e.
truth, non-violence, liberalism, passive resistance
(satya-grah), sacrifice, goodness and self-realisation,
have always stood the test of time in the course of her
long history. It is under the influence of such great
traditions that India, from time to time, produced
several leaders who upheld the genius and temper of
Indian civilisation and protected the country from the
non-Indian traditions of aggression, authoritarianism,
repression, hatred, intolerance and selfishness" (1977,
pp. 99-101).
Thus Indian political leaders have been able to
maintain	 democratic traditions in politics, a
condition which is a pre-requisite for democratic
decentralisation of development administration. The
political, administrative and development context was
changed with the partition of British India into
Republic of India and Pakistan in 1947. South Asia
which emerged from British colonial tradition found it
necessary to change the inherited administrative
apparatus, to suit national objectives.
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Since Independence, a number of administrative
measures have been introduced in India to make
administration increasingly participative. In India,
however, the political system has been more stable than
in any other South Asian nation. Moreover, even in
India, no radical changes have taken place except
perhaps for some attempts to revitalise the local
government system, and provide more democratic
foundations. Ali (1986b) argues in this context that:
"In some of the states of India, officers of the status
of the District Officer, variously called the Deputy
Commissioner, and the District Magistrate and
Collector, were made Chief Executive Officers of
elected local government institutions at the district
level. In the majority of the states, the old District
Officer still retains both the law and order and
development functions despite the institutions of the
Panchayati Raj. In India, there is no abrupt break iith
the past traditions".
In theory, however, India has strived for
democratic control over the local bureaucracy. The
major changes in local institutions in India took place
during 1959-62. Particular emphasis was placed on
participatory development, an approach in which
elected representatives would enjoy greater authority
over the local bureaucracy in decision-making.
Mukerjee claims that the enthusiasm for these changes
owed something to Gandhian memories of the Panchayati
Raj and their revival by J.P. Narain. 12 The latter's
teaching tended to present the Panchayati Raj as
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indigenous and traditional, a form of "conununitarian
democracy", more appropriate than Western notions of
"participatory democracy" ( Mukerjee, 1974, p. 53).
The three-tier local government system that
operates in different states of India can be seen in
the following diagram :
State Government
Field Administration	 Local Governments
Zilla Parishads
(district council)
Top Tier	 Each containing
Panchayat Samitis
Middle Tier
	 Each containing
Gram Panchayats
Bottom Tier	 Each containing
Gram Sabhas (Village Organisation
of all Adults)
The number of subordinate units in each 	 -
superior tier varies with the population of each unit.
Territorially, every subordinate unit is wholly
-	 contained within one superior unit. In the majority of
states, the most important unit is the Panchayat
samiti. 13 This is the body with the most functions. It
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has the task of interpreting government to inyriads of
villagers. In theory, the people at the village level
and the Panchayats themselves are under the supervision
of the staff and the members of the Panchayat Samiti
(Maddick, 1970, p. 4 ). The departmental staff of the
Panchayat Samiti in its turn is under the technical
supervision of the staff at the district level. The
operational efficiency of these local self-governments
systems in India, is however, widely debated.
5.4.1	 Decentralisation of Rural Development
Administration in West Bengal
The "Panchayati Raj" in West Bengal was
introduced in two separate Acts ( West Bengal Panchayat
Act, 1957 and the West Bengal Zilla Parishads Act,
1963). 14
 The gulf between the people at the base and
the institutional hierarchies above was widening over
time and this necessitated the creation of effective
local institutions. The change in the local government
system was based on the principle of 'democratic
decentralisation of power' (Mukerjee, 1974, p. 178).
The changes were explained in terms of (i) the need to
make provision for proper leadership in the rural
sector to sponsor and implement the national
development plans; (ii) to counteract the existence of
weak rural institutions without strong links with the
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rest of the country; (iii) to deal with mounting
discontent among the rural population; and (iv) to make
good the admitted failures in the national extension
and community development programmes. The aim was to
create effective leadership, and encourage a
spontaneous response at the village level which could
be mobilized for village reconstruction work.
West Bengal has a three-tier Panchayati Raj
system : (a) Gram Panchayat for a cluster of villages;
(b) Panchayat Samiti at Block level; and (C) Zilla
Parishad at the district level. These Panchayats are
responsible for (i) identifying and selecting
beneficiaries under different programmes; (ii)
selecting and formulating schemes with the officers of
sectoral departments posted at various levels of local
government; and (iii) implementing schemes under
various programmes with the assistance of government
officials (Gangopadhyay, 1987, SAARC Seminar Report).
The practical experience of the "Panchayati
Raj" system in West Bengal (and in other states, where
similar systems are operating) shows that greater power
and authority in the decision-making process, in all
the local level institutions, has been placed with the
people through their representatives. Local
goverrnnental officials, however, play an important role
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in the planning and implementation of development
programmes by assisting in the process of decision-
making and providing technical expertise in project
execution.
All three tiers of local institutions are
headed by elected persons. They are, however, not
directly elected. People have direct participation only
in the selection of their representatives at village
(gram) levels. The chief of a Panchayat is called the
'Pradhan', one who is elected from amongst the elected
representatives at village levels. In the election or
selection process of a Pradhan, only representatives of
the people at village levels can participate. The
Panchayat consists of about twenty to twenty-five
villages. Under the provision, any one of the Pradhans
of the Gram Panchayats has the chance to become the
chief (Sabhapati) of the Panchayat Samiti. In the Zilla
Parishad (district council), either a directly elected
member to represent the upper or lower house of the
state, or a Sabhapati of any Panchayat Samiti within
the district, may become the chief (Sabhadhipati))5
Under this provision, the competition for the post of
the Sabhadhipati of the Zilla Parishad is intense, and
it is most likely that a competent candidate will win
the post. The most striking feature in the local
governments system in West Bengal, is that the village
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level has been given the top priority. There is also
less urban bias in the distribution of power and in
selecting the local leadership to carry out development
functions.
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5.5	 Decentralisation During the Pakistan Period
In the case of Bangladesh, which was a part of
Pakistan during 1947 - 71, it was expected that a
similar experiment to that taking place in India would
come about. What actually happened in Pakistan is
described briefly in the following paragraphs.
India opted for a democratic structure in
politics and administration, but the Pakistan
experience was different, for a number of reasons.
First, the leaders of former West Pakistan were less
committed to democracy. They came mainly from feudal
backgrounds. Secondly, West Pakistani politicians, and
the civil and military bureaucracy, wanted to dominate
East Pakistan. E. Ahmed in his study observed that :
"The bureaucratic elites were an exclusive group not
only in societal terms, but also in regional terms,
since most of them were from West Pakistan. From the
partition, there was an imbalance in bureaucracy in
respect of regional representation." (1980, p. 63).
Because the population of East Pakistan was
likely to dominate the legislature in a parliamentary
form of government, the former West Pakistani leaders
preferred to rule the country more or less in the same
way as the colonial administrators had ruled India.'8
The evolution of a parliamentary democracy was
continuously frustrated in the country. It was,
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therefore, not surprising that the first constitution
of Pakistan was framed and came into force as late as
1956. In the absence of any written constitution, from
August 14, 1947 until March 23, 1956, the central
government concentrated powers in its hands and the
provinces were only allocated certain delegated powers.
Moreover, the constitution commission of 1956 under the
domination of West Pakistan, had little faith in
popular participation in the decision-making process.
This negative attitude was explained by the
constitution commission itself, as due to the poor
literacy rate, and the absence of a qualified francise
In the country. The constitution commission of 1956
recommended that a general election should be held in
the country in 1958, but before that date General Ayub
Khan seized power in Pakistan and imposed martial law
In the country. The constitution of 1962, as framed by
President Ayub Rhan, was Federal in character and in
theory at least, more decentralised than the
constitution of 1956.17 Under this constitution, the
railway system, so long centralised, was transferred to
the provinces and the Provincial Governments were given
relatively more importance.
Since the birth of Pakistan as an independent
nation, contradictions and disagreements characterised
the relationship between East and West wings over
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constitutional matters. During the early years of
Pakistan, this created political unrest in both the
East and West wings. Because the Bengali population in
East Pakistan were in the majority, the West Pakistani
leaders never agreed to share central powers on the
basis of democratic representation. The declaration of
the first Governor General of Pakistan in 1952 that
'Urdu shall be the only state language of Pakistan',
was a big blow to the nationalistic feelings of the
population in East Pakistan. 18 It created strong
political opposition towards West Pakistani leaders.
The attempt to make Urdu the, only state language of
Pakistan did not succeed but it was interpreted as a
reflection of the attitudes of West Pakistani leaders.
They were regarded as foreign rulers. It was the
virtual end of any possibility of political
integration.
To legitimize his capture of power, Ayub Khan
wanted to improve the economic condition of the
country. He was interested in finding out the short-
comings of administration, and introduced some
administrative reforms to increase the capability of
local institutions for implementing programmes of
economic development. During this period, however,
administrative decentralisation at the lower tiers was
not adequately provided for. The Basic Democracies
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Order of 1959 had introduced a system of dialogue
between the government's officials and the elected
representatives by devising administrative councils at
local levels. 19 Under this Basic Democracies Order, the
representatives of Union Councils were to carry out
government policies in rural areas, and provide a
source of political support for the national
government. There was a massive rural works programme
which made local government active and important during
this period. Under the Basic Democracies Order of 1959,
the Union Councils were entrusted, inter alia, with the
following functions :
- Celebration of public festivals;
- Provision of relief measures in the event of any
fire, flood, hail storm, earthquake or other
natural calamity;
- Relief for widows and orphans, and the poor
and persons in distress;
- Promotion of public games and sports;
Agricultural, industrial and community
development; promotion and development of co-
operative movement, village industries, forests,
livestock and fisheries;
- Adoption of measures for increased food
production;
- Provision of first aid centres;
- Provision of libraries and reading rooms.
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The Union Councils were made responsible for
cooperation with other organisations engaged in similar
activities.
Another important development in the local
government system during the Ayub regime, was the
creation in 1962 of a "Thana Development Circle" to
coordinate development activities within a Thana (the
geographical area of a Police Station during the
British period). 20 From that point of time development
planning, although on a limited scale, began at the
local level in Bangladesh. Since the early 1960s,
there had been efforts to initiate planning at grass-
roots level (based on village communities) to involve
people in rural development. There had been a massive
rural development effort led by the Bangladesh Academy
for Rural Development (BARD), Comilla.
Although in the Basic Democracies Order 1959,
all local councils had listed functions, these remained
mostly on paper. 21 For example, it was observed, in
1964-65, that the Rangpur District Council was
performing only 19 functions out of the 26 items on the
compulsory list, and only 19 functions out of the 70
items on the optional list. An interesting note was
recorded in the minutes of the Rangpur District Council
Meeting dated August 22,1963 under resolution no. 4 :
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"The main defect of the present system is not the lack
of technical staff, but too much centra].isation.
Moreover, the authority exercised by the Deputy
Commissioner as the Chairman and the Assistant Director
of Basic Democracies as the Secretary of the District
Council made the position of elected Vice-Chairman of
the District Council obscure and powerless." ( M. Au &
others, 1983)
Because	 the	 district	 administration
concentrated	 authority over local tiers, local
expertise in development was undermined.
The Pakistan regime had set up a large number
of departmental offices at divisional level. But this
tier of administration was not effective for local
development. Some studies observed that coordination
among these sectoral departments, through the
Divisional Commissioner, was weak. Besides,
interference by divisional administration in certain
cases disturbed local institutions. Several commissions
on administrative reforms during the Pakistan period,
suggested the abolition of this administrative tier.
But, inspite of Commissions and Committees, the concept
of decentralisation and people's participation remained
beyond the reach of the ordinary people. This was the
result of bureaucratic preponderance, and the distrust
of the Pakistani rulers for the people, in all spheres
of administration.22
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Though administrative councils at different
local levels comprised elected persons, the power was
always held by the civil bureaucrats during the
Pakistan period. In the first ever general election
(parliamentary) in 1970, the Awami League led by
Sheikh Mujib claimed victory. But because the Awami
League was led by an East Pakistani, and because all of
the parliamentary seats won by this party were in East
Pakistan, the leaders of West Pakistan did not agree to
share state power on a democratic basis. The army
crackdown on the civilian population of East Pakistan
began in March 1971, eventually leading to war, and the
Independence of Bangladesh.
13].
NOTES
1. For more inorivation the on local self-govt
system, before Partition of the Indian sub-
continent into India and Pakistan in 1947, see,
(1) Tinker, H. : The Foundations of Local Self-
government in India, Pakistan and Burma (London :
Praeger, 1968); (ii) Maddick, H. : Panchavati Ral
:A Study of Rual Local Government in India
(Suffolk : Longman, 1970); and (iii) Mukerjee,
S.K. : Local Self-Government in West Benal
(Calcutta : Dasgupta & Company, 1974, p. 7).
2. "Panchayat" in India means village-based
organisation, which comprises different
occupational groups of people. Literally it means
an "assembly".
3. For details, see Mukerjee (1974), op cit.
4. For details, see Tinker (1968), op cit.
5. For more information, see Huque, A.S. : The
Problems of Local Government Reforms in
Bangladesh : The Failure of Swanirvar Gram
Sarkar, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Vancouber :
University of British Columbia, 1984).
6. For details, see Mukerjee (1974), op cit.
7. The Zaminders were never in good relationship
with the villagers. They lived in urban areas.
See Huque (1984), op cit.
8. "Annual booty" was the amount of
taxes/charges payable to the Zaminders by the
farmers, for the use lands for one year.
9. "Dewani" means the right given on a property or an
area. This is a legal status.
10. The method of collecting revenues from rural
areas by the Zamindari system, disturbed the
ancient village-government system.
11. Also, see All, S.M. & others : Decentralisation
and People's Participation in Bangladesh (Dhaka :
NIPA, 1983); and Au, A.M.M.S. : Politics,
Development and Upazila (Dhaka : NILG, 1986b).
12 • See Nukerjee (1974), op cit.
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13. "Panchayat Samiti" is a sub-district level
organisation and is empowered with the
responsibility for coordinating and supervising
local development.
14. "Panchayat Raj" is the general terminology for
participatory local government organisations.
15. Both "Sabhapati" and the "Sabhadhipati" mean
literally "Chief" or "Head" of the institution.
16. East Pakistan always had a larger population than
West Pakistan.
17. For details, see All, S.M. & others (1983), op
cit.
18. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was then the Governor General
of Pakistan. In Pakistan, there was an organized
attempt at the cultural subjugation of the
Bengalees (People of East Pakistan). See Hauque,
A. (1985):"Politics in Bangladesh: conflict and
confusion" in Politics Administration and
Change, Vol.x, No.l&2, ( Centre for
Administrative Studies, Dhaka, 1985) PP.1-12.
On nationalism and the Bengalees in East
Pakistan, see Jahangir, B.K. : Probleinatics of
Nationalism in Banladesh (Dhaka : Centre for
Social Studies, 1986).
19. For details, see All. S.M. and others (1983), op
cit.
20. For details, see All, M.H. : Develo pment Planning
at Upazila Level ( Comilla : BARD,1987); Sultan,
K.M.T. (ed.) : The Coinilla Rural Administration
Experiment, Fourth Annual Report, 1965-68(Comilla : BARD, 1967).
21. For details, see All, S.M. and others(l983), op
cit.
22.	 See All, A.M.M.S. (1986b), op cit.
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This chapter discusses the attempts which have
been made in the post-independence period, to
decentralise the administrative system of Bangladesh.
First, a brief overview is provided, of the structural
problems of local administration, prior to the
introduction of the current policy of administrative
decentralisation. Then, more detailed discussion is
provided of the current policy of decentralisation in
Bangladesh. This discussion concentrates on current
practices of decentralisation, through the "Upazila
Administration", a local government tier which has
recently been given substantial authority for
development administration at local levels.
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6.]. An Overview of the Structural Problems of Local
Institutions. Prior to the Decentralisation
Policy of 1982
After the Independence of Bangladesh, an
urgent need was felt by the government to decentralise
the national administrative system. It was argued that
the centralised system failed to address the economic
problems of the country, and in particular that it
failed to satisfy the basic needs of the population in
rural areas. For 10 years, from 1972 to 1982, no major
reforms had been made in the administrative system, to
enable it to address the structural problems of local
administrations. The concept of decentralisation
remained in the official documents of the central
government, but was never implemented.
6.1.1 Failure of the Mul lb Government
It should be remembered that both the Awami
League and its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 	 had
overwhelming popular support. It might have been
possible for a government, under the leadership of
Sheikh Mujib, to restructure the administrative system
of the country and build democratic foundations.
Unfortunately nothing was achieved during this period
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to reconstruct the administration of the country, or to
link development in rural areas to the formation of
appropriate local institutions.
The first constitution of Bangladesh was
adopted by the government, dominated by the Awami
League, in 1972. It did provide the legal framework for
creating a democratically decentralised administrative
system in response to the developmental needs of the
country. 1 This constitution held that
"The state shall encourage local government
institutions composed of representatives of the areas
concerned and in such institutions special
representation shall be given, as far as possible, to
peasants, workers and women" (GOB, 1988, p. 9).
But, although a strong commitment was made in
the constitution to local representative institutions,
the government failed at the time to make any notable
progress in this respect. The government introduced an
Ordinance on local government reforms in 1972. This
Ordinance had no practical results in improving
representation at local level, as required by the
constitution. It merely changed the name of the Union
Board into "Union Panchayat(Assembly)", and this was
further changed into "Union Parishad (Council)" by a
presidential decree in 1975.2 In practice, there were
no basic changes, 'nor any reorganisation in local
administrations during the period of rule of the Awami
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League. The heads of institutions at Union level had
generally been elected by the people, prior to the
independence of Bangladesh. As in the Pakistan period,
all other local administrative tiers above this level
were headed either by civil bureaucrats or by other
appointed persons. The scheme for appointing "District
Governors", which the Awami League introduced in the
later phase of administration, was, in fact, an act of
recentralisation of authority through district
administrations. Thus the Mujib government did not
address the need for substantial reconstruction of
local administration, to deal with the growing problems
of rural communities. The village level was untouched.
6.1.2	 Failure of Self-Reliant Villa ge Government
Programme of the Zia Government
The first attempt to organize village
communities came in June 1980, during presidency of
Ziaur Rahman, through his programme of "Swanirvar Gram
Sarkar" ("Self-reliant Villa ge Government"). This
created popular institutions in sixty eight thousand
villages of Bangladesh. Its origin can be traced back
to the traditional concept of self-reliant rural
institutions, when village adults, through a system of
village assemblies, dealt with almost all local
problems. The eleven-member council of the Grain Sarkar
(village-government) was represented by different
occupational groups of the village and headed by a
headman (Pradhan), called "Gram Sarkar Pradhan" • The
responsibility for selecting the members, and the
Pradhan, of the Gram Sarkar was given to the villagers
themselves. This system, however, faced a number of
problems and ended with the assasination of President
Zia in May, 1981.
The underlying objective of "Swanirvar Gram
Sarkar" was to organize people at grass-roots level to
carry out development. There was, however, a strong
political motive for the government, which aimed to
establish a base for political support, especially for
the newly formed political party (the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party). 3 The Gram Sarkar programme faced
strong opposition from traditional rural elites, who
were the supporters of other political parties,
especially of the Awami League. President Zia,
therefore, had to look for a new group of leaders in
rural villages. Swanirvar Gram Sarkars were organized
in sixty eight thousands villages of Bangladesh within
a short period of time. There was in consequence a
worrying lack of preparation, both at national
political levels, and in the communities themselves, at
the grass-roots level.4
The government did, however, utilise the
experiences of the "Swanirvar Gram Andalon" (Self-
reliant Villae Movement), a programme which had
operated on the private initiative of one individual,
Chashi Mahbubur Rahman. 5
 This programme had been going
on for several years, without any financial support
from the government. It was guided by a "self-help"
phillosophy. It aimed to organise people at the village
level to solve their own problems through their own
initiatives, means and resources. The Zia government
provided the office for Chashi Mahbubur Rahivan to
continue his private programme. Under this programme,
people's associations in a large number of villages
were organized to carry out village level activities.
The record of this programme shows that a good
percentage of villages were successful in launching
substantial village development works. The types of
village development works the programme undertook were
road improvements, the construction of culverts and
sanitary latrines, the installation of tubewells,
planting trees, drainage of water, education for
adults, handicrafts, social security, and so on.
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In the face of strong political opposition, and
unrest in the armies and civil bureaucracy, Zia hurried
to implement his programme of "Swanirvar Grain Sarkar"
to legitimise his capture of power and to create power
bases at grass-roots level. With an Act passed in the
parliament, he introduced the "Swanirvar Grain Sarkar"
and abolished the "Swanirvar Gram Andalon." In most
cases, Gram Sarkars were formed in presence of village
adults under the supervision of "Thana Circle Officer".
This, however, did not prevent clashes between the
existing elites and the emerging village leaders under
the Gram Sarkar programme. The Gram Sarkars were given
similar development responsibilities as were practised
under the "Swanirvar Gram Andalon." The government also
provided financial resources for these activities. But
the "self-help" nature of the earlier programme was
undermined by the introduction of governmental
resources for village development works. In addition
rural credits provided by the commercial banks were
also supervised by the Gram Sarkars. This encouraged
the traditional rural elites to manipulate the
development resources under their control. Most of the
officers of the Gram Sarkars were inexperienced in
handling development programmes with highly diversified
functions.
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The record of the Grain Sarkars shows that the
only notable success this programme achieved in an
immediate sense, were improvements of village level
roads. Studies of the Grain Sarkar show that the
emerging rural leaders misused development resources.
There were, however, some positive results of this
movement. It did begin to break the traditional power
structure in rural areas. Gradually, however, the
traditional elites recaptured the control of resouces.
The "Swanirvar Gram Sarkar" programme on the whole
failed to link village organizations within an
institutional framework, which could function smoothly
without undue interference.
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6.2 The Current Practices of Decentralisation Policy
General Ershad assumed power in March 1982. His
policy of administrative reforms caine into effect in
Noventher 1982. The reforms were implemented between
1982 and 1984. The policy was adopted on the basis of a
Report prepared by a committee, the "National
Implementation Committee of Administrative
Reorganisation/Reform" (NICAR). 6 The major decisions
adopted by NICAR were largely administrative, but some
of them had political implications. The decisions were
related primarily to issues of administrative
responsibility for development functions.
6.2.1 The Administrative Dimension of Current
Decentralisation Policy at Upazila Level
The policy of administrative reforms which was
adopted by the military government of General Ershad,
devolved substantial administrative authority towards
local governments. 7
 The recommendation of the NICAR in
this respect, was appropriate and effective, based on
the spirit of devolution (Blair, 1985, p.1237). The
major changes were that the reforms (i) abolished the
administrative tier at Subdivision level, and upgraded
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the Subdivisions into districts; and (ii) provided the
"Thana" level with greater authority for local
administration and development. The name "Thana" was
subsequently changed to "Upazila" (sub-district) to
link literally with the "Zilla" (district). The
"Upazila Administration" was given a democratic
foundation through the policy of administrative
reforms, and virtually all local administrative,
developmental and regulatory functions were entrusted
to this local administrative unit. The composition of
the "Upazila Admir1istrationt was based on the concept
of "a little republic", operating without any
parliamentary control. Commenting on this approach Au
maintains that:
"It is in part a doctorinal approach, in part a
political approach and in part an administrative
approach"(1986b, p.1).
In the history of Bangladesh, only the
administrative reforms of 1982 have addressed the
problem of substantially reorganising local
administrative structures and hierarchies. Figure 6.1
shows the position of the "Upazila Administration" in
the national administrative hierarchies, and its links
with lower administrative tiers and village
communities. Bangladesh at present has a three-tier
local government system - the Zilla, the Upazila and
the Union, in place of the previous four-tier system.
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Administrative structure
Old	 New
Dhaka	 Dhaka
Division (4)	 Division (4)
District (21)
District (64)
Subdivision (71)
	
Thana (470)
	 Upazila (460)
I	 Thana (35)*
	
Union (4300)	 Union (4300)
Revenue	 Revenue
Village (68 thousands) 	 Village (68 thousands)
Citizens (95 millions)	 Citizens (95 millions)
Notes : * Metropolitan Thanas are, not changed.
Numbers in parentheses indicate units in
entire country.
Figure 6.1 : Hierarchies of administration
in Bangladesh.
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With the upgrading of the Subdivisions(Mohokumas) into
districts (Zillas), the Upazilas (Sub-districts) have
gained a higher status in local administration. The
status of the Upazila has increased in terms of local
administration, politics and development. The Upazilas
are also significant for local development
administration, in terms of geographical area,
population and socio-political backgroud.
The geographical size of the average Upazila
(an Upazila is slightly more than 100 square miles) is
considered to be ideal for local level planning in
Bangladesh. Without a network of modern means of
transport and communications, the geographical size is
beneficial both in terms of access for the central
authorities to local community level institutions, and
the access which the "Upazila Administration" has to
the Union and village level institutions and
communities. 8 But in terms of population (a Upazila has
about 200,000 population), even a Upazila is quite
large. Because of this some would argue that an
administrative tier above this level, would be
ineffective in dealing with rural problems.9
The decentralisation policy of 1982 broke the
earlier tradition of absolute authority of the district
administration, to control the local authorities below
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its level. It was thus an important move towards
reorganising the local administrations)- 0 The major
objectives of decentralisation at Upazila level, were :
(1) To establish "Upazila Administration" as a
strong local government, dealing independently
with all local affairs; and
(ii) To bring administration nearer to the people,
and make it accountable to the people.
To fulfil the above objectives, administrative
control was decentralised, substantially reorganizing
the administrative structure at Upazila level (Figure
6.2). In the previous system, the technical officers
had to listen to the "Thana Circle Officer" who was the
coordinating authority at Thana (now Upazila) level,
but they took orders from, and looked for career
advancement to, the respective ministries in Dhaka. The
devolution placed the entire Upazila staff (about 250
in nuithers) under direct supervisory authority of the
"Upazila Nirbahi Officer" (UNO), a civil bureaucrat
with a status of former Subdivisional Officer. The real
key to the administrative side of the Upazila
enterprise is that the UNO and all technical officers
are under the control and supervision not of the line
ministries in Dhaka, but of the elected Chairman of the
"Upazila Parishad." The actuating device is simple and
eloquent : the Upazila Parishad Chairman writes the
personnel evaluation report (called the annual
confidential report, or ACR) of the UNO, and the UNO
Notes	 * Assistant Ju:Ige Figures in parentheses show ruier of staff.
Figure 6.2 : Organization of the Upazila Achninistration.
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does the same for all the technical officers.
The democratic council, called the "Upazila
Parishad", consists of the elected heads of about
eight to ten Union Parishads contained within each
Upazila (plus the elected heads of any municipalities
within the Upazila). In addition, there are three
appointed women members and one other appointed member
(apparently to be a freedom fighter from the 1971 war)
all with voting rights. The UNO and most of the other
technical officers, are also the members, but have no
voting rights, in contrast to all the earlier system,
in which official members always had at least half the
votes. The structure of the "Upazila Parishad" is shown
in figure 6.3.
The current decentralisation policy has
separately listed the functions of the "Upazila
Administration" and that of the central government at
Upazila level (Appendix 6.1). In place of earlier
unitary control by the bureaucracy, the current
administrative practice is dual in nature. The "tJpazila
Chairman" is a high authority, and coordinates and
supervises the operation of the transferred functions
to the "Upazila Parishad." To help in the execution of
these functions, the UNO acts as the Staff Officer to
the "Upazila Chairman", and the Secretary to the
Decision from 1
central govern-I
____j
3 nominated
women end
1 nominated
ik. *
6Evisor
lupezile
_____________	 INirbahi
I Upazila	 1	 lOfficer
I Central	 I	 (UNO)
I Cooperatfve
I Associ.tiont
UpazilaPerished	
Non-voting
Members
Supervi so
Up azila
Techni c
Officer
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Representative Bodies
National
Parl lament
Directly elected ,-
Upazila Chairman
/	 Members
'S	 I
Directly electe
Pnn J
[ion Parishad	
1
Members
\	 Directly elected 	 Farmers
\	 ward/village	 Cooperative
RePresentativj	 Society
Voters	 Members
Note	 a Preferably the heed of the Muktijodde Sangsad (Association of Freedom Fighters).
Figure 6.3 :
	
Structure of the WUpezite Psrlshad.
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"Upazila Parishad." The Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO)
has the authority to control the annual budget and
supervise the regulatory functions. He is also a
counter signatory to the "Upazila Chairman" in almost
all the Upazila matters. This suggests that although
the Upazila Nirbahi Officer is subordinate to the
"Upazila Chairman", in practice he represents an
authority closely parallel to the "Upazila Chairman"
(Appendix 6.2). Such a distribution of power between
the bureaucracy and the local political leadership
suggests the likelihood of conflicts in development
administration.
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6.2.2 Political and Social Dimensions of
Administrative Decentralisation at Upazila
Level
In the history of Bangladesh, reforms in local
government have taken place mainly in the context of a
patron-client relationship, between the central
government and local institutions)- 1
 The recent reforms
are no exception. In view of the precedent set by
General Zia, it is not surprising his successor General
Ershad shortly after taking over power came up with his
own programme of reforms in the local government
system, inter-alia to provide a local basis of
political support. The introduction of a democratic
local institutions at the Upazila level implied a new
power base, in control of development administration in
rural Bangladesh.
The major administrative reform described in
this chapter was adopted without any political
consultation in parliament. Non-democratic moves
towards administrative decentralisation always create
suspicion and distrust among nationally-organised
opposition political parties. They see in such a move,
a non-democratic attempt to effect the politico-
administrative structure. In Bangladesh, opposition
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parties have argued that such fundamental changes
should not have been brought about by the government,
unless it were prepared (a) to lift martial-law, (b) to
hold parliamentary elections, and (c) to recognize the
constitutional principle of the sovereignty of
parliament. The administrative reforms initiated by
General Ershad appeared to undermine the very basis of
democratic local government. The politicians opposed it
on constitutional grounds. The bureaucracy atteinted to
resist on other grounds. The specialists argued that
such a major programme of decentralisation would be
difficult to implement without restoring political
stability, and carrying out some pilot experiments to
examine the feedbacks. The generalists took a moderate
views on the issue.
The military government of Ershad implemented
the reforms programme during the period, 1982-84, in
the face ot strong resistance, open or subdued, from
different interest groups. The question of the
legitimacy of the "Upazila Administration" is now over.
The "Upazila Parishad Bill" was passed in parliament
by theErshad government after the general election in
1986. Before this, the elections of the local
governments (Upazila and Union) had been held under
martial-law. It is important to note in this context,
that political parties in Bangladesh have never been
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directly involved in local government elections in a
formal manner. The Upazila elections were no exception.
At the time of the polls in 1984, political activities
were banned following the refusal of the opposition
parties to participate in elections under military
rule. The political parties opposed the polls at
Upazila level on the grounds of principle. The election
was held under martial-law in the country, and a large
number of candidates contested the election for posts
of Chairmen of the "Upazila Parishad". No political
parties formally participated in the poll, but reports
have it that the political parties indirectly supported
their candidates.' 2 It is, however, difficult to
measure the level of political participation by the
candidates in the poll. A study by S. Ali (1986) showed
that a high number of candidates from different
political parties contested for the post of "Upazila
Chairman". This study shows that members of opposition
political parties won in 55 percent of seats.
Although, the political opposition did not
accept the elections to "Upazila Parishad" held under
martial-law, it is likely that many opposition leaders
wanted political parties to contest the local
elections, in order to strengthen the opposition
movement against the government's "Janadal Party". As a
formal political competition between parties, the poll
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could have been the first step towards democratic
transition in the country. The Upazila poii, coining as
it did without the formal participation of opposition
political parties, had some adverse effects. A large
number of elected "Upazila Chairmen" who had previously
been members or supporters of the opposition parties,
contested the poll as independent candidates. Most of
these newly elected Upazila Chairmen gradually
affiliated themselves with the ruling party or
supported the political activities of the government.
The elections, therefore, favoured General Ershad, in
creating a political power base for his party.'3 The
bureaucratic machinery was also active in this
transformation. Development programmes, by increasing
central funds at the local level, tended to accentuate
the support of local representatives for national
government.
Thus from the point of view of theory and
practice of government, the Upazila concept had much
stronger political implications than is apparent at
first sight. It involved :
1) the allocation of resources of the state from
the centre to the Upazila;
ii) division of functions of the state between
the centre and the Upazila; and
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iii) an	 elected	 local	 council without
parliamentary control and supervision.
These are complicated issues of politics and
government, and political parties could not remain
unaffected by such moves.
6.2.3 The Upazila Chairman
The post of Upazila Chairman is important and
lucrative. He is a symbol of local authority to the
people. This political post has diminished the civil
bureaucracy below the district level. The power and
status of the Chairmen of the "Union Parishad" has also
increased due to the provision of voting rights for
them (as representative members) in the decision-making
of the "Upazila Parishad."
The first term of the office for "Upazila
Chairmen", ended with fresh elections held in March
1990. Unlike previous elections, this election was
contested by party-based candidates. Together the
opposition parties won the majority of seats, while the
ruling party came with a majority in the 425 Upazilas
in which the elections were held. The ruling party has
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won 156 out of 425 Upazilas, amid reports that ruling
party rigged votes.14
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6.3 Development Plannin g in the "Upazila Parishad"
An important objective behind the creation of
the "Upazila Administration" was to achieve development
by utilising local expertise, skills and resources.15
Technical staff who had been available at the
Subdivision level are now engaged in development
administration in the Upazilas. The hope is that they
will spread expertise for efficiently carrying out
rural development programmes, and rejuvenate a
development spirit in the rural economy.
6.3.1	 Scope of the "Upazila Parishad" in Local
Development Planning
The list of functions of the ttUpazila Parishad"
suggests that a large volume of development works are
to be carried out by the "Upazila Administration." The
second schedule of the Local Government Ordinance,
1982, provided the "Upazila Parishad" with
	
the
following development responsibilities 16
 :
1) All development activities at the Upazila
level, formulation of Upazila Development Plans
and Programmes and implementation, monitoring
and evaluation thereof.
ii)	 Promotion of agricultural activities for
maximising production.
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iii) Promotion of livestock, fisheries and forestry.
iv) Planning and execution of rural public works
programme.
v) Promotion of health, family planning and family
welfare.
vi) Promotion and encouragement of employment
generating activities.
In addition, the Upazila Parishads are to be
the instruments of decentralisation of development
activities undertaken at the national level.
Arrangements are made for training officials and staff,
through organizations like the Rural Development
Academies, Regional Public Administration Training
Complexes (RPATCs), and Local Government Engineering
Bureau (LGEB). 17 To make the ItUpazila Parishad"
functionally effective, guidelines from the central
government have been issued from time to time, in the
form of booklets, manuals, resolutions, orders and
circulars. These guidelines highlight the strategy of
Upazila development, and provide interesting insights
into the working of the "TJpazila Administration" as an
authority in decentralised planning. The possible
economic implications of the current decentralisation
policy are considered more fully in the next chapter.
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NOTES
1. See Huque, A.S. : The problems of Local
Government Reforms in Ban gladesh : The Failure of
Swanirvar Grain Sarkar (Vancouber : The University
of British Columbia, 1984).
2.	 See Huque, ibid.
3. For more information on "Gram Sarkar", see Au,
A.M.M.S. : "A Collection of Articles on
Decentralisation", The Journal of Local
Government, Special Issue on Upazila, (Dhaka :
NILG, 1986a) pp.4-6.
4. The "Swanirvar Grain Sarkar" was set up in
isolation, and it lacked linkages with existing
local government structures. It came into direct
confrontation with the Union Administration,
because the government ignored this organisation
which had existed over a long period of time,
i.e. about one hundred years. For more
information, see Ali, A.M.H.S. (1986a), op cit.
5. Chashi Mahbubur Rahman was a civil servant in
the administration during Pakistan regime. He
also served the Bangladesh Government, before he
took the initiative of "Swanirvar Gram Andalon".
See Huque (1984), op cit.
6. See GOB : Report of the Committee for
Administrative Reorcianisation/reforms. 1982
(Dhaka : GOB, 1982).
7. For details of the policy of administrative
reforms and decentralisation, see All, A.M.M.S. :
Decentralisation, Development and Upazila (Dhaka
NILG, 1986b).
8. Decentralisation, however, has favoured to a
certain links between the Upazila Headquarters
with the District Headquarters, and between the
Upazilas themselves. See Hyder, Y. : Development
the Upazila Way (Dhaka : The University press,
1986).
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The present research in this thesis has not
indicated any significant improvements in the
rural transport system. Rather, sporadic and
unplanned construction of unmetalled rural roads,
bridges and culverts, has created other problems,
such as localised floods by standing water,
damage to fisheries and traditional irrigation
facilities.
9. For details of local level planning in
Bangladesh, see Hye, H.A. : Local Level Planning
in Bangladesh (Dhaka : NILG, 1982).
10. It has failed, however, to break the traditional
structures of rural elites and corrupt persons,
who have always controlled power and resources at
the local level.
11. See Au, A.M.M.S. (l986b), op cit.
12. See All, ibid. pp. 84-85.
13. General Ershad has not been able to maintain
large scale popular support. This his predecessor
General Zia could do, within a comparatively
short period. Zia's personal image proved to be
an effective element in gaining popular support
among the rural people. He was regarded as an
honest person by the general population.
14. See Weekly Janainat, A Bengali Newsweekly (London
: Janamat Publishers, 30 March - 5 April, 1990).
15. The first attempt to involve people in planning
at the grass-roots level was made in 1952 with
the introduction of Village Agriculture and
Industrial Development (V-AID) programme. Under
this programme, however, people's participation
was not especially encouraging in the planning
process. It was a begining. See Au, H. :
Development Planning at Upazila Level, (Comilla :
BARD, 1987).
The rural development efforts gained momentum
under the able leadership of Dr. Akhtar Hameed
Khan, an ICS Officer and the founding Director
of BARD. On the basis of the field experiences in
Kotwali Thana, Comilla, the government of the
then Pakistan accepted and introduced a number of
development programmes organised at the village
and Upazila levels to serve the rural people.
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16. See GOB : An Interim ReDort on Upazila
Development (1982-83 to 1985-86), (Dhaka :
Planning Commission, GOB, 1986), p.2.
17. See GOB, ibid. pp. 2-3.
Chapter 7
ECONOMIC ASPECTS : DEVELOPMENT, DECENTRALISATION AND
BASIC NEEDS
7.1 The Economy of East Pakistan Under the Pakistan
Regime
7.2 Failure of National Development Policies, 1971-90
7.3 Increasing Emphasis on Privatization
7.4 Emphasis on Local Level Development
7.5 Basic Needs Strategies in the Development Plans
of Bangladesh
7.6 The "Upazila Administration as an Instrument to
Achieve the Objective of "Satisfaction of Basic
Needs"
7.6.1 The Development Plan of the "Upazila
Parishad" and Availability of Resources
for Development
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Seers (1972) argued that the questions to ask
about a country's development are three : "What has
been happening to poverty? What has been happening to
unemployment? What has been happening to inequality?"
If all these problems have become less severe at any
point in time, then the country may be said to have
achieved some "development". 1
 But the condition of the
masses in developing countries is not only a matter of
poverty and unemployment. It is also compounded by
subordination, oppression, exploitation and disregard.2
Development demands the elimination of fundamental
socio-economic malaises.
The distribution of political power reflects
and underwrites, the distribution of economic power
(Cohn Leys, 1975). In Third World countries,
development involves, in the ultimate analysis, a
"breaking and building" process - breaking the
traditional power structure and ownership of resources,
and building up a new social order where all persons
belonging to different social classes and regions can
participate meaningfully in both the productive and
distributive processes (Emajuddin,1986).
Economic development in the sense that it
involves all the people in productive activities
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through a participatory system, is fundamentally
different from economic growth. In theories of growth,
the increase in GNP or per capita income is the main
focus, and the key assumption is that such an increase
will take care of poverty, unemployment, inequality of
income, etc. both at class and regional levels. In
economic development the main focus is on the
elimination of poverty and unemployment and on a
reduction in inequality. It is assumed that
"development" so defined will take care of the problem
of the productive capacity of the society. Economic
development demands that the poorer social classes, and
weaker regions, must have political power; otherwise,
redistribution is not likely to take place. Shourie has
argued that unless the power and interests associated
with a system of production are distributed among all
social classes and regions, even those economic
measures which are meant for the benefit of the poor
and weak may ultimately end up benefiting the rich and
the influential ( Shourie, 1973, pp. 340-52).
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7.1	 The Economy of East Pakistan Under the Pakistan
Regime
There were many differences in 1947 between the
two regions of Pakistan. But they were similar in that
they were industrially underdeveloped and had been the
producers of agricultural raw materials. East Pakistan
produced 85 per cent of the world's best quality jute
and West Pakistan produced a considerable amount of
good quality cotton. At Independence in 1947, the
industrial bases of the two regions were of almost the
same size. In terms of industrial development, there
was very little difference between the two regions.
East Pakistan was ahead in some industrial products
such as textiles and tea, whilst West Pakistan had a
comparative advantage in sugar and metals. In
irrigation facilities, West Pakistan was ahead. Per
capita income was also slightly higher in West
Pakistan. It is, however, important to note that at
Independence, banking activity was greater in East
Pakistan. It is fair to conclude that although West
Pakistan may have had slightly better development
opportunities in 1947, on the whole there was very
little difference in the level of development between
the two regions.
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The small gap that existed between the two
regions of Pakistan at the end of colonial rule,
widened very rapidly over the years and in the 1960s
took on a critical dimension. 3 A study by E. Ahmed
(1980) provides a detailed account of the
disproportionate measures which were adopted by the
West Pakistani administrators, and which weakened the
economy of Bangladesh. 4 The overall average annual
growth rate in East Pakistan was 0.2 per cent in the
1950s and 5.4 per cent in the ].960s. In West Pakistan
the overall annual growth rate was 3.6 per cent in
l950s and 7.2 per cent in the 1960s. These inequities
in growth rates were also reflected in per capita
income in the two regions. The per capita income of the
two regions of Pakistan, are shown in Table 7.1. In
East Pakistan, per capita income declined at the rate
of 0.3 per cent per annum in the 1950s. There was an
average increase of 2 per cent per annum in per capita
income in the 1960s. In West Pakistan, per capita
income increased at an annual average rate of 0.8 per
cent in the 1950s and at 4.8 per cent per annum in the
l960s. In East Pakistan, the cost of living was 5 per
cent to 7 per cent higher on average, comparing 1959/60
with 1968/69.
167
The interregional disparity in per capita
income and output increased rapidly after Independence
1947. Disparity in the allocation of resources, both
domestic and foreign, between the two regions, was an
inevitable result of the development strategy which was
adopted. The approach was based on the assumption of
"one-economy't . This was the basic feature of the
development strategy adopted by Pakistan. Bureaucratic
elites defended it on the grounds of efficiency. West
Pakistan had a larger stock of social and economic
capital in the form of power, transportation and
communication facilities. It had a higher ratio of
natural resources to population. West Pakistan not
only hosted the central government, but held nearly 100
per cent of its key positions. 5
 It was thus able to
dominate East Pakistan and control the development
resources available to the country. The two regions
received a differential share of investment. The
disparities in investment in the two parts of Pakistan,
are shown in Table 7.2. This continued through the
three five-year plans adopted from 1955/56.
Other policies disadvantaging East Pakistan
were followed in respect of the allocation of foreign
aid and loans, and nationalistic feelings among the
mass of the population of East Pakistan began to take a
strong political shape. This was reinforced by the
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historic 'language movement' which began in 1952. The
first Governor General of Pakistan attempted to make
Urdu the only national language of Pakistan. This was
halted in the face of massive political demonstrations
in East Pakistan. The demand for political,
administrative and economic autonomy grew and ended
only with the Independence of Bangladesh, as a separate
nation in 1971. Economic disadvantages were at the
heart of the Independence movement.
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7.2	 Failure of National Develo pnent Policies, 1971-90
In the face of difficulties, both in the
standard of living of the population in urban and rural
areas, and in the instability of the political-
administrative system, Bangladesh has employed several
differentiated development strategies, since its
Independence in 1971. None of the strategies has made
perceptible inroads into the development needs and the
demands of the population.
In the most recent strategy, an attempt has
been made to decentralise the country 's administrative
system, in order to attain greater efficiency in
national development, and to utilize local development
potential and expertise. This strategy is discussed
subsequently in the thesis. It is useful at this stage,
however, to provide an overview of the major
development plans and objectives as set out in the
Five-Year Plans (FYP), which have governed the country
since its Independence.
Bangladesh has so far launched three five-year
plans and one two-year plan. The Third Five-Year Plan
(TFYP) is due to end in June 1990. The country has
favoured 'planned development' and its ultimate goal,
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as indicated in the current TFYP of 1985-90, is .tJ1
alleviation of poverty from the societ yi within a
quickest possible time-period. The objectives set in
the TFYP are as follows :
1) Reduction of population growth;
2) Expansion of productive employment;
3) Universal primary education and human resource
development;
4) Development	 of a- technological	 base for
bringing about long-term structural change;
5) Food self-sufficiency;
6) Satisfaction of basic human needs;
7) Acceleration of economic growth; and
8) Promotion of self-reliance.
The Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP) of 1980-85 had
similar objectives. The First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) of
1973-78, however, had a slightly different orientation.
The main emphasis in that plan was placed on the
gradual transformation of the society, using
socialistic structures to alleviate poverty, maintain
equity in distribution and minimize the gap between
rich and poor. 6 Although the FFYP favoured an
egalitarian approach in development, the target
objectives of the plan were not achieved during the
plan period. The FFYP was seriously affected by the
initial stages of war recovery. Zillur Rahman (1986)
maintains that because of the world wide energy crisis,
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hyper inflation followed by global economic recession,
the failure to mobilise internal resources and foreign
assistance, and the brutal change of government in
1975, the FFYP remained an academic document rather
than the means of achieving development objectives. The
national goal of gradual transformation of the
traditional Bengali society into a socialistic one,
was shattered through the assasination of the
country's first elected president, Sheikh Mujibur
Rahinan in 1975. After the fall of his government, the
country invoked "planned development" but typically
with a "mixed" character of economic policies and
strategies.
Although Bangladesh has launched several FYPs,
the progress in economic development has been slow.
These plans have failed to achieve target goals and
objectives. Economic growth rates in different plan
periods are not encouraging (Table 7.3). The balance of
trade and balance of payment have not been entirely
satisfactory (Tables 7.4 and 7.5). Of course economists
have long pointed to the failure of planning in the
Third World. Therefore the Bangladesh experience is not
unexpected. But there have been cautious indications,
and warnings from different authorities and experts,
that the centralisation tendency in the economic
management of the country, is one of the major factors
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accounting for such failures. Development has suffered
at the implementation stages, because of weak
administrative structures at the local level. Hence the
government has tended over time to emphasize the need
to decentralise the system of development
administration in the country.
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7.3 Increasing Emphasis on Privatization
Since the mid-1970's Bangladesh has been
opening up its economy increasingly to
industrialisation. This has also been one of the major
areas where greater decentralisation has been taking
place. Although it is not the aim of this research to
study "privatization" as an issue in decentralisation,
some pertinent background information is provided here.
Table 7.6 shows that since 1979-80, private sector
investment has increased.
In 1972, the bulk of industrial enterprises in
Bangladesh were taken over and operated by the
government. Within a few years, however, it was
realised that the direct participation of the public
sector in running industries was not a feasible
proposition. Since 1975, government policy has been
increasingly to dissociate itself from direct
management of industrial enterprises, and increasingly
to induce the participation of the private sector, for
rapid industrialisation of the country (DI,1987).
During the last decade, privatization of the industrial
sector has expanded through various measures i.e,
disinvestment and denationalisation of industries,
withdrawal of ceilings on private investment,
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simplification of procedures for industrial
concessions, liberalisation of the import system, and a
large package of fiscal incentives. The Investment
Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) was established on 1st
October,1976 under the Investment Corporation of
Bangladesh Ordinance, 1976, with the objective of
encouraging and broadening the base of investments.
Help in developing capital market and mobilising
savings was also sought (DI,].987). The establishment of
ICB, therefore, aimed to provide institutional support,
to meet the equity-gap of industrial enterprises with
public company status.
The Foreign Private Investment (promotion and
protection) Act 1980 ensures legal protection for
foreign investment in Bangladesh (MI, 1980). Bilateral
investment protection agreements have also been signed
by the government with many countries. The 1980 Act
eased the procedures for approval of foreign investment
in Bangladesh. Under this Act, no prior approval is
required for foreign investment in joint ventures if
the total project cost does not exceed US 3.3 million,
and if foreign equity participation does not exceed 49
per cent.
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To encourage industrialisation in the private
sector, the government has created Export Processing
Zones (EPZ). At present one EPZ is in operation near
the biggest sea port of the country at Chittagong. The
government wishes to set up another EPZ near to the
international airport in the capital city. The EPZ in
Chittagong provides the necessary fiscal and
infrastructural facilities (such as duty free imports
of capital goods, raw materials, duty free exports,
factory buildings, warehouses, roads, power, water,
telecommunications, etc.) for export-oriented
enterprises (DI : 1980). To attract foreign investment
in the industrialisation process of the country, 100
per cent private share was allowed in the EPZ.
In June 1982 previous industrial policies were
reviewed by the government. In order to provide a new
dimension and greater thrust to the industrialisation
of the country, a new policy was formulated (MIC,
1982). The objectives of this policy, and the
classification of industries under public and private
sectors, are shown in Appendix 7.1. The new industrial
policy placed emphasis on the simplification of
procedures for private sector industries, and greater
decentralisation of sanctioning powers. The previous
sanction limit of the BSB and BSRS was increased at
regional and district level, commercial banks were
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authorised to finance small scale industries.
Under the new policy, particular emphasis was
given to the simplification of licensing procedures for
importing raw materials and machinery, improvements in
the terms of debt-servicing, incentives for increasing
domestic production and exports, promotion of sub-
contracting to favour the growth of small industrial
units as sub-contractors to the bigger ones, skill
development in both public and private sectors and
coordination of industrial policy, import policy and
tariff rates and taxes. To accelerate the pace of
industrialisation, the government announced the
Industrial Policy of 1986, with some amendments to
policies adopted in previous years. The objectives and
strategies of this industrial policy are shown in
Appendix 7.1. In the Industrial Policy of 1986, the
role of the private sector has finally been recognised
as predominent. Except in seven areas, private sector
investment has been open, without any ceiling and with
few formalities for registration. The policy has sought
to encourage foreign investment in Bangladesh and also
to support Bangladeshi ventures abroad in activities
having a comparative advantage.7
The Industrial Policy of 1986 underlined the
need for increasing the contribution from the
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industrial sector to GDP. It also favours the expansion
of industries in rural areas, agrobased and agro-
supportive	 industries, to create employment
opportunities in rural areas.
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7.4 Emphasis on Local Level Development
Local development plans and strategies, as
parts of national development plans and strategies, are
important. They provide guidelines for development at
local, community and project levels. They expose people
to "development". Local development plans can
incorporate local hopes and aspirations, and create
opportunities for development administrators and the
people to participate and cooperate.
A local development framework is considered in
this thesis to mean a strategy of developmenc for a
small area. In this study, the Upazila is a local
development unit administered in Bangladesh at the
present time by a local government system which is
similar throughout the whole national territory. Local
development is used in this study therefore to mean the
development within a Upazila. The Upazilas are the
places where local and national development activities
converge.
In Bangladesh, formal recognition of the need
and importance of local-level planning has been slow in
coming. 8 This has perhaps been the case in many other
developing countries. The adherence to conventional
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approaches to national economic planning is very deep-
rooted. In Bangladesh it was only in the Draft Second
Five Year Plan, 1980-85 that local level planning was
officially recognised as an important tool for
accelerating the pace of economic development within
the overall context of resource constraint, burgeoning
unemployment and mass poverty (Hye, 1982, p. 16) .
Wisdom dictates that governments should expand
their power base through participatory development,
because development is much more than a matter of
encouraging economic growth within a given societal
structure (Hye,1982). It implies the "modernisation" of
that structure, a process of social, economic and
political change that requires the remaking of society
in its most intimate as well as its most public
attributes. The above implies that the economic is not
a sufficient definitions of development. Rather, it
involves the restructuring of relationships between
government and people so that the mass of people can
exercise some influence over national policies that
affect their own lives.
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7.5	 Basic Needs Strategies in the Development Plans
of Bangladesh
Bhagwati (1988) argues that there are two
economic solutions to poverty : (i) the indirect route,
i.e., the use of resources to accelerate growth and
thereby the incomes and the living standards of the
poor; and (ii) the direct route, i.e., the public
provision of minimum-needs-oriented education, housing,
nutritional supplements and health, plus other
significant components of the living standards of the
poor. The first solution appears to have failed so far
to improve the conditions of life of those of the
population in extreme poverty in Third World nations.
For the second, it requires large scale public
resources targetted towards the poor, so far slow to
come forward. We lack the knowledge to assert with any
real confidence, that either of the two explanations is
definitive.
The World Employment Conference of 1976
refrained from defining any universal standards of
basic needs and emphasized that "the concept of basic
needs is a country-specific and dynamic concept" (ILO,
1977, pp. l84_192)).0 The United Nations Secretariat
(1981) defined basic needs as the conjoint set between
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"objective" needs (identified by planners using
technical criteria) and "subjective" needs (identified
by the target population through detailed household
surveys). 11 As an anti-poverty approach to economic
development, the BNA can be effective in improving the
quality of life. It does not necessarily come into
direct conflict with the growth-led concept of
development, but may sugget that structural
readjustinents are necessary.
Following an egalitarian philosophy, the First
Five-Year Plan (1973-78) of Bangladesh was committed to
minimising the gap between the richer and the poorer
groups of the population. 12
 A number of policies were
adopted to achieve this objective.
The basic strategy was to concentrate on
increasing output in those sectors of the economy using
labour-intensive production methods. Agriculture and
rural industries were the major targets. Reconstruction
and rehabilitation works, which the country needed
after the end of the war, also aimed to increase
employment.
The plan aimed to raise as many as possible of
the poorest people above the "poverty line", by
providing essential consumer goods at reasonable
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prices. Production plans were oriented towards the
satisfaction of the demands of low-income groups. Low-
income housing, cheaper varieties of textiles and
various kinds of inexpensive consumption items were
among these categories of goods.
The plan proposed to set up an institutional
framework which would concentrate benefits in the hands
of small farmers. It stressed the need for conscious
and effective policies to avoid the repetition of past
experience whereby richer farmers tended to benefit
more than poorer farmers, from such programmes.
To ensure food supplies and nutritional
standards amon the poor, the plan relied upon food
rationing and the distribution of essential goods
through "fair price" shops at controlled prices.
Because of high overhead costs in publicly-run
distribution systems, controlled distribution was
limited to a very few items which were in short supply
and could be easily managed.
Particular attention was given in the plan to
social consumption. Health and education were targetted
for high rates of growth. Targets were set to increase
hospital beds by decentralisation of health facilities,
and higher enrolment in primary schools.
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The plan, however, failed to achieve its
objectives. The first five-year plan ended with a
dismal picture of overall poverty in the economy. The
government could not bring about any major structural
changes in the economy, nor did it bring about any
effective reforms in the political and administrative
structures, which had so long been under serious
criticism. The economy suffered from poor economic
growth. Policies failed to provide basic needs. In the
public sector there was poor managememt) 3 At the local
level, the distribution of supplies of basic needs was
inefficient. There was mismanagement and corruption.
With unchanged local government structures, "relief
committees" involving the local political leaders and
workers, performed dishonestly.
After the dismal decade of 1970s, the 1980s
began with the experiments of reforms in local
government system with a new hope of development. The
general tendency was to free the economy, with better
management at local level. The Second Five Year Plan
(1980-85) started in July 1980 with the recognition of
"Swanirvar Gram Sarkar" as an important vehicle in
running the rural economy, with effective distribution
and management of resources at grass-roots level. The
main focus of the Plan was to reduce poverty through
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growth of income and employment. The Plan warned that
even if national income were to be equitably
distributed, it could hardly afford every individual a
decent living. It recorded that more than three-fourths
of the population could not afford to meet minimum
dietary requirements. There had been a gradual decline
in the per capita availability of many daily essentials
like cereals, fish, protein, milk and pulses. The
poorer section of the population, which earned its
livelihood as wage labour, had also suffered most from
high inflation rates.
The performance of the "Swanirvar Gram Sarkars"
in grass-roots level development activities, was not
altogether encouraging. After the take-over of power
by the Ershad government, there was further emphasis on
decentralisation policies, currently operating at
Upazila level for development administration.
The Third Five Year Plan referred to the
satisfaction of basic needs as follows :
"Access to food and other basic needs can be
continuously ensured to the common man through
productive employment. So with the expansion of
productive employment output of basic needs will also
need to be expanded, particularly of cereal food, fish,
pulses, milk, edible oil, cotton textiles, drinking
water and housing and health services" (GOB, 1985).
It was recognised in the Plan that while it is
only growth of output that can provide a sound
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foundation for welfare programme, it would be necessary
to continue in the medium term, welfare programmes like
food-for-work and vulnerable group feeding, because of
the pervasive nature of poverty and the large scale
malnutrition prevailing in the country.
Given the objective of increased employment and
technological development, education and skill
formation have been suggested as the key to alleviating
poverty. It was felt that if the family income would be
raised through improvements in productivity, it would
be likely that school enrolment ratio would also go up.
The Plan proposed to increase both development and
current expenditures on education.
For health improvement, the Plan aimed to
improve and extend health services in rural areas.
There were other strategies in the Plan to support the
basic needs approach in development. Population control
has been an important strategy over the last two
decades. The Plan claimed that population size and its
growth have direct bearings on the poverty condition.
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7.6	 The "Uazi1a Administration" as an Instrument to
Achieve the Obiective of "Satisfaction of Basic
Needs"
A fundamental question is whether the
introduction of the "Upazila Administration" system in
the country has been a move towards meeting the
problems of the rural population. Some authors suggest
that "reforms in the interest of the lower income
brackets are often no more than bribes to conceal much
bigger advantages given to the higher brackets". 14
 It
is imperative to see whether resources made available
to vulnerable groups, through basic needs programmes,
actually reach them. Or are they captured by those,
traditionally, with influence and power? Falk (1984)
argues that change in social, and political
organisation, which aim to close the gap between the
rich and the poor, are complex, difficult, and perhaps
impossible. 15
Whilst earlier attempts at reforming the
administration in Bangladesh, have failed to improve
the overall quality of life at grass-roots level, the
experiment with the "Upazila Administration" has been
different and distinctive. The change of status of the
local government system at Upazila level, from a field
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agent of the central government, to something akin to
"caretaker" of local affairs, has definitely provided
an ample opportunity to address local problems, more so
than at any other time before. The provision of an
independent decision-making authority within the
"Upazila Parishad", with greater power for the elected
representatives to set priorities in selecting
development schemes, and placement of senior tecnical
officers and staff under the supervision of a
democratic council, are some of the opportunities that
can be utilised to achieve the goal of alleviating
poverty.
Under present provisions, however, the "Upazila
Parishad" has insufficient leeway to allocate resources
according to its priorities. The allocation of
resources between different sectors of the economy,
follows national development priorities. Since,
however, national development policy follows an anti-
poverty approach, it is likely that in principle at
least "Upazila Administrations" will-adopt policies
which are consistent with the objectives of satisfying
basic needs.	 -
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7.6.1	 The Development Plan of the "Upazila Parishadtl
and Availability of Resources for Development
Like the national government, the "Upazila
Parishad" formulates five-year and annual development
plans, in its development strategies. For financing
development plans the "Upazila Parishad" depends on
central grants, made available annually. There is also
a flow of other resources for development at Upazila
level, e.g. NGO projects, and special and emergency
funds from the central government. These resources may
vary from year to year, depending on the circumstances.
The allocation of the development assistance
fund to the Upazila Parishads is based on four
criteria, population, area, extent of backwardness, and
performance. Under the present provision, all sectoral
funds are placed at the disposal of the "Upazila
Parishad." Following the guidelines of the central
government, the "Upazila Parishad" allocate resources
for development programmes, and evaluates the progress
of individual projects, following a project proforina.
It has also been decided that the "Upazila
Parishad" may create its own sources of income, by
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undertaking income-generating projects. But an Interim
Report of the Planning Commission recorded that :
"Efforts of the Upazila Parishads to mobilize local
resources for financing a part of their development
programme are not yet perceptible" (GOB, 1986).
The "Union Parishad" has some incomes from its
own sources, in the form of taxes. The collection of
such taxes, however, has never been effective in the
face of growing poverty in the rural villages. Growing
poverty in rural areas is the reason why the collection
of such taxes has gradually deteriorated. The "Union
Parishad" has depended traditionally on central grants
for carrying out its development programmes. The
decentralisation of administration at Upazila level,
therefore, has not implied any significant impact on
the mobilisation of local resources.
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Tables - Chapter 7
Table 7.1
	
: Per capita income in East Pakistan and
West Pakistan at 1959/60 prices.
(In Rupee)*
Year	 East	 West	 East-West disparity
Pakistan	 Pakistan	 ratio in percentage
1949/50	 287	 338	 1.18
1959/60	 277	 367	 1.32
1969/70	 331	 533	 1.61
Note : * The monetary unit of Pakistan currency.
Sourch : Ahmed, E., 1980.
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TabLe 7.2 : Per capita revenue and deveLopment expenditure in East
Pakistan and West Pakistan, 1950-70 at 1950/51 prices.
Year	 Revenue Deveto- Outside TotaL	 DeveLopment Average	 Percapita
	
expend- pment
	 PLan exp (crore) expenses as popuLation estimate
	
Iture	 expen-	 (crore)	 percentage	 in miLion (in rupees)
(crore) diture
	 of aLL pak.
(crore)	 totaL	 Dcv..	 Rev.
East
Pakistan:
1950/51-	 171	 100	 -	 271	 20	 45.3	 22.08 37.75
54/5 5
1955/56-	 256	 270	 -	 526	 26	 52.0	 51.92 48.86
59/60
1960/61-	 434	 925	 45	 1404	 32	 59.4	 163.30 73.06
64 / 65
1965/66-	 648	 1656	 -	 2141	 36	 69.0	 240.00 70.29
69/70
West
Pakistan:
1950/51-	 720	 400	 -	 1129	 80	 36.1	 108.03 201.94
54/5 5
1955/56-	 898	 757	 -	 1655	 74	 42.3	 178.96 212.26
59/60
1960/61-	 1284	 1840	 211	 3355	 68	 49.1	 421.79 261.51
64 / 65
1965/66-	 2223	 2610	 360	 5195	 64	 57.0	 521.05 390.35
69/70
Note :
	 1 Crore = 10 NiL Lion
Source : Ahmed, E., 1980.
17. 315.913 • 5
4.24.6 4.2
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Table 7.3 : Microeconomic changes in the economy of
Banglaesh over different plan periods.
Major indicators	 First Five Two Year Second Five
Year Plan	 Plan	 Year Plan
(1973-78)	 (1978-80)	 (1980-85)
(i) GDP growth (%)
	
6.1	 3.4	 3.8
(ii) Export growth (%)
	 1.8	 3.2	 4.9
(iii) Import growth (%)
	
0.5	 12.3	 4.5
(iv) Foreign aid	 -2.1	 2.3	 3.3
growth (%)
(v)	 Invesment as a %
of GDP terminal
year
(vi)	 Saving as a % of
GDP terminal year
(vii) Tax-GDP Ratio	 7.5	 8.0	 8.2
(Terminal Year)
Source : GOB, 1985, P.5.
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Table 7.4 :
	 Balance of trade of Bangladesh.
(In inilion Taka)*
Year	 Export	 Import Balance	 Import as %
of Export
1973-74	 2,974	 7,320	 -4346	 246.13
1974-75	 3,061	 10,842	 -7781	 354.20
1975-76	 5,552	 14,703	 -9151	 264.82
1976-77	 6,670	 13,993	 -7323	 209.79
1977-78	 7,178	 18,216	 -11038	 253.78
1978-79	 9,632	 22,073	 -12441	 229.16
1979-80	 10,997	 30,525	 -19528	 277.58
1980-81	 11,484	 37,288	 -25804	 324.70
1981-82	 12,387	 38,729	 -26342	 312.66
1982-83	 18,016	 45,265	 -27249	 251.25
1983-84	 20,136	 50,874	 -30738	 252.65
1984-85	 26,225	 68,263	 -42038	 260.30
1985-86	 27,396	 62,929	 -35533	 229.70
1986-87	 33,682	 68,496	 -34814	 203.36
1987-88	 41,161	 91,588	 -50427	 222.51
Note : * The monetary unit of Bangladesh Currency.
Source :	 B.B.S., GOB, 1989.
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Table 7.5 : Balance of Payments of Bangladesh.
(In Crore Taka)*
items	 1978-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88
Current
Account
Imports	 2307.8 5257.2 3?25.5 4834.9 5172.9 5408.0 6122 6353.8 7185.2 8393.2
Cf. o. b)
Exports	 892.3 1150.8 1334.4 1454.5 1860.6 2051.5 2521 2716.6 3064.3 3704.5
Cf .0. b)
F ref gh t
and insurance
(a) On
Import
Cb) Earned
Cc) Net
Other goods
and services
net :
Balance :
279.1	 434.1	 443.1 556.0 586.4 610.7 708	 711.3	 778.2	 939.6
-	 -	 -	
-	 6.1	 6	 7.6	 6.8	 5.5
-279.1 -434.1 -443.1 -556.0 -586.4 -604.6 -702 -703.7 -771.4 -934.1
7.2	
-16.7	 61.1	 54.5	 65.8	 72.4	 50	 -4.9	 -97.6 -34.0
16:7.4 -2557.2 -2973.1 -3881.9 -3832.9 -3888.7 -4252 -4345.8 -4989.9 -5656.8
Investment	 -33.5	 22.0	 -37.0 -194.8 -259.0 -160.8 -172 -376.7 -372.6 -415.4
income net
Transfer by	 217.7	 325.0 619.6 772.5	 1422.4 1376.2 1034 1569.3 1927.4 2461.1
Bangladesh
nationals
Grants	 988.0 1129.0 1099.9 1359.8 1859.5 1840.9	 1828 1639.0 2032.4 2578.5
Donations
cash or kind
Deficit/	
-515.2 -1081.2 -1290.6 -1944.4 -810.0 -832.4 -1562 -1514.2 -1402.7-1032.6
Surplus current
Account
Continued..
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CapitaL Account
Aid and
	
681.6 803.7 931.8 1487.0 1107.6 1385.5 1209 1682.8 1667.7 1474.6
Loan net
(a) Long	 714.3 828.5 916.2 1070.6 1440.7 1213.2 1269 1515.8 1887.7 1900.2
term net
(b) Short	 -33.7 -24.8	 15.6	 416.4 -333.1	 172.3	 -60 167.0 -220.0 -425.6
term net
Other	 -43.9 -252.8 287.7 	 294.3 -457.4 -463.3	 363 -185.1 -127.9 -405.1
capitaL
transaction
Errors	 52.0	 52.1	 77.1	 163.1 159.8	 -89.8	 -10	 16.5	 -137.1 -36.9
and ommisions
SurpLus	 515.2 +1081.2 +1296.6 +1944.4 810.0 	 832.4	 1562 1514.2 1402.7 1032.6
on capitaL
budget
Note :*1 Crore	 10 MiLLions.
Source : B.B.S, GOB, 1986; & B.B.S., GOB, 1989.
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TabLe 7.6	 :	 Phasing of financial outtay,1973-74 to 1989/90
(Taka in Crore,1 crore= 10 mu ion).
Year	 TotaL	 Public	 Privater	 Private Sector
sector	 sector	 as % of totaL
1973-74	 595	 525	 70
1974-75	 725	 645	 80
1975-76	 870	 775	 95
1976-77	 1040	 925	 115
1977-78	 1225	 1082	 143
Sub-totaL	 4,455	 3,952	 503	 11.3
1978-79	 -	 -	 -
1979-80	 2717	 2082	 635	 23.37
1980-81	 2962	 2112	 850
1981-82	 2893	 1913	 980
1982-83	 3404	 2144	 1260
1983-84	 3645	 2235	 1410
1984-85	 4296	 2696	 1600
SubtotaL	 17,200	 11,100	 6,100	 36.16
1984-85	 6209	 3232	 1977
1985-86	 6385	 3825	 2560
1986-87	 7010	 4360	 2650
1987-88	 7686	 4970	 2716
1988-89	 8419	 5610	 2809
1989-90	 9100	 6235	 265
SubtotaL	 38,600	 25,000	 13,600	 35.23
Source :
	
GOB, 1973, p. 35;	 GOB, 1983, P. 50.
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NOTES
1. For details, see Seers, D. : "What are We Trying
to Measure?" in Measuring Development : The Role
and Adequacy of Development Indicators (London :
Frank Cass, 1972).
2. See Leys, C. "The Politics of Redistribution",
IDS Bulletin, No. 2 (Sussex : University of
Sussex, 1975), p. 6.
3. For details of segmented economic growth and
development during the Pakistan period, 1947-
1971, see Ahmed, E. : Bureaucratic Elites in
Segmented Economic Growth : Bangladesh and
Pakistan (Dhaka : The University Press, 1980).
4. For about two decades during the Pakistan
period,	 economic development was influenced
by the Harrod-Domar	 growth model. For more
information on economic	 development during
the Pakistan period, see Au, S.M. & others :
Decentralisation and People's Participation
in Bangladesh (Dhaka : NIPA, 1983).
5. See Aluned (1980), op cit.
6. The party of the Awaini League which governed the
country until August 1975, did not envisage
bringing about significant changes in societal
structure. The Awami League had no such
programme. Politically it represented rich
businessmen (though not the rich industrialists)
and the petty burgeois of the society. For more
information, see Hauque, A. :"Politics in
Bangladesh : Conflict and Confusion", Politics,
Administration and Change, Vol.X, No. l&2
(Dhaka : Centre for Administrative Studies,
1985).
7. The government of Bangladesh has recently
established the Investment Board with greater
authority in decision-making, to ease the process
of private investment.
8. See Hye, H.A. : Local Level Planning in
Bangladesh (Dhaka : NILG, 1982).
9.	 Also, see GOB : The Second Five-Year Plan 1980-85
(Dhaka : GOB, 1983).
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10. See ILO : Employment. Growth and Basic Needs (New
York : Praeger, 1977).
11. See Weigel, V.B. : "The Basic Needs Approach
Overcoming the Poverty of Hoiuo Oeconomicus"
World Development, Vol. 14, No. 12 (London
Pergamon, 1986)
12. See GOB : The First Five-Year Plan 1973-78 (Dhaka
: GOB, 1973).
13. The Awami League nationalised 85% of
industries and 90% of foreign trade. It
nationalised banks, insurance companies, a major
portion of inland and coastal shipping, airways,
and took over 60,000 abandoned houses. It put a
ceiling of Taka (monetary unit of Bangladesh
currency) 2.5 millions on private investment. For
more information, see Hauque (1985), ibid. pp.
6-7.
14. For details, see Nyrdal, G. : Beyond the Welfare
State : Economic Planning in the Welfare States
and its International Im plications (London :
Gerald Duckworth, 1960).
15. For details, see Falk, R. : "Satisfying Human
Needs in a World of Sovereign States : Rhetoric,
Reality and Vision", in Wilber, C.K. (ed.) : The
Political Economy of Development and
Underdevelopinent (London : Random House, 1984).
PART III
TEE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION : EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
200
A Introductory Note to Part III
The objectives of the fieldwork were twofold :
(i) To obtain information from those who are
directly involved in the "Upazila Administration", plus
local elites, who could be expected to be more
knowledgeable about the impact of decentralisation of
the "Upazila Administration". The intention was to see
if, in the opinion of professionals and elites,
decentralisation had encouraged the creation of local
democratic institutions to encourage participation in
local development.
(ii) To gather information from rural people,
for whom it is claimed that current decentralisation
policy in Bangladesh has been actively sought.
Particular attention was paid in the fieldwork to the
need to listen to the rural poor, to gain information
about problems associated with their basic needs, and
to see whether decentralisation has brought a better
hope of improving their condition.
Two forms of data collection corresponded to
the two main objectives of the thesis. Two sets of
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questionnaires were used in the fieldwork (Appendix
8.1). The fieldwork was carried out between December
1988 and March 1989, in the most appropriate season.
Climatic factors had to be taken into account
considering the limited time and resources for the
research. The questionnaire covered three Upazilas :
Singair (Manikganj District), Jhikargacha (Jessore
District) and Madhupur (Tangail District). Maps in
Appendix 8.2 show the geographical locations of the
three Upazilas, which were selected as being
representative of the larger country. The sample did
not, however, include the hilly parts of the country,
inhabited predominantly by the tribal population.
In chapter 4 a brief preliminary discussion can
be found of the field survey using the questionnaires.
More detailed information on fieldwork is provided
here. Tables showing the results of the questionnaire
survey are presented in Appendix 8.3. Some summary
results are discussed here. Some information from
other sources, for example from the Upazila Parishad
office, and published statistics, are also provided to
further justify some of the arguments on the impact of
decentral isation.
Chapter 8
THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON INSTITUTION-BUILDING
FOR DEVELOPMENT AT LOCAL LEVEL : THE FIELDWORK RESULTS
8.1 The Impact of Decentralisation on Administration
8.2 Political and Social Aspects of the Impact of
Decentral isat ion
8.3 The Impact of Decentralisation on Planning and
Decision-making
8.4 Concluding Comments
203
This chapter looks at the impact of
decentralisation on institution-building at the local
level. The empirical work was guided by three aspects
of decentralisation. To recall, these are (i)
administrative; (ii) political and social; and (iii)
lannin and decision-making, based mainly on a survey
using Questionnaire A. The survey using this set of
questionnaires was difficult. The questionnaire had
many sensitive questions. Respondents, especially
government officials, had a tendency to bypass direct
answers. They were willing, however, to discuss
informally aspects of decentralisation involving the
"Upazila Administration". This helped in the gathering
of opinions on the impact of decentralisation.
Strenuous efforts and patience were required to
complete this survey over period of about five months.
I am confident that the respondents provided reliable
information.
In all, 84 respondents were interviewed in
three Upazilas. In each Upazila, the sample respondents
included 12 government officials, 8 elected
representatives (1 nominated member was included), and
8 persons selected from the local elites. Selection of
local elites faced the problem of geographical
concentration at or arround the Upazila headquarters,
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because of the limited means of an individual
researcher to cover a wide geographical area in rural
areas where poor transport facilities hinder movements.
However, this sample represented different occupational
groups, including lawyers and political leaders of the
ruling and opposition parties. Informal discussions
were held with many others.
An Overview
Questionnaire A was used to gather information
from the administrators, representatives and local
educated elites in order to examine, in their opinion,
the effectiveness of the "Upazila Administration" in
local development. In theory substantial power and
authority has been provided for this local government
unit, under the current decentralisation policy. There
is a move away from the traditional power base at the
district level, to the Upazila level. In theory the
"Upazila Administration" is more independent than the
District Administration was, since the former is headed
by an elected Chairman, whereas the latter was headed
by a person nominated by the central government. The
dependence of the "Upazila Administration" on the
central government, on the face of it, is mainly
financial. Authorities can, however, raise revenue from
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some sources which were previously controlled by higher
authorities. Discretion is also given to create new
sources of income.
The question is whether local democratic
structures are helping to create local institutions
which are responsive to local problems? How are they
performing and what are the implications? Responses to
these questions in the Questionnaire were generally
negative. Many problems were cited by the respondents,
and are discussed in this Chapter. It appears that
decentralisation has created problems. One element
should not be forgotten. The policy of decentralisation
has been implemented comparatively recently and this
gives only a short period in which to examine its
impact. Though there are many problems in the immediate
effects of decentralisation, there is, however, demand
for the continuation of this local democratic
structure. Some positive signs are reflected in other
sources of information used in Chapter 9.
Though there is, justifiably, great
controversy on the reliability of opinion survey data
in the Third World context. The present researcher is
confident that the steps which were taken to ensure
	 -
reliable results enable him to draw valid conclusions
from the fieldwork study.
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The answers to the questions are discussed
under the following headings : administrative,
political and social, and planning and decision-making.
Administrative Aspects of Decentralisation
a) Is the new Upazila Administration system
better than the previous Thana Administration system?
b) Is the Upazila Administration in practice an
independent authority for development administration?
c) Is the policy of decentralisation suffering
from dual loyalties, conflicts and corruption?
d) Does the Upazila Administration have adequate
cooperation and coordination for local development?
e) Have the rural people benefitted from
decentralisation policy?	 -
Political and Social Aspects of Decentralisation
a) Has the policy of decentralisation improved
democratic practice at local level?
b) Has the current practice of decentralisation
had positive impact on political participation?
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C) Has the current practice of decentralisation
involving the Upazila Administration created new
political and social pressure groups at local level?
d) What has been the effect of decentralisation
on social transformation?
e)	 Does the Upazila Judiciary benefit rural
people?
Aspects of Planning and Decision-making
a) Has there been an improvement in the
efficiency of development planning in the Upazila
Administration?
b)	 Has the investment policy of the Upazila
Administration received priority in local development?
C)	 Has decentralisation improved the rural
development process?
d)	 Are there any major problems in the
development planning process?
e) Do NGOs perform better than public authorities
in rural development?
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8.1 The ImDact of Decentralisation on Administration
a) On the question of whether the "Upazila
Administration" system is better than the previous
"Thana Administration" system, the views of the
respondents are shown in Table 8.1. It is evident that
there were some problems with the previous "Thana
Administration" system. Cited as problems were the lack
of authority for development, insufficient staff, and
limited resources. The majority (52%) of the
respondents were of the opinion that of these, the
shortage of staff was the main problem in the "Thana
Administration" system. However, the respondents
stressed some good aspects of the "Thana
Administration". The staff of the Thana Administration
were generally regarded as being more honest and
neutral than in the new "Upazila Administration".
On the issue of viability for local
development, 86 percent of the respondents believed
that the "Upazila" is the most appropriate level for
local development in Bangladesh. Although this
legitimises the claim that the present system is better
than the previous one in terms of local geographical
unit of administration, in practice the "Upazila
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Administration" has not substantially changed
development prospects. 54 percent see moderate gains
for local development. In the subsequent discussions,
it will be evident however, that the "Upazila
Administration" has generated some new dimensions for
development administration in Bangladesh, though it is
difficult to see precise gains.
b) Views on the independence of the "Upazila
Administration" are provided in Table 8.2. The
independence of the local administration under a policy
of devolution is a fundamental issue. Devolution gives
more independent authority for local development.
The national government claims that the "Upazila
Administration" is independent in decision-making. The
fieldwork results show a mixed response to this issue.
The majority (76%) of the respondents agree that the
present system provides an independent authority in
decision-making for development. About 60 percent
maintains that the "Upazila Administration" is a
decentralised authority. But opposite views are also
notable in the results. The results of an alternative
question as to whether the "Upazila Administration" is
a bottom-up approach of the central government, shows
that more than 40 percent of the respondents see the
present system as a bottom-up approach of the central
government. The majority of the respondents maintained
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that there are significant external influences on the
decision-making of the "Upazila Parishad". These are,
however, not always direct or open.
The central government does not in practice
consult the "Upazila Administration" in regard to any
changes of policies at the Upazila level. A large
majority (88%) of the respondents said that in
practice, the "Upazila Parishad" has no power to reject
any central decisions. Local representatives are,
however, gradually becoming aware of these issues. New
party-based Upazila elections may help the
representatives to exert increasing pressure on the
central government for greater independence of this
democratic structure.
C) Table 8.3 presents information on whether
the policy of decentralisation is suffering from dual
loyalties, conflicts and corruption. The fieldwork
results indicate that the "Upazila Administration" is
dual in nature with serious conflicts between the local
political leadership and the bureaucracy. 1 A large
majority of respondents (88%) are of the opinion that
there are conflicts between the government executives
and the elected representatives. Views of the precise
nature and origins of these conflicts vary among
respondents, depending on whether they are
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administrators, representatives or local people.
Conflicts in the main, involve a fight for power and
status in the local administration, and the desire to
win in the decision-making process of the "Upazila
Parishad". Conflicts over ideological issues or
professional ethics are not, however, prominent.
Conflicts also exit among the elected
representatives.2
Of late the local Parliament Members have been
given some authority to grant licences at the Upazila
level. People believe that this has created further
problems. Parliament Members are now surrounded by
groups with vested interests. Many believe that there
is also a tendency towards recentralisation, more
control of the "Upazila Administration" by the national
government and its political organs, in order to make
political gains. This undermines the importance of the
"Upazila Chairman" and may also dissatisfy other
elected representatives and Upazila level officers.
Moreover, this may generate group interests and
conflicts damaging to local democracy.
The Upazila Chairman is the head of the
institution and the Upazila Nirbahi (Executive) Officer
(UNO) is his subordinate in status. There is serious
conflict between these two. They fight to capture power
212
and status, the outcome of which is detrimental to
local development administration. This conflict is due
to the distribution of authority between them. Both
hold power, and though the UNO is a subordinate to the
Upazila Chairman, he has a tendency to prove his
administrative superiority. It appears to the present
researcher that for a smooth functioning of local
development activities, it is important that these two
key persons remain in close and cordial relationship.
This in turn will influence others to be in accord and
have good relations. This should bring greater
cooperation and trust, which is lacking currently among
the officers and elected representatives. There is also
the need for a strong Upazila Chairman, qualified in
the management of the local democratic structure.
Some officials of the "Upazila Administration" argued
that the chairman of the "Upazila Parishad" should not
be an elected person. Views on this, however, differ
between Upazilas. Officials in one of the three
Upazilas were of the opinion that the Chairman should
not be elected. Respondents in that Upazila reported
that the Chairman adopted one-man rule. In that
Upazila, the representatives of the "Upazila Parishad"
had passed a resolution of no-confidence in the
Chairman and had requested central authority twice to
remove the "Upazila Chairman". No decision was given by
the central authority, either to continue or
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discontinue his office. This generated anger among the
representative members of the "Upazila Parishad", since
the Upazila Chairman, under such circumstances, has
continued in office. It was reported that the Upazila
Chairman was an influential member of the ruling party,
and considered himself the sole authority for "Upazila
Administration", especially in development matters.
But to maintain greater political accountability and
obligation in the local administration, it is necessary
that appropriate actions are promptly adopted by the
national government.
There is a gap in the conceptualisation of the
duties of the Upazila Chairmen, in that the civil
bureaucrats maintain that under the decentralisation
policy, the Upazila Chairman is the chairman of the
"Upazila Parishad", which comprises the regular
government officials, elected representatives and
nominated candidates. But Upazila Chairmen consider
themselves Chairmen of the Upazila, an all-embracing
term which leads to problems. The respondents,
however, were of the opinion that a democratic system
in the Upazila Administration" must be welcomed by
all, and that the Upazila Chairman and other elected
representatives should be honest in their duties. The
current practice, however, has not yet ensured such a
democratic system, and the actions of the elected
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representatives are also not beyond suspicion.
Some officials have argued that the existing
power and authority of the UNO should be reduced. In
their opinion, there is undue interference by the UNO.
It is notable in this context that during the
implementation of decentralisation policy, strong
opposition came from the technical departments against
their placement under the control of the UNO, who is a
person of the general administrative cadre.
The "Upazila Administration" is suffering from
corruption. A large majority (89%) of respondents
believe that corruption in different forms has
substantially increased in the "Upazila Administration"
compared to previous "Thana Administration" period.
These corrupt practices in the delivery of
administrative services are largely responsible for
conflicts in the "Upazila Administration". The majority
(71%) of respondents believe that corruption mainly
involves the misuse of development funds. It is
necessary that the increased flow of resources are
efficiently utilised in local development.
d) The "Upazila Administration" has inadequate
cooperation and coordination for local development.
The "Upazila Administration", being a corporate
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authority, requires cooperation and coordination for
development programmes. The survey shows that the
current decentralisation policy has not been successful
in overcoming these shortcomings. 3 The respondents
expressed the view that lack of cooperation among
different functionaries is at present the main problem
of the "Upazila Administration". About 65 percent of
respondents believe that there are no coordination
problem within a particular department. But about 70
percent of the respondents believe that there are
coordination problems in programmes which involve more
than one department. This indicates that the officers
are not in good relations and they have vested self-
interests.
e)	 The poor has gained little from
decentralisation policy (Table 8.4). The current
decentalisation policy has merely brought
institutional changes to the rural communities.
Respondents could not specify any significant
achievements of the current decentralisation policy
which would have direct impact on the satisfaction of
the needs of the people, particularly those of the
rural poor. They maintain that decentralisation also
has not significantly improved the ideological and
professional morale of the staff of the "Upazila
Administration", to work for the benefit of the poor.
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The majority of respondents, however, regard
decentralisation as a significant achievement. But very
few were optimistic about the direct benefit of the
"Upazila Administration" to the rural poor, in terms of
basic needs, in short-run. The staffs of the "Upazila
Administration" are not seriously committed to work for
the benefit of the people. A similar proportion of
respondents (64%) were sceptical about the commitment
of staff to their professional duties.
Some of the Upazila level officials reported on
the insincerety of the staff in the "Upazila
Administration". They maintain that the "office of the
Upazila Administration starts on Sunday and ends on
Wednesday". In Bangladesh, the official weekly holiday
is on Friday. How can this happen? The answer is as
follows. The heads of most departments worked
previously at the district headquarters. Some of their
families live in the district headquarters, though
there is family accommodations available in the
"Upazila Parishad". Department heads try to spend more
time with their families, and somehow convince the head
of the institutions to allow this. The arrangement
appears to be mutual acceptable, though some
individuals do not like such practices. It demonstrates
the fact that there is lack of commitment to official
duties among many staff.
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One Upazila was, however, found to be better in
this respect. In the Upazila Jhikargacha, there was
better leadership by the Upazila Chairman. Led by an
opposition local political leader, this Upazila was
judged to have the best performance in the division,
after an interim evaluation by the government. This
suggests that if local political leadership is
improved, there is the possibility that local
democratic structures may give better results.
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8.2	 Political and Social Astects of the Impact of
Decentral isation
a) Information on the issue of democratic
practice in local administration is provided in Table
8.5. About 70 percent of respondents are of the opinion
that the present democratic practices of the "tlpazila
Parishad" should continue. It is evident also that the
majority of the respondents are satisfied with the
present system at Union and village levels. But as they
expressed it, democratic practices are not yet ensured
in local administrations at Upazila level. Increased
efforts are necessary to improve the conditions of
democratic practice in the local administration. It is
important to make administration accountable to people.
b) The current practice of decentralisation
has not had any significant positive impact on
political participation (Table 8.6 )•4 The majority
of the respondents (51%) is of the opinion that
political participation has decreased since the policy
of decentralisation was implemented. 5 22 percent of
respondents believe that political participation has
increased, and another 26 percent regard it as being
unchanged. People in general believe that
decentralisation has not improved the local political
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environment.
In the process of fieldwork the present
researcher became aware of a common belief among the
rural population, that national politics does not much
matter for them. Declining participation in polls at
the national level may be explained by the increasing
poverty of the rural population, who see no sign of
improvement in their quality of life. Local elections,
however, still bring about participation of the people.
A study by Ali (1986) shows that in the Upazila poll of
1984, about 55 percent of voters turned out to cast
votes for the post of Upazila Chairman. This highlights
the significance of the local democracy to the rural
population.
C) The current practice of decentralisation
involving the "Upazila Administration" has created new
political and social pressure groups at local level
(Table 8.7). The survey reveals that democratic
administration is difficult due to pressure from
diverse political and social groups. These groups try
to obtain privileges from the new administrative
system. Generally, pressure from the ruling political
party is predominent. But other locally- dominant
political and social groups are also active, and take
undue advantage of the administration. 	 It is
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individuals, i.e. local political leaders, rather than
political parties as such, which try to obtain such
advantages. These activities are detrimental to the
local democracy. It is notable that non-political
elites such as rich farmers, rich businessmen, and
construction contractors are also active in this
respect.
d) The opinion of respondents on the the
effect of decentralisation on social transformation are
shown in Table 8.8. In the short-run, decentralisation
has been association with a deterioration in the
political and social environment at the Upazila level,
though opinion on this varies among respondents. They
reported that there is political repression both by the
ruling party and by locally dominant political and
social groups. This has been a historical trend in the
case of rural Bangladesh. Agricultural labourers form a
major social and economic group. Politically, however,
this group is often vulnerable to any change of
policies at the local level in respect of development.
The urban-based dominant national political stream in
Bangladesh does not provide any encouraging avenues for
political participation by the poor in rural areas. So,
in the dynamics of national politics, they have no
direct voice and strength to press their needs. They
are the group who are generally exploited in the
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interests of the local political and social elites.
Although trade unionism is practised by
industrial workers in Bangladesh, the agricultural
labourers have no such means of exercising their rights
(Atiur Rahman). 6 The central cooperative association of
the farmers under the auspieces of the Bangladesh Rural
Development Board, which is organised at Upazila level,
is perhaps the only place where they have scope to form
their organisations, build cooperatives, and distribute
rural credits. Rights such as minimum wages,
appropriate prices for their products, and security
against the actions and attitudes of traditional
elites, are not upheld. A great majority (80%) of the
respondents are in favour of trade union rights for
agricultural labourers. Some of the respondents,
particularly among government officials, were against
this option. They believed that trade union rights for
agricultural labourer would create obstacles in the
rural development process (One respondent). 7
 This
reluctance among the officials to release more power to
the poorer section of the people is not healthy.
The opinion of the respondents suggest that the
general social environment has deteriorated since the
introduction of democratic administrative processes at
the Upazila level. Religious and ethnic conflicts are,
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however, not of any major significance. 8 This is a
healthy aspect of the rural communities in Bangladesh,
which may encourage greater participation in activities
of social improvement under the decentralisation
policy, like literacy drives and mass education.
Organization of rural communities requires adequate
policies to support such actions.
e) Under the current practice of
decentralisation, the judiciary has been instituted at
the Upazila level. Previously rural people utilised the
judicial facilities which were available at
subdivisional or district headquarters. The objective
of decentralising the judiciary was to ease the process
of delivering justice to rural communities. In Third
World countries, the poor and weak often fail to obtain
benefit from government programmes. Such programmes are
often targetted at the poor, but the benefits may then
be captured by the strong and influential. There is
strong opinion among respondents as to whether the
Upazila Judiciary is benefiting the rural poor or not
(Table 8.9). People seem to be satisfied because the
close proximity of the judiciary means	 access to
justice. A large majority (77%) of respondents,
however, see that there is corruption in judicial
services. About 64 percent respondents believe that
local elites influence the process of delivering
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judicial services, and that this undermines social
justice.
Decentralisation of judiciary, however, has had
some indirect impact on improving social conditions in
rural areas. Before this people had to wait a long
period for the settlement of their suits in the
Subdivisional or District courts. They used to spend
more money and time under such circumstances. The poor
found it particularly difficult to obtain justice in
such situations. Negotiations between parties in
disputes which in the past were performed at the
village meetings, are nowadays seldom found.
Decentralisation of the judiciary has not removed
these problems.
Some facts regarding "security" as a basic need
are also evident from the field survey. 72 percent
respondents believe that the police force is not
playing a proper role in providing security. However,
about 80 percent of respondents are of the opinion that
in the control of corruption, there is welcome
cooperation between the Upazila Magistracy and the
police in maintaining law and order at the Upazila
level. It must be remembered, however, that the police
do not perform their proper duties in maintaining
security and law and order in Bangladesh, because they
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are constantly engaged in corrupt practices to earn
their own living. This issue will need to be addressed
in the future, as part of any decentralisation policy.
We know, however, that it will not be easy to bring
police administration under the control of the
administration.
Suggestions made by respondents to improve
social conditions at the Upazila level, strongly
support the contention that the creation of a stable
political system, is an effective way of improving
society. 9 Many of the respondents believed that to
improve the social environment, the enforcement of law
and order needs to be strict and effective. These are
not easy tasks for national and local governments,
given poverty at an alarmingly high level. These tasks
can only be seen as part of the complicated process of
development, requiring good central-local relations.
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8.3	 The Impact of Decentralisation on Planning and
Decision-making
a) Views of the respondents on development
planning in the "Upazila Administration" are expressed
in Table 8.10. The majority of respondents were of the
opinion that the "Upazila Administration" is more
suitable for economic management at local level. 65
percent of respondents believe that an advantage of the
"Upazila Administration" is increased staff facilities.
A significant percentage of respondents (46%) believe
that if increased development authority is settled on
the "Upazila Administration", this will favour better
management of local development. A large majority of
respondents (86%) expressed the view that as far as
development planning is concerned the "Upazila
Administration" is an improvement over any previous
administrative system at the Upazila level.
b) It is important that the investment policy
of the "Upazila Administration" distributes the
benefits of development to all. Opinion on this is
reflected in Table 8.11. The Upazila Parishad does not
offer equitable distribution of investment, income or
employment. Given current practices, equity in the
distribution of investment is not likely. This issue is
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complicated by the fact that decision-makers and
planners may not be properly trained. A self-reliant
approach in local development depends to a large extent
on the exploitation of local expertise. The "Upazila
Administration" has not been able yet to utilise
sufficiently local skills, or local resources.
c) Opinions of the respondents on the impact
of decentralisation on rural development are expressed
in Table 8.12. Decentralisation has transformed the
Upazila headquarters into a busier place than it has
ever been. 1° It is an important centre for political
and administrative functions. This, however, has not
been translated into a strong impetus for development
either within the urban areas, or in rural parts of the
Upazila. Nor do national economic conditions over the
last few years, provide encouraging signs. 61 percent
of people believe decentralisation will encourage the
growth of Upazila towns, but they do not believe that
decentralisation has promoted rural development.
This study is concerned primarily with the
question of whether the "Upazila Administration" has
contributed to the provision of basic needs for the
rural poor. The empirical evidence shows that the
"Upazila Administration" is not aware of such needs,
and it has in fact no policies other than the national
227
programme of "vulnerable group feeding".
d) There are certain problems in the
development Planning Process as expressed by the
respondents (Table 8.13). The "Upazila Administration"
has been provided with an increased administrative
capacity as compared with the previous administrative
structure. Nevertheless, about 65 percent of
respondents are of the opinion that inefficiency in
planning and implementation, lack of coordination in
development programmes, and lack of resources, are some
of its major problems. These problems need to be
strongly addressed by the local authorities . Necessary
guidance, supervision and follow-up by the central
authorities may help early recovery of the underlying
problems.
e) Opinion of respondents on NGO performance
are shown in Table 8.14. Most of the NGO programmes at
the Upazila level are related to rural development
functions. One of the opposition political leaders has
claimed of late that the NGOs are running the country.
It is notable that in Bangladesh, a large number of
NGOs are working with diversified development
programmes)- 1 Respondents expressed the view that the
performance of NGO programmes at the Upazila level is
significant	 and at the very least is better than
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government programmes offered through the "Upazila
Administration".
In this research detailed information on NGO
activities at Upazila level has not been collected.
The information provided here is simply to make readers
aware of the highly significant NGO role in development
in Bangladesh.	 The "Upazila Parishad" has the
authority to coordinate NGO activities. It is felt by
both government officials and elected representatives,
that there are no significant conflicts between the
functions of the NGOs,	 and the
	
"Upazila
Administration".
In the development process of Bangladesh, the
role of NGOS is significant, and is likely to continue
to be so in the future. In some areas important
activities, for example the operation and maintenance
of deep tube wells for irrigation, have been entrusted
by the government to the NGOs. The Grameen Bank is an
example of a parastatal, which bears some resemblance
to an NGO in that the state interferes with it as
little as possible. It is generally agreed to be
successful. In the future, activities from NGO's and
the Grameen Bank may aid the learning process within
the "Upazila Administration". NGOs are also playing an
important role in providing training for the local
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government staff who are involved in rural development.
Reciprocally, future NGO activities may be better
coordinated at the Upazila level, as the administrative
capacity of the Upazila increases.
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8.4	 Concluding Comments
The experience of decentralisatiori at the
Upazila level in Bangladesh has not been altogether
satisfactory. Conflicts, lack of cooperation and
coordinatiion among administrators and the elected
representatives, and corrupt practices in development
functions have been major problems of the "Upazila
Administration". Because democracy has not been upheld,
public accountability is weak in the administration.
Under such circumstances, given the flow of resources
to the Upazila level, corrupt-minded people have come
to control resources and influence development
policies. Though direct central control on the
administration has been substantially reduced, indirect
influence in different ways jeopardises the democratic
activities of the "Upazila Administration". Planning
and decision-making under such circumstances have not
been effective. Moreover, development policy at the
Upazila level under the current decentralisation
policy, has been poorly organized. It will be evident
in the next chapter that under such conditions, little
improvement in the well-beings of the rural poor has
come about. Rural elites, and the corrupt and
unprincipled, are the ones obtaining the greatest
benefits from decentralisation.
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Administratively speaking, the main result of
the programme of decentralisation has been the
installation of a larger administrative set-up with
greater authority. Historically no government in this
region has been so committed to decentralisation of the
administrative structure. The process seems to be
irreversible in spite of the undemocratic way in which
it was introduced. People have welcomed at least the
outward signs of a political-administrative structure.
In the short-run, decentralisation has not made any
significant contribution to the creation of democratic
institutions which favour participation in
development. There is, however, hope for better results
in the future. Chapter 9 discuss this in more detail.
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Tables - Chapter 8
Table 8.1 : Opinion on the previous Thana
Administration as compared with the
Upazila.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Problems of Thana Administration
(compared with Upazila) :
Lack of authority for development
Lack of staff
Lack of resources
Lack of participatiion
Aloofness of the staff in local problems
40.48
52.38
39.29
20.24
13 .10
Advantages of Thana Administration:
More honesty of staff	 23.81
Neutrality in decision-making	 26.19
No external influence on local administration 5.95
Upazila as a level for local administration :
Appropriate	 86.90
Not appropriate	 13. 10
Viability of new administration for development :
Substantially optimistic 	 27.38
Moderately optimistic	 54.76
Not optimistic	 15.48
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Table 8.2	 :	 Independence of the	 "Upazila
Administration."
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total Respondents.
Independence in decision-making :
Independent
Not independent
No response
Decentralised authority :
Decentralised
Not decentralised
No response
Bottom-up approach :
Bottom-up
Not bottom-up
No response
External influence :
There is influence
There is no influence
No response
Central government's consultation with
the Upazila Administration :
Consult
Does not consult
No response
Upazila Parishad's power to reject
any central decision :
76.19
17.86
5.95
60.71
13 . 10
26.19
42.86
5.95
51.19
38.10
52 • 38
9.52
15.48
65.48
19.04
Can reject	 -
Cannot reject	 88.10
No response	 11.90
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Table 8.3 : Dual loyalties, conflicts and corruption in
the Upazila Administration.
Aspects	 percentage of the
total Respondents
Conflicts between representatives
and officers :
There are conflicts
There are no conflicts
Nature of conflicts :
Power and status
Decision-making
Personal clash/rivalry
Conflicts between Upazila Chairman
and UNO
There is conflict
There is no conflict
No response
Corruption in Administration :
There is corruption
There is no corruption
No response
88.10
11.90
77.38
63 . 09
11.90
78.57
19.05
2.38
89.29
4.76
5.95
Nature of corruption :
Financial misuse
	
71.43
Corrupt decision-making	 29.76
No response	 5.95
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Table 8.4 : Benefits for rural people from
decentral isation.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total Respondents
Direct benefit :
Closeness of the institution
More income and employment
Better social facilities
No response
77.38
7.14
9.52
5.95
Commitment of staff to people's
benefit :
Substantial	 10.72
Moderate	 57.14
None	 29.76
No response	 2.38
Table 8.5 : Comments on the continuation of present
democratic structures in local
administration.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total Respondents.
Upazila Administration :
It should continue
It should not continue
It should continue with certain reforms
No response
Satisfaction on Union and Village
organizations :
69.04
14.29
14.29
2.38
Satisfied	 54.76
Not satisfied	 42.86
No response	 2.38
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Table 8.6 : Impact of decentralisation on the political
envirorunent.
Aspects	 percentage of the
total Respondents
Political participation :
Increasing	 22 • 62
Decreasing	 51.19
Same as before	 26.19
General political environment :
Improving	 17.86
Not improving	 44.04
worsening	 29.76
Not predictable	 8.33
Table 8.7 : Nature of political and social pressures.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total Respondents
Political pressure on Administration :
There is pressure	 71.43
There is no pressure	 28.57
Nature of political pressure :
By political party	 29.32
By political leader	 36.90
By local elites	 22.47
By poor /unexnployed 	 9.97
237
Table 8.8 : Some social and political aspects at the
Upazila.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total Respondents
Source of political repression/supression :
By ruling party
By locally dominant groups
Corrupt persons
None
No response
Trade Union rights for agricultural
labourers :
Should be given
Should not be given
No response
26.19
26.19
7.14
7.14
33.34
80.97
9.52
9.52
General social environment :
Has improved	 20.24
Has not improved	 20.24
Has deteriorated	 33.33
Same as before	 25.00
2Table 8.9 : Aspects of Upazila judiciary and security.
Aspect	 Percentage of the
total Respondents
Justice for rural poor :
They obtain justice
They do not obtain justice
Corruption in the delivery of justice
There is corruption
There is no corruption
No response
External influence in the delivery
of justice :
There is influence
There is no influence
No response
Role of police in security :
Playing proper role
Not playing proper role
No response
Police-Magistracy cooperation :
47.62
52 . 38
77.38
19. 05
3 .57
64.29
11.90
3.57
23.81
72.62
3.57
There is cooperation	 78.57
There is no cooperation	 19.05
No response	 2.38
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Table 8.10 : Qualification of the "Upazila
Administration" for development
planning at local level.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total Respondents
General qualifications :
Increased authority
Increased staff
More resource
Democratic participation
Increased awareness of staff
Improvement of Upazila Administration
over Thana Administration :
Improved
Not improved
No response
Participation in development process :
Substantial
Marginal
Same as before
None
Worsening
46.43
65.48
19.05
23.81
20.24
86.91
7.14
5.95
20.24
42.86
19. 05
8.33
9.52
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Table 8.11 : Investmant policies of the Upazila
Administration.
Aspects	 percentage of the
total Respondents.
Spatial equity :
Maintains equity
Does not maintain equity
No response
Income and employment equity :
Maintain equity
Does not maintain equity
No response
11.91
80.95
7.14
10.72
83 .33
5.95
Table 8.12 : Rural development process.
Aspects	 percentage of the
total Respondents
Area of the Upazila headquaters :
Growth is encouraged	 61.91
Growth is not encouraged	 34.52
No response	 3 .57
Development in rural areas :
Improving	 47.62
Not improving	 48.81
No response	 3.57
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Table 8.13 : Problems in the planning process of the
Upazila Administration.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total Respondents
Development administration :
There is a problem 	 -	 64.29
There is no problem	 26.19
No response	 9.52
Current planning problems :
Lack of coordination	 23.81
Lack of resources 	 -	 14.29
Lack of efficiency in implementation
	 29.76
Comment on planning process :
Better than before	 15.48
Good	 29.76
Worse	 23.81
On paper all right not in practice	 17.86
No response	 13.09
Table 8.14 : NGO performance as compared with the
performance of-the Upazila Administration.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total Respondents
NGO functions :
Better	 71.43
Same	 7.14
Worse	 -
No response	 -	 21.43
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1. On conflicts in the Upazila Administration", see
Seraj, T.M. : "Problems and Prospects of
Decentralisation and Urbanization at the tJpazila
Level", The Journal of Local Government, Vol. 17
No. 1 (Dhaka : NILG, 1988), pp. 107-109.
2. Local Parliament Members (MP) have some power at
the Upazila Level. The government has already
provided the MP5 with some licensing authority
at the Upazila level. This has created a conflict
between the MP5 and the elected representatives
of the "Upazila Administration".
3.	 See Huda, A.T.M.S. (ed.) : Co-ordination in
Public Administration in Bangladesh (Dhaka :
BPATC,	 1987).
4. The electoral process has a significance beyond
the narrow limits of the actual mechanism of the
ballot. Polling is only the means of democratic
self-expression. For political views on
democratic elections in the Indian context, see,
"Undercutting the democratic process", Economic
and Political Weekl y , vxxiii, No.35, (August 27,
1988).
5.	 A Parliament Member of one Upazila also expressed
such a view.
6. Dr. Atiur Rahman, a research fellow in the
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
expressed the strong view that the agricultural
labourers should have Trade Unions. The
present researcher discussed with him, the survey
and questionnaires.
7.	 The Upazila Engineer in one Upazila, expressed
such a view.
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8. In the cultural history of Bangladesh,
secularism, humanistic socialism, and religiosity
are persistently intertwined elements. The
Muslims, Hindus and other religious groups have
never been in any major conflict since
Independence in 1971. For more information, see
Jahangir, B.K. : Problematics of Nationalism in
Bangladesh (Dhaka : Centre for Social Studies,
1986).
9. The Chittagong Hill Tract is a major hilly
area of Bangladesh with conflicts between the
original tribal inhabitants and new settlers from
other parts of the country. A rebel section of
the tribal population is in conflict with the
government over the autonomy of the Hill Tract.
There have been many armed conflicts
between the rebel forces and the armies. To
ease unrest, the government has made
provision recently for elected councils at all
local administrative tiers in the Hill Tract.
10. The Upazila Headquarters are now considered by
the national government as small urban centres.
The government also has completed the preparation
of "Landuses Plans" for all of the Upazila
headquarters. It is expected that such
developments will encourage rural people to stay
in rural areas, thus checking the migration of
the rural poor to large urban centres. In this
respect, decentralisation is aimed at
rejuvenating rural life by creating new income
and employment opportunities at the Upazila
level.
11. More than four hundred NGOs are working in
Bangladesh, with a host of ideas, strategies,
political affiliations, ideologies and
development programmes. For more information,
see Nebelung, M. : "On the NGO-Mode of
Intervention in Rural Bangladesh : The
Mobilisation of Assetless Agricultural Workers as
an Emancipatory Development Strategy", A paper
presented to the Development Association Annual
Conference (Birmingham : University of
Birmingham, 6-9 September, 1988).
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THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON THE SATISFACTION OF
BASIC NEEDS IN THE RURAL AREAS OF BANGLADESH
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Decentralisation and the Delivery of Basic Needs
There is no definite set of criteria which can
be used in the evaluation of the impact of
decentralisation on the satisfaction of "basic needs".
But recalling Chambers' argument that the neglected
"rural poor" can be helped by decentralisation as a
viable alternative to centralised efforts for rural
development, an attempt has been made in this chapter
to evaluate the impact of decentralisation on basic
needs.
Local institutions can take more care of the
rural poor, in the light of what was said in the
"Manila Declaration" :
"If you have come to help me you can go home again. But
if you see my struggle as part of your own survival
then perhaps we can work together" (IFDA, 1990) .1
The basic philosophy is that "the people will
not come to the institutions, rather the institutions
should go to the people for development". 2 Empirical
investigation of this chapter is informed by this
philosophy. Emphasis has been placed on information
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collected at the grass-roots level, through a Survey
and Questionnaire (Questionnaire B). Information from
secondary sources ha; also been used.
A similar strategy, as in the case of
"Questionnaire A", was followed for "Questionnaire B".
The Questionnaire contained questions on various
aspects of basic needs. There were both open-ended and
closed questions. There were differences in the type of
respondents however, and also in the process of
interviewing. Random sampling was followed to select
respondents among three categories of households, based
on income status. The list of the households was
collected from the "Union Parishads". The households
were categorized into three income groups, based on the
amount of property taxes levied on them by the "Union
Parishads". Six villages, two from each Upazila, were
selected for survey using the Questionnaire. In each
Upazila, one village was selected near the Upazila
headquarters, and another one at a far of f place, at a
distance of about three miles (Appendix 8.2).
Some difficulties were encountered in the field
Survey. The survey was conducted by employing
investigators. The investigators were trained in the
procedure of surveys. The main problem faced by the
investigators was to collect information from
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respondents who were not sufficiently knowledgeable to
answer difficult questions on the impact of
decentralisation. Moreover, many of the poorest group
were not interested in answering a questionnaire which
essentially required considerable time. However,
sufficient numbers were interested in speaking about
the new institutions at the Upazila level. The
researcher himself interviewed some respondents in each
village, to gauge the reactions and attitudes of the
rural people towards the "Upazila Administration". To
complete the Survey, however, it was necessary to
employ investigators. Six villages in three Upazilas
were surveyed by these investigators. A single
investigator was hard pressed to complete two
questionnaires in one day. A lengthy stay in the
Upazila was necessary. Accontmodation facilities were
available in the Upazila Administration, and were used
for this purpose. The investigators made strenuous
efforts to provide a Survey successful. Before
decentralisation there was at the Upazila level hardly
any accommodation facility. This facility should help
improve future surveys in the rural areas.
In the main, the Survey reflects the views of
the rural poor. Landless people were included. To
avoid a one-sided view however, some additional
interviews were held with the relevant officers of the
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"Upazila Administration".
It was not possible in the Survey to cover the
entire Upazila, even less the whole country. I believe
that the fieldwork has been effective nevertheless in
taking a broad cross-section of opinion and exploring
current attitudes towards the impact of
decentralisation. In particular we have concentrated on
the effects of decentralisation on the satisfaction of
basic needs in the rural areas.
In total, 138 respondents were interviewed in
6 sample villages of 3 Upazilas. In the Upazila
Singair, 49 respondents were interviewed; in the
Upazila Jhikargacha, 47 respondents, and in the Upazila
Madhupur 42 respondents. This covered about 25 percent
of households in the villages.
The Survey concentrated on several aspects of
basic needs. Three aspects were, however, given more
emphasis. These aspects were (1) access of the people
to information, (ii) the provision of health care, and
(iii) assistance offered during any natural disasters.
These are discussed briefly in turn below.
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Access to Information
Access to information on various government
policies for development, is an important basic need.
In poverty-striken Bangladesh, where the literacy rate
is only about 25 percent, decentralisation if it is to
be regarded as a success should help in keeping rural
people, particularly the rural poor informed, of the
opportunities available for them. 3 This may not
directly improve the basic conditions of life of the
rural poor, but it will make an indirect contribution
towards improving knowledge, choice and self-esteem.4
It is also a necessary prerequisite for greater
participation of the rural poor in development.
Provision of Health Care
Health care is a fundamental need of the rural
poor. There was no major public health service at the
Upazila level before Independence. Not all of the
Subdivision Headquarters even had hospital services.
District Headquarters were the only dependable source
of public health for major treatments. At present,
however, all of the Upazila Headquarters, excepting a
very few, have large health complexes. The Upazila
Health Complex (UHC) consists of a hospital unit, a
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family planning unit and a unit of primary health
administration. In addition there are sub-centres of
family planning and primary health cares generally at
Union Headquarters. There are qualified private doctors
who have their practices at the Upazila Headquarters.
Traditional village health care is also available
though not in every village.
It should be pointed out that the UHC is not a
direct creation of the current decentralisation policy.
This health programme was undertaken in the Second
Five-lear Plan, with an objective of providing health
for all by the year 2000. The completion of the
programme is nevertheless a more recent phenomenon, and
the policy of decentralisation has accentuated the
programme. This health service has received priority
from the national government. it is notable, however,
that health services have not been further extended in
the rural villages since 1976 (Table 9.1).
The UHC was previously under the direct control
and supervision of the Chief Civil Surgeon at the
district level. Decentralisation has placed the UHC
under the "Upazila Administration". Different unit
officers of the UHC are members of the "Upazila
Parishad." The "Upazila Parishad" has, therefore,
responsibility for improving the health services of the
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Upazila. This research evaluates the performance of the
Upazila Health Complex in providing health services for
the rural people, particularly the rural poor.
Assistance During Natural Disasters
Natural disasters, such as floods, cyclones or
drought are endemic in Bangladesh. The country faces
natural disasters every year, though the damage caused
by these calamities varies from year to year. The
problems of the rural poor, and their lack of basic
needs, are significantly related to these disasters.
Generally-speaking the resources to help the
victims of disasters come via the central government.
Decentralisation has created a new opportunity to
organize local initiatives to help the victims of
natural disasters, and to coordinate and supervise
national programmes of relief operation.
Officials and representatives of the "Upazila
Administration" were interviewed, to see if the
"Upazila Administration" is capable of undertaking
necessary precautionary measures, as well as relief
works, relating to natural disasters. The answers were
simple and clear - "no". Some officials added that if
there had been such capabilities, the Army would not
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have been in charge of the relief operations at the
Upazila level, during the floods of 1987-and 1988.
Information was also collected from the rural
people using Questionnaires about their losses during
the floods of 1988, and the help they received from the
public authorities ( One Upazila was not, however,
affected by floods).
An Overview
The key question is whether- decentralisation
has improved delivery .of basic needs. Questions which
have been posed are : (a) Do rural people now have
more information on government policies and strategies
for development, at the local level? (b) Do the rural
poor benefit from improvements in public health
services, located at certain focal points? Do rural
people receive help from the local administration in
times of natural disasters, such as floods, cyclones,
and drought?
Answers to these questions are not
straightforward, but I will argue that the information
which has been gathered through the Questionnaire,
presents a fair overall picture of the outcome.
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Overall, the response of the people
questioned, to the issue of the Upazila and basic
needs, was a negative one. The Upazila has not improved
the delivery of basic needs. The respondents believe,
however, that local administration should be
democratic, and that the "Upazila Administration"
should continue in the future. There was a consensus
that the increasing governmental efforts at the Upazila
level, will ultimately benefit the rural areas.
Secondary sources too, make it possible to express a
cautious optimism, about the future effectiveness of
decentralisation, and this conclusion is expanded in
the final chapter.
Access to Information
a) Are rural people aware of national-local
affairs?
b) How do people acquire information about
national-local affairs?
c) Do rural people have information about their
officials and elected representatives, in the Upazila
Adininistrat ion?
d) Did rural people have information about the
previous "Thana Administration".
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e) Do people have better information about
government policies with the Upazila Administration?
f) Do people believe that corruption in the
"Upazila Administration" has decreased?
Health Care
a) Which health facilities do rural people
generally use - Public or Private?
b) Are the rural people satisfied with the
services of the UNC?
c) Why do rural people prefer private health
services?
d) Do people get treatment free of cost in
emergencies?
e) Do rural people visit public doctors or
health officials to consult on health matters?
f) Do public doctors or health officials visit
rural people?
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Natural Disasters
a) Do people receive any help for flood damage?
b) Do people believe that the distribution of
flood relief is "fair"?
C) Do people receive help from the Upazila
Administration?
d) Do rural people know the relevant officer in
charge of looking after problems of natural disasters?
e) Has the Upazila Administration coped with the
problems of natural disasters?
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9.1 Access to Information : Questions and Answers
a) Rural people in general are not aware of
everyday national-local affairs (Table 9.2). The
fieldwork results show that about 53 percent of people
in rural areas are not aware of everyday national
affairs. This is not unexpected in poverty-striken
rural Bangladesh with a poor literacy rate. The view of
35 percent of respondents, that they are aware of
everyday national affairs is encouraging in this
respect. By everyday national affairs, they mean
important national events which receive substantial
coverage on television, radio and in the newspapers.
At the Upazila level, 40 percent of
respondents are aware of everyday Upazila affairs. In a
poor nation where about 80 percent people live below
the poverty line, this figure is not unexpected. In the
context of this thesis, however, this figure is not
encouraging for improved participation. A substantial
number of people have no clear knowledge of the
"Upazila Administration". For democratic practice
knowledge of the local institution is important.
b) People in the rural areas get information
on various issues related to development through
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different means (Table 9.3). The major media in rural
areas are the radio, and "people as messengers".
Friends and relatives are important in conveying
information. Television is not yet a major medium of
communication in rural areas of Bangladesh.5
c) It is important that rural people have
information about the activities of their local
democratic institutions in order to gain greater
benefit from their services. The majority of
respondents had no detailed knowledge of the activities
of government officials, and of the elected
representatives of the "Tipazila Administration" (Table
9.4). People were nevertheless more informed about
their elected representatives than they were about
government officials. About 11 percent of respondents
know the Upazila-level government officials. About 35
percent of respondents have met or talked to officials
of the "Upazila Administration". This is not altogether
disappointing, but awareness of democratic institutions
is still very imperfect.
About 25 percent of respondents have attended
meetings organised by any officials of the "Upazila
Administration". Relatively few people attend meetings
to obtain information on cultivation methods, prices,
credit, development policies and functions of the
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"Upazila Administration". In practice there has not
been any significant breakthrough, in comparison with
the previous situation.
d) 20 percent of respondents said that they had
knowledge of the previous "Thana Administration" (Table
9.5). In their opinion the previous administration
did not provide easy access for the rural poor. Only a
small number of respondents (10%) had attended
programmes organized by the "Thana Administration".
Some respondents had the idea that officials of the
"Thana Administration" had visited villages. About 54
percent of respondents believe that the "Upazila
Administration" is performing better than the "Thana
Administration". This is, however, not a large
majority of respondents, and there are also opposite
views. Many respondents could not compare the
performance of the "Upazila Administration" and the
"Thana Administration".
e) The majority of respondents cannot judge
whether the present administrative system at the
Upazila level has improved the flow of information
(Table 9.6). Some respondents believe -that
decentralisation has increased communication at the
Upazila level. They judge it in terms of the increase
in staff, buildings, offices, and services of the
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"Upazila Administration". They are, however, not
sufficiently knowledgeable about the practical outcome
of these increased facilities.
Respondents expressed the opinion that the
present system of decentralisation should continue.
About 70 percent of respondents supported this
proposition, in the hope that resources from the centre
would gradually move	 towards the local level.
f) People believe that corruption in the
"Upazila Administration" has increased (Table 9.7 ).
About 91 percent of respondents believe that corruption
in local development administration has increased.
Most of the respondents maintain that corruption of the
administration involves misuse of development funds,
nepotism in development contracts, such as in the
construction of bridges, roads, irrigation canals,
schools and so on.
About 95 percent of respondents believe that
there has been an increase in the number of corrupt
individuals. The increase in the flow of development
funds at the Upazila level, has brought about this
increase. Rural people, particularly the poor, have
long experience of corruption, deception and repression
in a variety of forms. Although they are not
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knowledgeable about complex political-administrative
structures, they are silent observers and evaluators,
and know when actions are taken against their
interests.
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9.2 Provision of Health Care : Questions and Answers
a) Health facilities used by the rural people
are shown in Table 9.8. The empirical evidence shows
that private health facilities are used more by the
rural people than are the public health services.
Traditional bazaar doctors are popular among the rural
poor. The reason is that these practitioners are
symphathetic to the traditional beliefs of the rural
poor, and they relate well to village people,
fulfilling their expectations, psychological and
spiritual as well as physical.6
A study by the Bangladesh Institute of
Development Studies (BIDS) found that although a
substantial number (92%) of rural people know about
the presence of a health centre in their locality,
they are not as yet properly aware of the functions of
the UHC. 7 That study found that more than half of the
rural people do not know the exact location of the UHC.
Another study jointly carried out by the UNICEF and the
GOB (1981) found that after two years of operation of a
pilot health care programme, 37 percent of the
villagers did not know the physical location of the
institutions. This implies negligence in rural health
services. Decentralisation has not favoured any
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significant improvement in this respect.
b) A large majority of rural people is not
satisfied with the services of the Upazila Health
Complex (Table 9.9). Discharge of health functions by
public means is a necessity in rural Bangladesh, in the
context of the absolute poverty of the majority of the
rural population. The delivery of health services to
the illiterate and poor is not, however, an easy task.
The experience of the UHC have not been encouraging in
this respect. Rural people do not use their services.
Respondents were of the opinion that the UHC do not
have sufficient facilities to provide the services
which they require. At the same time, some of them said
that they did not know what services were available
from the UHC.
Rural people do not in practice get free
treatment from the UHC. This does not mean, however,
that there is no provision in theory for free
treatment. The fact is that the UHC always runs short
of the means of treatment, including the supply of
medicines. There is also corruption in different forms.
The rural poor suffer in this situation. Many of the
rural poor defer treatment for some time, not being
able to manage the cost of treatment. But if the UHC or
other public health services were able to provide the
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required facilities, the poor would be willing to
accept those services. The rural poor do not take
health matters seriously enough, because they suffer
from extreme poverty.
The UHC does not ensure all-important health
services for children and mothers. Nor are health
services located at the Upazila headquarters easily
able to extend their services to remote villages,
because of transport problems. Nevertheless, the major
weakness of the health service appears to be the
unwillincrness of the health officials and doctors to
visit villages. This is despite provision in theory for
some health staff, including the head of the health
administration, to visit Union and villages on a
regular basis to investigate the health problems of the
rural poor. If this were to happen in practice there
would be growing awareness among the rural poor, about
services available at the UHC.
The provision of free vaccinations for rural
people appears to be working in practice. However, it
is a fact that people generally do not visit public
health institutions for vaccinations. Many of the rural
poor never have any vaccinations, nor do they believe
in their necessity for health. Traditional norms of the
rural life, coupled with many superstitions which are
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embedded in rural Bangladesh, are responsible for this
situation.
c) Rural people prefer private health
services (Table 9.10). About 73 percent of respondents
expressed the view that the services of the private
doctors are better, though they need to pay more for
treatment. Why do they use private health services?
There are a number of reasons, some of which have been
already mentioned.
The location of the UHC in the Upazila
headquarters does not provide easy access for all the
rural people, living in different parts of a Upazila.
The major problem in this respect is the poor transport
network in the rural areas. The distance between the
remote villages and the Upazila Headquarters is not
easily covered, especially for those who use their feet
as the only means of transport. It is not surprising,
therefore, that almost all of the rural poor never
use the public health services located at the Upazila
Headquarters. The use of quacks, Kabiraj or religious
means become inevitable in such circumstances. Examples
were found to suggest that some rural poor do not
bother at all about any treatment, unless an emergency
threatens life. The only possibility of changing such
attitudes of the rural poor towards their health
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requirements, is to extend health services to them.
Whatever the reasons, the UHC has not progressed much
in this respect.
d) People do not get treatment free of cost in
emergencies. There is a tendency to believe that free
emergency services are provided by the hospitals of the
UHC. Of the total questioned, 25 respondents reported
that they had needed emergency treatments from the UHC
for their family members. Of those who needed emergency
treatments, only 5 received treatments free of cost
from the UHC. The rest had to bear the cost of
treatment, by purchasing medicines and other
accessories. Decentralisation has not improved
facilities.
Of those 5 who had to bear costs, 3 reported
that they managed by borrowing from different sources.
Some respondents reported that they had requested the
hospital doctors to see if there was any possibility of
help, but they did not receive any help. This is an
important issue to be seriously considered under the
present context. It is worrying that even for an
emergency, the UNC fails to provide required services
to the rural people. It is further worrying that under
such circumstances, at least some of the rural poor
become poorer and landless.
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e) The rural people generally do not visit
public doctors or health officials to consult on health
matters (Table 9.11). Some reasons have already been
discussed. A small number, who had consulted public
doctors or health officials on health matters, normally
did so when they needed appointments for treatment for
diseases. The major reasons for not visiting the health
personnel are two : (1) unaware of the public health
facilities, and (2) lack of facilities at the UHC,
resulting in charges for treatments. Many of the rural
poor fear to approach the doctors or the health
officials of the UHC. For any improvement in such
conditions, regular contacts between people and the
health institutions is required.
f) People generally do not see public doctors
or health officials visiting the rural people (Table
9.12). A large majority of (about 80%) respondents are
of this opinion. Even if they visit, they do so very
rarely. The rural poor believe that the public health
authorities do not perform their stated duties. Most of
the public doctors of the UHC have private practices.
At the Upazila headquarters, generally there are some
chemists' shops. The public doctors use these shops for
their private practices. This creates in public
doctors a lack of responsibility in their duties in the
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health complex. Thus some vital factors can be
identified which make the services of the UHC
unattractive to the rural people. This also explains
why a large majority of the rural people simply do not
know of any public doctors or health officials in the
UHC.
Decentralisation has not substantially helped
to extend health services to the rural people,
especially those of the poor. Rather, in one of the
three Upazilas, the health service has seriously
deteriorated due to poor maintenance. Under the new
laws this maintenance should have been provided by the
"Upazila Administration". It was reported by the UHC
authority that the "Upazila Administration" neglected
this service. The administration takes little care to
improve rural health services. This service has not
received any significant priority in development
policy. This draws our attention to the root cause of
the problems of rural development. There are problems
of maintenance, supervision, and monitoring of the
health facilities by the local administration which
coordinates this important function.
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9.3	 Assistance During Natural Disasters : questions
and Answers
a) During the devastating floods of 1987 and
1988, a large part of Bangladesh, and a large
percentage of its population suffered serious flood
damage. To a greater or lesser extent, the country
suffers from such natural calamities every year.
Information was collected in this respect about the
flood damage, relief distribution and performance of
the local democratic administration in such
circumstances.
Of the 91 respondents interviewed in the two
flood-affected Upazilas (Madhupur and Singair), 88
respondents reported that they were affected by the
floods and lost properties (Table 9.l3).8 Only 7 of
these flood affected households received some relief.
This help was, however, very little compared to their
total loss. Why they did not receive relief in
substantial quantity, will be evident in the following
discussions.
b) People believe that the distribution of
flood relief was not fair (Table 9.14). There are
reports that the relief materials which were made
available at the Upazila level, were not distributed
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fairly. Distribution of flood relief was not impartial,
and there had been misuse of resources. Respondents
reported that the distributors failed to heed demands
from the public, though there were official
instructions to extend help and cooperation. Some
reported that "on paper, many people might have
received relief, but in practice very few got it".
Some claimed that both the government officials and the
local representatives had little sympathy for helping
the flood victims, and as soon as the flood water
receded, they forgot the misery of the people. The poor
and helpless suffered a lot in their attempts to
recover the situation.
C) The "Upazila Administration" was not very
helpful to the flood victims as they did not receive
any substantial help. People provided various
information on this issue (Table 9.15). It appears that
people do not get any significant help from the
"Upazila Administration" in any natural disasters.
An empirical study by Ahmed (1986) suggests
that the distribution of relief does not always satisfy
the principle of equity, as the less-affected persons
in some instances receive relief while relatively more
affected ones do not. 9 This study shows that improper
distribution of relief materials is one important
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reason why most people do not receive any significant
relief in natural disasters. One major problem is that
emergency relief materials are generally distributed
from the Upazila headquarters. Thus those rural poor
who are immediately informed of, or live near the
Upazila headquarters, get more relief than those
in distant villages.
The "Upazila Administration" is not yet capable
of managing major emergency relief operations during
devastating floods which submerge all rural roads. This
also applies to some extent to the voluntary
organizations. Whatever the objective and means there
is the problem that flood relief never reaches all the
flood victims. Many villages remain untouched by relief
operations.
But more importantly, flood rehabilitation
programmes suffer from poor management, inal-
distribution, corruption and resource shortages.
Ahmed's study found that in one Union the housing
materials for flood rehabilitation in the villages,
were used for repairing a primary school because the
union authority found it difficult to distribute the
limited relief goods among a large number of affected
people. Distribution of credits take the traditional
forms of corruption by middlemen who liaise between the
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credit borrowers and the distributing agencies
including the commercial banks)0
d) Most of the rural people do not know the
officer who is in charge of looking after the problem
of natural disasters (Table 9.16). But when respondents
were asked whether they could identify the Upazila
Project Implementation Officer (UPIO) who is the
relevant officer, some respondents reported that they
knew about him. Most of the respondents have, however,
not seen the UPIO visiting villages, or visiting people
affected by natural calamities. This reflects the fact
that there is worrying lack of responsibilty in the
local administration.
e) People also do not believe that the "Upazila
Administration" has been substantially helpful to look
after the problems of natural disasters. The view of
respondents on this issue is not encouraging. Overall,
there is a negative impression. Respondents who live in
rural areas do not see any improvement in this respect.
Why does it happen, even if the administration is taken
closer to the rural people?
Some respondents reported that the attention of
the local authorities is soon diverted from helping the
victims in the rural areas to other things, when the
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immediate danger of flood water goes away. The local
administration busies itself with such things as the
construction of bridges and culverts, roads, buildings,
and so on. The rural poor believe that these projects
are preferred by the local representatives and
government officials, because they help them to earn
money through corrupt practices. Rural rehabilitation
works are not given any priority. Decentralisation has
increased this tendency in local development. There are
reports that those who are responsible for initiating
and coordinating development works are not honest in
performing their duties. How can they then provide the
necessary supervision for rehabilitation works, or
control the corruption of their si.thordinates? Unless a
strong procedure of accountability is established in
the "Upazila Administration", these practices will
continue and prevent an effective and humane response
to the plight of the poor during natural disasters.
More precise results may be evident in future empirical
work on decentralisation in Bangladesh. Perhaps, it is
too early to examine the complex and diversified
aspects of decentralisation, that are currently taking
place in Bangladesh.
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9.3.1	 A Note on Some Recent Measures for Alleviating
Dainacie from Floods
Decentralisation brought some measures at the
Upazila level, after the devastating floods of 1988. In
each Upazila, one "Halipad" has been constructed near
the Upazila headquarters to help delivery of relief
materials by helicopters. In each Union, the banks of
at least one public pond have been raised up by
earthworks to be used as a flood-shelter in any future
floods. In addition some primary schools are to be
made two-storied, to be used as flood shelters. New
primary schools are to be particularly included in this
programme. These measures, however, have been adopted
following instructions from the central ciovernment. No
initiatives in practice have come about from the
"Upazila Administration". Nevertheless decentralisation
can be considered as a factor in the gradual
improvement in such programmes of emergency works, for
any future floods, or other natural disasters.
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94	 Concluding Comments
The opinions which have been reflected in the
Survey, suggest that recent decentralisation measures
have not brought any significant changes in satisfying
the basic needs of the rural poor. More worrying is the
apparent increase in negative elements, such as the
increased power of the rural elites, and the corruption
which has been damaging to the conditions of the rural
poor. Chambers argued in his book "Putting the Last
First" that decentralisation is one of the ways of
improving the prospects of the poorest groups. But
following his example of asking the poor for their
views, we find that this has not happened, at least in
the short-run. In three vital areas pertaining to basic
needs, i.e. access to information, health care, and
responses to natural disasters, the situation has not
improved. Indeed it is possible that potential gains
have been captured by those who are already in an
advantageous position in the rural economy, and that
the position of the very poor may have deteriorated
even further.
Though opinion survey indicates there has not
been any perceptible improvement in the conditions of
the rural poor, respondents from diverse sections of
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the population at the Upazila level, have expressed
positive views on the continuation of the "Upazila -
Administration". It is important to note that there are
positive signs from other sources of information
provided in the Tables at • the end of the Chapter.
Resources are moving towards local development (Table
9.17). Nationally published statistics show that
resources are being increasingly concentrated at the
Upazila level (Table 9.18). Although the three Upazilas
surveyed were not found to have been capable of
generatincT any significant amount of resources at the
local level, national statistics present a more
encouraging picture.
- The income of one Upazila in the year 1984-85
(Table 9.19), shows that it mobilized on its -own
account, a significant proportion of its total
resources (about 20% of the Annual Development Budget).
Upazila-wise, earlier statistics are not available.
There is a possibility that some Upazilas are capable -
of generating a significant quantity of finance from
their own resources.	 -
But less encouraging is evidence on the planned
disbursement of Upazila finance. - The planning
guidelines of the "Upazila Parishad" (Table 9.20), and
the development plans of the three sample Upazilas
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(Tables 9.21 to 9.23), can be examined in this respect.
It is notable that agriculture and rural industries are
gradually being given less importance in the plans.
Basic needs like health and social welfare do not
received significant priority, though the situation in
primary education is slightly better. Physical
infrastructure and miscellaneous activities have
received top priority in the plans. In Bangladesh, such
activities cannot be ignored. But it is equally
important to adopt an anti-poverty approach in the
plans to benefit the rural poor.
Why does physical infrastructure development
get top priority? Many respondents were of the opinion
that construction of bridges, roads and buildings are
projects which can be substantially manipulated.
Elected representatives use their offices to earn a
livelihood and recover election costs. Some officers
also prefer to invest in these projects. The reason is
same. This is an important reason as to why the
Agriculture Officers of all three Upazilas were
unsatisfied with declining investment in agriculture.
Future planning, therefore, needs to be reconsidered in
this respect to focus on the problems of the rural
poor. It seems that honesty in administrative
performance is required more than the planning itself,
though lack of experience and poor quality in planning
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cannot be ignored. It is true that there is lack of
evaluation and monitoring of development projects at
the Upazila level. This, however, should not affect the
independence of the "Upazila Parishad". Studies on
decentralisation invariably suggests that
decentralisation as concept has many positive
connotations, the problem lies with its implementation.
Qualified optimism on decentralisation is
evident in some recent works on Bangladesh. For Hye
(1987), the decentralised development introduced
through the Upazila system, is the most suitable for
rural development in a country like Bangladesh as it
holds out the hope of making optimum use of the
available resources - human, financial and physical,
within a participatory framework. Its strength lies in
the sysnthesis of all previous approaches to rural
development. Under a strong democratic national
government committed to local democracy and
decentralisation of development, conditions may improve
in the future.
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Tables - Chapter 9
Table 9.1 : Rural health facilities.
(In number)
Year	 Upazila Health	 Rural Health	 Union Sub
Complex	 Centre	 Centre
1976	 151
1977	 179
1978	 253
1979	 275
1980	 275
1981	 280
1982	 312
1983	 319
1984	 344
1985	 346
1986	 356
1987	 356
Source : B.B.S., 1989, p.550.
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
12	 1275
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Table 9.2 : Awareness of rural people on national-
local affairs.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
National affairs :
Aware	 35.51
Not aware	 52.90
No response	 11.59
Upazila affairs :
Aware	 41.30
Not aware	 26.81
No response	 31.88
Table 9.3 : Media of information to rural people.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Media :
Own radio
Other's radio
Own Television
Other's Television
Newspaper
Friends/relatives
Frequency of use :
Daily
Weekly
Fortnightly
Occasionally
No response
Interests :
36.23
7.97
4.35
9.42
8.70
32.61
31.16
2. 17
0.72
18.84
47 • 10
Politics	 34.06
Development	 37.68
Others	 38.41
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Table 9.4 : Knowledge of the "Upazila Administration"
indicated by rural people.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Know all officers :
10.87
81.16
7 .97
Know
Do not know
No response
Know some key persons :
Union Chairman
Upazila Chairman
Upazila Nirbahi Officer
Met or talked to any officer :
Met or talked
Did not meet or talk
No response
Attended any meetings organized by
the Upazila Administration :
Attended
Did not attend
No response
27.54
28.99
21.01
35.51
28.26
36.23
24.64
68.12
7.25
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Table 9.5 : Information on the previous Thana
Administration, by rural people.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Knew officers of Thana Administration :
21.01
73.91
5.07
Knew
Did not know
No response
Had easy access to the officers :
Had
Did not have
Same as now
No response
Attended any meeting :
Attended
Did not attend
No response
2.90
23 . 19
15.22
58.70
9.42
84.06
6.52
Upazila Administration compared to
Thana Administration :
Better	 53.62
Same	 11.59
Worse	 2.90
Cannot Judge	 26.09
No response	 5.80
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Table 9.6 : Flow of information to rural people after
the policy decentralisation was implemented
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Information on Government Policies :
Better
Not better
Cannot judge
No response
Assessment on the future of the
Upazila Administration :
It should continue
It should not continue
Do not know
No response
Awareness of the planning process :
21.74
23.18
50.72
4.35
69.57
19.57
0.72
9.42
Aware	 5.80
Not aware	 84.78
No response	 9.42
Table 9.7 : People's knowledge of corruption in the
Upazila Administration.
Aspects	 -	 Percentage of the
total respondents
In the Upazila Administration:
Has decreased
Same as before
Has increased
No response
By the local elites :
2 .17
0.72
91.30
5.80
Has decreased	 -	 0.72
Same as before	 0.72
Has increased	 94.20
No response	 4.35
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Table 9.8 : Health facilities used by the rural people.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Health facilities used :
Upazila Health Complex 	 37.68
Private doctors	 36.96
Village quacks	 67.40
Others	 5.07
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Table 9.9 : Satisfaction of the rural people with the
services of the Upazila Health Complex.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Satisfaction in general :
Satisfied
Not satisfied
No response
Resources of the UHC to provide services :
Has necessary resources
Has not necessary resources
No response
Treatment in the UHC :
Free of cost
Not free of cost
No response
What people do having no money for
treatment :
Cut in other expenses for treatment
Leave treatment for certain period
No responses
Child health care in the UHC :
Free of cost
Not free of cost
No response
7.97
89.86
2 • 17
5.07
85.51
9.42
15.94
76.09
7.97
2. 17
63 . 04
37.68
2.90
84.78
12 • 32
Mother care in the UHC :
Provide	 5.07
Does not provide	 89.86
No response	 5.07
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Table 9.10 : Reasons for using private doctors by rural
people.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Reasons :
Better service 	 73.19
Closer location	 6.52
More reliability	 2.90
Table 9.11 : Visits by rural people to the public
doctors/health officials.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Visits by rural people :
Visit	 7.25
Do not visit	 84.78
No response	 7.97
Reasons for not visiting the public
doctors :
Unawareness of facilities	 15.94
Fear to approach	 1.45
Need to bear treatnient costs	 30.43
No response	 52.17
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Table 9.12 : Visits by public doctors/health officials
to rural areas as seen by the rural people
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Know the public doctors/health officials :
Know	 12.32
Do not know	 75.36
No response	 12.32
Visits by doctors/health officials to the
rural areas :
See them visiting	 4.35
Do not see them visiting	 79.71
No response	 15.94
Table 9.13 : Relief for the flood victims.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Flood loss of the people :
Had lost	 63 .77
Had not lost	 2 .17
No response	 34.06
Relief received :
Had received	 5.07
Had not received 	 57.25
No response	 37.68
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Table 9.14 : Fairness/unfairness in relief
distribution.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Relief distribution :
Fair
Unfair
No response
Type of unfairness :
Partiality
Misuse
No response
2. 17
50.72
47. 10
45.65
2. 17
52 .17
Table 9.15 : Reasons for not receiving help/relief from
the Upazila Administration during the
flood.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Reasons :
It had little/no resources 	 15.21
It was not willing to help 	 21.01
It neglected some villages	 8.70
Not aware of the facts 	 4.35
Relief during other disasters :
Receive relief	 0.00
Do not receive relief
	
57.25
No response	 42.75
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Table 9.16 : Knowledge of the rural people about
the relevant officers who look after
the problem of natural disasters.
Aspects	 Percentage of the
total respondents
Relevant officer (s) :
10.14
57.97
31.88
Know
Do not know
No response
Project Implementation Officer (PlO) :
Know
Do not know
No response
37.68
60.14
2.17
Visits by PlO to the affected areas :
See him visiting	 10.14
Do not see him visiting 	 49.28
No response	 40.58
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Table 9.17 : Receipts and expenditures of local
government Parishads.
(In million Taka)
Heads	 1984-85	 1985-86	 1986-87	 1987-88
Zila Parishad
Receipts	 253.06	 207.79	 221.63	 216.84
Expenditures	 251.99	 212.89	 267.62	 235.22
Upazila Parishad
Receipts	 2380.66	 4274.16	 4877.05	 5910.64
Expenditures	 3192.09	 4161.38	 4830.17	 5806.77
Union Parishad :
Receipts	 418.49	 491.01	 659.24	 722.76
Expenditures	 422.15	 495.18	 656.64	 720.02
Source : B.B.S., 1989, pp. 378-79.
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Table 9.18 : Receipts and expenditures of the Upazila
Parishad under different heads.
(In million Taka)
Heads	 1984-85	 1985-86	 1986-87	 1987-88
Receipts :
Taxes	 51.37	 42.04	 43.37	 63.90
Rates	 0.86	 1.15	 4.99	 6.02
Fees and Tolls 157.95	 208.44	 243.17	 293.64
Property Income 70.08	 59.71	 138.41	 118.78
Miscellaneous	 531.13	 474.96	 582.33	 648.61
Works Programme
Grants	 548.60	 1374.06	 1306.53	 1814.91
Total :
	
2380.66	 4274.16	 4877.05	 5910.64
Expenditure :
Wages and
Salaries
Commodities
and Services
Gross fixed
capital
formation
Works
Programme
Transfer
979.24
317.39
1232.30
490.55
172.61
1801.60
220.75
1737.37
245.85
155.81
2205.05
234.38
1898.09
318.34
174.31
2498.46
298.71
2342.29
328.22
339.09
Total : 3192.09	 4161.38	 4830.17	 5806.77
Source : B.B.S., 1989, p.378.
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Table 9.19 : Annual income of the Upazila Parishad
rhikargacha in 1984-85.
Sources	 Income in Taka
A. Lease of water bodies for fisheries	 20,000
Fees for licence, permits, etc.
	
30,000
Tolls from hats and bazaars	 4,00,000
Services of Upazila agricultural tools 	 -
Other taxes	 50,000
B. Profit from investment	 30,000
House rents	 2,50,000
Others	 62,000
Total	 8,42,000
Source : Kalam, A.K.M.A. : U pazila as a Basic Unit for
Local Level Planning in Bangladesh : Problems and
Potentials, Unpublished MtJRP Thesis (Dhaka : Department
of Urban & Regional Planning, BUET, 1984).
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Table 9.20 : Sectoral allocation pattern for Annual
Upazila Development Fund (AUDP).
Sector	 Minimum Maximum
share	 share
(a) Agriculture and Irrigation :
Intensive crops programme, Demonstration
farms, Seeds Programme; Digging of tanks,
Reclamation of derelict tanks, Rural
fisheries, Development of Social Forestry
including road side plantation and
Horticulture; Development of poultry and
livestock; Drainage and Irrigation,
Small flood embankment and small
irrigation works.
15%	 25%
(b)Small and Cottage Industries: Workshop 5% 	 10%
programme; Skill development, traning and
extension, Income generating activities,
etc.
Physicial Infrastructure
(c)Transport and Communication: Road 	 17.5% 30%
construction, Rural Works Programme,
Construction, reconstruction and deve-
lopment of small bridges, culverts, etc.
(d)Housing and Physical Planning : 	 10%	 17.5%
Development of hats and bazars, storage
facilities, community centres, supply of
drinking water, construction of low cost
sanitation units, etc.
Socio-Econoinic infrastructure :
(e) Development of Education: Educational 5% 	 12.5%
institutions, buildings, playgrounds,
teaching aids.
(f)Health and Social Welfare: Health 	 7.5% 15%
measures, sanitation and immunisation
family planning, social welfare activities
including child welfare, youth and woman
development.
(g)Sports and Culture : Promotion of 	 2.5% 7.5%
games, sports and cultural activies.
(h)Grants to Union Parishad rural works 	 5%	 7.5%
programme.
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(i) Miscellaneous activities: Birth and	 2.5%	 5%
death registration services, disaster
relief (if necessary, 0.5% of this amount
may be utilised for survey work and to
supervise development activities).
Notes : 1. Expenditure on repair and renovation work
for a project in a particular sector shall
be limited within the allocation for that
sector.
2. Allocation for one project in a particular
sector should not exceed one-third of the
total allocation for that sector in a year.
3. The types of activities which cannot be
financed by Upazila Development Fund have
been listed.
4. For repair and maintenance of the buildings
transferred to the Upazila, a maximum of 5%
of the total development assistance fund of
the respective upazila or TK.3.00 lakh
(whichever is higher) may be allocated.
Rent collection from the upazila buildings
may also be utilised for this purpose.
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TabLe 9.21 : Annual Development Plans of the UpazUa Parishad
Hadhupur.
(In Taka)
Sectors	 1983-84	 1984-85	 1985-86	 1986-87	 1987-88	 1988-89
Agriculture and
i rrlgatlon
Small and cottage
industries
Physical.
Infrastructure
Transport and
communication
Housing and physical
planning
Soc b-economic
infrastructure
15,00,000 15,90,600 10,59,700 2,97,817 10,46,352 8,37,894
(30.00)	 (28.39)	 (20.00)	 (9.30)	 (14.47)	 (12.51)
-	
-	 3,64,900	 -	 50,210	 60,000
(6.89)	 (0.69)	 (0.90)
17,50,000 17,23,150
(35.00)	 (30.76)
-	 15,89,500 10,82,323 21,09,000 24,19,008
	
(30.00)	 (33.80)	 (29.17)	 (36.10)
-	 5,09,341	 4,12,000 12,63,201	 5,62,000
	
(9.61)	 (12.87)	 (17.47)	 (8.39)
12,50,000 14,58,050
(25.00)	 (26.03)
Education	 -	 -	 5,44,682	 8,88,802 11,22,253 13,32,048
	
(10.28)	 (27.76)	 (15.52)	 (19.88)
Health and social
welfare	 -	 -	 3,95,886	 91,148	 5,40,566	 3,87,000
	
(7.47)	 (2.85)	 (7.48)	 (5.78)
Sports end
culture	 2,50,000	 2,65,100	 1,32,000	 -	 79,000	 50,000
	
(5.00)	 (4.73)	 (2.49)	 (1.10)	 (0.75)
Grants to Union
Parishads	 -	 -	 3,97,400	 3,59,996	 2,29,027	 1,53,400
	
(7.50)	 (11.24)	 (3.17)	 (2.29)
MisceLlaneous	 2,50,000	 5,65,100	 3,04,928	 70,000	 7,90,359	 8,98,300
	
(5.00)	 (10.09)	 (5.76)	 (2.19)	 (10.93)	 (13.41)
Total	 50,00,000 56,02,000 52,98,337 32,02,086 72,30,310 66,99,650
Source : Upazila Parishad Office, Madhupur, District Tangail, 1989.
AgricuLture and
irrigation
SmaLl, and cottage
industries
PhysicaL
Infrastructure
Transport and
communicati on
Housing and physical.
pLanning
Soclo- economic
Infrastructure
Education
HeaLth and sociaL
wet fare
Sports and
cut ture
Grants to Union
Per ishads
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TabLe 9.22 : Annual. DeveLopment PLans of the UpaziLa Parishad Singair.
(In Taka)
Sectors	 1983-84	 1984-85	 1985-86	 1986-87	 1987-88	 1988-89
Miscel. Laneous
12,52,643 12,58,000
	 6,52,400	 5,11,159	 7,65,672	 2,06,582
C25.05)	 (31.32)	 (15.00)	 (15.45)	 (16.35)	 (13.05)
-	
-	 2,17,500	 1,70,382	 1,17,570	 6,411
C5.00)	 (5.15)	 (2.51)	 (0.40)
13,04,447 12,53,200
(26.09)	 (31.20)
-	 13,04,800 10,22,298 22,55,177	 6,17,038
	
(3000)	 (30.91)	 (48.15)	 (38.98)
-	 7,61,200	 5,96,350	 65,270	 1,31,357
	
(17.50)	 (18.03)	 (1.39)	 (8.30)
	
13,57,812 11,23,250
	 4,34,950	 4,25,957	 3,85,765	 1,43,610
	
(27.16)	 C27.97)	 (10.00)	 (12.88)	 (8.24)	 (9.07)
-	
-	 3,26,200	 2,55,573	 21,328	 70,380
	
(7.50)	 (7.73)	 (0.46)	 (4.45)
	
2,46,875	 2,24,650	 2,17,500	 75,190	 50,208	 35,618
	
(4.94)	 (5.59)	 (5.00)	 (2.27)	 (1.07)	 (2.25)
	
6,52,286	 -	 3,26,200	 2,55,573	 3,13,800	 1,06,852
	
(13.05)	 (7.50)	 (7.73)	 (6.70)	 (6.75)
	
1,85,937	 1,57,300	 1.08,750	 85,190	 7,09,200	 2,65,152
	
(3.72)	 (3.92)	 C2.50)	 (2.58)	 (15.14)	 (16.75)
TotaL	 50,00,000 40,16,400 43,49,500 33,07,662 46,83,990 15,83,00ó
Note : * First instaLment.
Source : UpaziLa Parishad Office, Singair, Distict Hanikganj, 1989.
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Table 9.23 : Annual DeveLopment PLans of the UpaziLa Parishad Jhikargacha.
(In Taka)
Sectors	 1983-84	 1984-85	 1985-86	 1986-87	 1987-88	 1988-89
AgricuLture and
irrigation	 5,00,000	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5,13,000
	
(16.67)	 (17.10)
Small and cottage
industries	 -	 -	 -	 -	
-	 1,35,000
(4.50)
Physical
Infrastructure :
	
15,00,000
(50.00)
Transport and
communication	 -	 -	 -	 -	
-	 6,75,000
(22.50)
Housing and physical
pLanning	 -	 -	 -	 -	
-	 4,05,000
(13.50)
Soc jo-economic
infrastructure :	 7,00,000
(23.33)
Education	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2,97,000
(9.90)
Health and social
welfare	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2,59,000
(8.63)
Sports and
culture	 1,50,000	 -	 -	 -	
-	 1,08,000
	
(5.00)	 (3.6)
Grants to Union
Parishads	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 **
Miscellaneous	 1,50,000	 -	 -	 -	
-	 6,08,000
	
(5.00)	 (20.27)
TotaL	 30,00,000 44,65,000 44,97,500 33,12,584 47,68,000 30,00,000
Note : ** The district authority was entrusted to provide funds for the Union Parishad.
* First instalment.
Source : Upazila Parishad Office, Jhikargacha, District Jessore, 1989.
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NOTES
1. See IFDA : Ifda Dossier (Nyon, Switzerland :
IFDA, 1990).
2. The Grameen Bank Project in Bangladesh is guided
by these principles. The project is claimed to be
a successful one in providing employment and
generating income for the rural poor. See Yunus,
M. : Grameen Bank Prolect in Ban gladesh : A
Poverty Focused Rural Develo pment Programme,
Paper presented at the workshop on "poverty-
focused rural development and small farmer credit
for South Asia, the Pacific and East Africa", at
the BARD, Comilla, Bangladesh (Dhaka : Grameen
Bank, 1982). There is also a relatively large,
more recent literature, on this topic.
3. On the impact of illiteracy on rural development,
see Beguin, S. and Banu, S. : Education for Rural
Development : Impact of Some Educational
Innovations in Selected Areas (Comilla : BARD,
1988).
4. Following the policy of decentralisation, the
government made provision for the appointment of
a "Mass Communication Officer" in the "Upazila
Administration". This was never implemented, but
in my view the appointment of a "Mass
Communication Officer" would have good effects on
the disseminating of information on government
policy, to the rural people.
5. Because of lack of electricity, television is not
yet an important medium of communication. Most of
the villages of rural Bangladesh are not
electrified. A rural electrification programme
is, however, in operation through the Rural
Electrification Board (REB). But this provision
is not primarily for household consumption, but
to expand irrigation and rural industries.
6. See GOB & UNICEF :
Thanas (Dhaka : UNICEF, 1981).
298
7. See Khan, M.R.
Bangladesh (Dhaka : BIDS, 1988).
8. Natural disasters are one of major causes of
low agricultural production in Bangladesh. For
more information, see Murshid, K.A.S. : "Weather,
New Technology and Instability in Foodgrain
Production in Bangladesh", The Bangladesh
Development Studies Vol. XV No. 1 (Dhaka : BIDS,
1987).
9. For detailed on relief operation in rural areas
during a natural disaster, see Ahined, K.A. :
"Local Government and Relief Operation : A Case
Study of Balaganj Union Parishad", The Journal of
Local Government, Vol. 15 No.1 (Dhaka : NILG,
1986), pp.65-83.
10. Many reports are found even on daily newspapers,
about corrupt practices in relief distribution,
food for works programme, and other projects.
There are reports of suspension from office of
the elected representatives on such charges of
corruption.
Chapter 3.0
CONCLUSION
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It has been argued by a number of authorities
that decentralisation builds up democratic institutions
at the local level, and helps delivery of basic needs
to rural areas. This thesis has been guided by this
philosophy, in its examination of the practice of
decentralisation in Bangladesh. The literature survey
of Part I indicated that decentralisation is not
uniformly practised across the world. It faces problems
associated with its diverse nature, and difficulties in
implementation. It suffers from the general
unwillingness of central authorities to decentralise
power to local authorities. Central government tends to
retain a considerable degree of control over local
authorities, and economic objectives are frequently
undermined by political considerations. Nevertheless,
decentralisation is in popular demand in Third World
nations. The results have been mixed, and no country
has achieved what could be regarded as complete
success. The Bangladesh case is no exception.
Evaluators face difficulties in assessing the
impact of decentralisation on development. There are no
specific criteria which can be applied in evaluation.
This thesis has followed some broad guidelines,
associated with political, administrative and economic
implications of decentralisation policies. These
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guidelines also provided the framework for the
fieldwork.
As far as the Bangladesh case is concerned,
over-centralisation was a key feature of the
administration during the British and Pakistan period.
There was, however, a growing demand for democratic
local administration during the later half of the
British administration, and although it was slow, some
progress was made.
After Independence in 1947, Pakistan failed to
introduce a local government system which would grant
greater power to the people. This continued for more
than a decade after 1971. Indeed it is possible that
over the past two centuries there has been a gradual
deterioration in long-run confidence and skill in local
self-governance in rural Bangladesh, given the
historical experience. In recent years development in
the rural areas has become increasingly dependent on
government grants and subsidies. Some progress through
the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) was
perceptible during the l960s but the trend was not
sustained. The involvement of rural elites and corrupt
persons in increasing numbers, in the control and
utilisation of resources, has been a constant problem.
Reforms in local administration have not been
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effective, either in addressing the structural problems
of rural development, or in delivering basic needs to
the rural poor.
A major change in the system of local
development administration in Bangidesh, came through
the policy of devolution in 1982. This provided for the
establishment at the Upazila level, of a powerful
politico-administrative structure with substantial
development authority. The success of the government in
legitimising this new local government system has not
been complemented by corresponding success in
development. The development goal of decentralisation
is yet to be achieved. Increasing emphasis on
privatisation, however, seems to have better prospects.
The current policy of decentralisation
involving the "Upazila Administration" is an ambitious
one. But the policy suffers from a number of problems.
It is weakened by the non-democratic political
character of the national government (Shawkat All 1986;
Mohabbat Khan, 1987). The reforms have been a
repetition of the historical legacy of partial
reconstruction, to fulfil the immediate objective of
gaining political support and administrative control.
The objective of development has been a secondary
consideration as it has always been in the past.
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This study has shown that the links of
villages with the "Upazila Administration" are still
weak, both physically and psychologically. The
confidence of the villagers in these structures is not
strong. Current policy has failed to give greater
control over decision-making by the rural poor.
The rural poor remain neglected in the
development process. There has not been any significant
improvement in the satisfaction of basic needs. The
"Panchayati Raj" of India has set a better example in
this respect (Neil Webster, 1989). In the Indian case,
decentralisation has been favoured by democratic
practice in all tiers of local government
(Gangopadhyay, 1987). In the Bangladesh case, there has
been a worrying lack of political goodwill and
commitment from the central government to address the
real problems of local government in the country,
despite the emphasis on re-organization to favour the
Upazila level.
That the "Upazila Administration" is more
effective for development planning, is not yet clear.
It has failed to create its own sources of income, and
in the long-run this may turn out to be a critical
issue for the independence of the "Upazila
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Administration". It is necessary to reduce its
financial dependence on the central government.
It is important to note that "self-help"
philosophies do seem to work in Bangladesh. There have
been a number of voluntary projects, under the auspices
of non-governmental organizations, which have been
successful. The experience of the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) indicates that social
conciousness can be raised. 1 The Grameen Bank project
has been successful in the inobilisation of rural
credits, generating income for the rural poor, and
implementing other rural development projects. 2 The
experience of such organisations proves that given
strong commitment and motivation on the part the field
agents, success is a strong possibility. The
"Panchayati Raj" experience of India provides evidence
that if participatory structures of local self-
government are left in place for a long period, they
can become instrumental in social transformation. We
also point to the need for democratic practice in
local development administration, if the rural majority
is to have a say in managing its own future.
There are some simple measures which the
government could take to make the Upazila system
operate more effectively, to achieve development
305
objectives. For instance, separate job desáriptions for
each of the officers of the "Upazila Administration",
are necessary to avoid clashes in local development
administration. For a democratic institution to run
smoothly, it must avoid conflicts and clashes. In the
current practice of "Upazila Administration" in-
Bangladesh, the Upazila Chairman and the UNO are the
two most important functionaries. It is important that 	 -
these two have mutual understanding, holding each
other in respect, the kind of relationship that
prevails between a Minister and his Secretary at the
national level.
Political representation from village level to
the "Union Parishad" needs to be increased to
strengthen the voice of the rural people, particularly
the rural poor. At present about ten villages are
represented by only three members in the "Union
Parishad". This is inadequate. At least one elected
representative from each village should be represented
at the "Union Parishad". Villages which have no.
representatives, are being deprived of their legitimate
share of development. In addition there is a compelling
necessity to organise rural people at the village
level.
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Despite the problems revealed in the fieldwork
opinion survey, my conclusion is open minded. I believe
that decentralised institutions which have shown little
success in their first five or even ten years, could
nevertheless promote significant rural transformation
in Bangladesh in the long-run given appropriate
measures by the central government. This presupposes
that the government of the day will have a commitment
to democratic practice, at all levels of
administration. If democracy is pursued at some levels,
but not at all levels, conflict is inevitable. The
present disatisfaction with the practical outcome of
decentralisation in Bangladesh, expressed in the
opinion surveys, and in recent academic research in the
country, is significantly dependent on the national
political scenerio, local power structures and, their
interrelationships. Many of these studies have failed
to provide alternative suggestions, and some,
unfortunately, have a degree of political bias. It is,
however, difficult to maintain political neutrality
when debating such issues. In my opinion, to derive
benefits from decentralisation requires courage and
patience, following the constitutional route to
determine the future course of action in
decentralisation. For Smith (1980, p. 137), the appeal
of decentralisation is now so great that it is in
competition with democracy as the concept that no
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political theory, ideology or movement can afford to
eschew, and the Bangladesh case is probably no
exception.
In this conclusion I am supported by other
empirical studies, which are cautiously optimistic
about the effects of decentralisation on Thirid World
development. Rondinelli and Nellis (1986) and Cochrane
(1983) showed that decentralisation has brought an
increase in the resources directed towards local
levels from the centre. Blair (1985) maintains positive
views on the experience of current decentralisation
policies in Bangladesh and India. The Indian experience
shows that with decentralisation significant material
improvements in the economic conditions of the poorer
sections of the rural social formation have occurred
under the Panchayati Raj (Neil Webster, 1989). At the
same time problems remain, with certain social
relations preventing more radical changes, including
improvement in the political participation and
development of some groups, particularly women. Roger's
(1985) study of Malaysia showed how greater political
participation at community level helped provide greater
resource control, and improved social awareness among
the poorer section of the population.
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It is hoped that this research is a starting
point, rather than the final word. At present there is
a volume of literature on decentralisation, but mostly
in the form of general studies. Many studies present
historical accounts on decentralisation measures. But
relatively few studies explore the link between
decentralisation and grass-roots development.
There is scope for more detailed studies of
specific issues, and for case studies. Studies are also
required which look at decentralisation in terms of
central-local and inter-governmental relations. This is
a research area where a particular contribution may be
made by the discipline of political science, together
with studies of public administration and multi-
disciplinary studies on development. The empirical
demands of such studies, however, need to be
recognized. Although they can be found in the research
literature of developed nations, it is not surprising
in view of data limitations, that very few exist for
Third World countries. Though this thesis illuminates
some problems of rural areas, constraints of time and
resources have not permitted any significant
breakthrough in these directions, in particular, in
detailed studies of central-local and intergovernmental
relations. I realize that comprehensive surveys are
needed in order to suggest more specific measures to
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improve decentralisation. Group efforts and research
organizations may form the ideal bases for undertaking
such comprehensive studies of decentralisation.
In the case of Bangladesh, there is the need to
follow up the "Upazila Administration" experience over
the next five to ten years. We need to know how the new
party-based elected Upazila Chairmen perform in
practice in local development, and whether their
political identities bring greater public
accountability in local administration. Future actions
will determine how the "Upazila Administration" fits
into, and relates to inter-govermental organizations.
This study has argued that there is a lack of linkages
between the "Upazila Administration" and rural
villages. Relations with the district organizations are
also uncertain. Future research may illuminate these
aspects.
An important area of study is the kind of
"development package" which decentralisation policy
should offer at the local level. Studies need to take
an inter- or multi-disciplinary approach. They need
to examine diversified aspects of development, covering
physical,	 social,	 economic,	 political	 and
administrative issues.
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More particularly there is a need to move away
from the simplistic view that decentralisation
invariably helps the rural areas, the villages, and
within the villages, the rural poor. This thesis shows
that even the more straightforward improvements in
basic needs - access to information, health care,
alleviation of natural disasters - do not always result
from decentralisation, in the way we might expect.
There are gainers and losers in a policy of
decentralisation. More specific measures are needed to
increase the political and economic well-being of
disadvantaged groups. It is important to note, however,
that our fieldwork survey showed that people still
want, and have faith in, a decentralised
adiiinistration. This is a further and compelling reason
for trying to improve decentralisation in Bangladesh so
that it performs in practice in the way its advocates
suggest.
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Notes
1. See Love].]., C.H. and Fatema, K. : Assignment
Children : The BRAC Non-formal Education
Programme in Bangladesh (New York : UNICEF,
1989).
2. See Rahman, A. : Demand and Marketin g Aspects of
Grameen Bank - A Closer Look (Dhaka : The
University Press,1986).
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Appendix 6.1 : Functions of the "TJpazila Parishad" and
the Central Government.
Functions of the "Upazila Parishad"
1. All development activities at the Upazila level;
formulation of Upazila level development plans
and programmes and implementation, monitoring and
evaluation thereof.
2. Preparation of Upazila development plans on the
basis of union development plans.
3. Giving assistance and encouragement to Union
Parishads in their activities.
4. Promotion of health, family planning and family
welfare.
5. Provision for management of environment.
6. Training of Chairmen, Members and Secretaries of
Union Parishad.
7. Implementation of government policies and
programmes within the Upzila.
8. Supervision, control and co-ordination offunction of officers serving in the Upazila,
except Munsifs, Trying Magistrates and officers
engaged in regulatory functions.
9. Promotion of socio-cultural activities.
10. Promotion and encouragement of employment
generating activities.
11. Such other function as may be specified by the
government from time to time.
12. Promotion and extension of co-operative movement
in the Upazila.
13. Assistance of Zilla Parishad in development
activities.
314
14. Planning and execution of all rural public works
programme.
15. Promotion of agricultural activities for
maximising production.
16. Promotion of educational and vocational
activities.
17. Promotion of livestock, fisheries and forest.
Illustration List of Re qulatory and Maj or Development
Functions Retained by the Central Government
1. Civil and criminal judiciary.
2. Administration and management of central revenue
like income tax, customs and excise, land
revenue, land tax etc.
3. Maintenance of law and order.
4. Registration.
5. Maintenance of essential supplies including food.
6. Generation and distribution of electrical power.
7. Irrigation schemes involving more than one
district.
8. Technical education and education above primary
level, viz., agricultural, engineering and
medical, education; High School, College and
University education.
9. Modernized District Hospitals attached to the
Medical Colleges.
10. Research organisations, like council of
scientific and industrial reseaerch (C.S.I.R.)
laboratories.
11. Large scale seed multiplication and dairy farms.
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12. Large scale industries.
13. inter-district and inter-Upazila means of
communication, viz., posts, telegraph,
telephones, railways, mechanically propelled road
and inland water transport, highways, civil
aviation, ports and shipping.
14. Flood control and development of water resources.
15. Marine fishing.
16. Mining and mineral development.
17. Compilation of national statistics.
Source : CMLAS : Manual on Thana Administration,
Volume I, (Dhaka : CMLAS, 1983).
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ppendix 6.2 : Charter of Duties of the Staff of the
"Upazila Administration
pazila Chairman
1. The Chairman of a the Upazila Parishad shall be
responsible for the conduct of the day to day
administration of the Upazila Parishad and
supervision and control of the staff of the
Upazila Parishad.
	
2.	 The Chairman shall dispose of the following
business of the Upazila Parishad.
a) Appointment, transfer, punishment or removal
of any servant of the Upazila Parishad, not
being a government servant.
b) Collection and recovery of all taxes, rates,
tolls,fees and other
c) Receipt of all amount on behalf of the
Upazila Parishad.
d) Incurring of expenditure on any item within
sanctioned budget not exceeding such limit as
may be specified by the Upazila Parishad
e) Conduct of all correspondence on behalf of
the Upazila Parishad.
f) Issuing of notice on behalf of the Upazila
Parishad.
g) Compounding of all offences under the
ordinance.
h) Such other business as may be specified by
the government.
3. The Chairman of the Upazila Parishad will
coordinate all the development activities of the
Upazila.
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4. He will initiate formulation of policies in
development matters, indentify project and
schemes and ensure timely implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of the schemes.
5. He will be responsible for relief works in time
of natural calamities, famine and epidemics.
6. He will promote and organise employment
generating activities including agriculture and
food productions.
7. He will promote socio-cultural activities.
8. He will be responsible for proper administration
and functioning of primary education.
9. He will be responsible for implementation of
family planning programme.
10. He will also be responsible for ensuring
implementation of government policies and
programme within the Upazila.
11. He will extend necessary help and assistance for
maintenance of law and order.
12. He will initiate the annual confidential report
of the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO).
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M 'SS 1NG
I
325
8. Create employment opportunities, especially in
rural areas;
9. Promote efficient import substitution, export-
oriented and export-linkage industries;
10. Encourage geographical dispersal of industries;
11. Promote development of indigenous raw materials
and technology-based industries through research
and adoption;
12. Support efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in
clothing by 1990;
13. Encourage forei gn investment in appropriate
sectors and particularly in high technology,
export-oriented and labour intensive industries
14. Encourage Bangladeshi ventures abroad in areas
having a comparative advantage; and
15. Encourage tourism.
Source : DI, 1987.
a ppendix 8.1 : Questionnaires.
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Questionnaire A
Confidential
For research only
QUESTIONNAIRE
For Administrators. ReDresentatives and other Local
Persons with Knowledge and Status
Name of Respondent :
Occupation! Position :
Upazila
Date
I.	 Political AsDects
(a) Please give your opinion on changes in the rate of
political participation by the people at Upazila
level
Increasing I I Decreasing /7 Same as before I I
If your answer is 'increasing' in what form are you
measuring the participation ? Please use 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
according to increasing weight.
Electoral participation 17 General policy-making LJ
Proj ect identification, planning and implementation IJ
Project monitoring and evaluation [J Exchange of
ideas and experiance /117 Others (specify) :
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(b) Do you face any political presure on the work of
your department ?
Yes LI No L7
If your answer is 'yes' why ? (please use 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, according to increasing weight of your answer)
Presure from political party / /
	
Presure from
political leaders F / Presure from social elites /7
Presure from unemployed/poor LJ Others (specify) :
Dose it hamper your work ?	 Yes /_I 	No L/
If your answer is 'yes' how ?
Hampers expected work plan L7 Hampers expected
distribution of resources/investment plan
	 L7
Forces corruption I / Others(specify) :
(C) What is your comment on the democratic governance
of institutions at Upazila level ?
It should continue /_/ It should not continue r
	
It
should continue but reform is necessary /_/
Others (specify) :
Are you satisfied with the democratic institutions at
Village, Union and Upazila level ?
Yes I -iI No [__/
If you have any comment on democratic practics o local
institutions, please state :
Democratic practice has not yet come about /_/
Union/village level institutions need to be
strengthened L/ Upazila Parishad should be given more
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authority L_/ Dual administration cannot continue LT7
Corruption should be stopped U Upazila Parishad
Chairman should be more qualified j i People are now
encouraged by decentralisation rl
(d) Do you believe that the Upazila system of local
administration is the most appropriate for
national development in Bangladesh ?
Yes /:117 No £117
(e) In your opinion, to what extent does the Upazila
administrative system contribute towards ensuring
people's participation in the development process?
Substantially contributing L7	 Marginally
contributing /_I Not contributing I I Same as before
L_I Worsening [ 7
(f) What is your comment on the local political
enviroment ?
Improving f7 Not improving f_i Worsening /_I
(g) Do	 you	 notice	 any	 conflicts	 between
Representatives and Government Excutives ?
Yes /_I No L/
If your answer is 'yes', what type of conflicts do you
notice ?
Power and status i7 Decision-making £7
Professional/ideological conflicts /111 Personal clash
f_i Others (specify) :
Is there any conflict between the Representatives ?
Yes I 1 No /117
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If your answer is 'yes', please state what type of
conflicts exist ?
Power and status L7 Decision-making £7
Professional/ideological differences 	 7 Personal
clash (between the local NP and the Upazila Parishad
Chairman LI_j
Do you notice any conflicts between the Upazila
Chairman and the Upazila Nirbahi Of ficer(iJNO) 7
Yes LIJ	 No L_/
(h) Do you see any conflicting issues in the job
description of the staff of the Upazila Parishad ?
Yes /iJ No //
(i) What is your comment on the future of Upazila
Administration system when comparing it with the
previous Thana Administration in terms of a
development role ?
Substantially improved /_I Moderately improved 7
No improvement L_J
II.	 Administrative Aspects
(a) From your knowledge or experiance, what were the
major problems of Thana Administration for
development at local level ? Please state :
Lack of development authority /_j Lack of staff
capacity r 1 Lack of resources /_I Lack of democratic
participation f / The officials were aloof from local
problems /_j
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Please also state if there was any specific advantage
in the previous Thana Administration system over the
present Upazila Parishad Administration system :
Officials and representatives were more honest J7 The
administration was more neutral /_/ There was no
influence on Circle Officer's decision I / People
would like to participate more in the elections LI /
(b)	 Please give your opinion on the following :
(1) Are there any coordination problems among
your departmental staff ?
Yes /J No I J
(2) Is there any problem of coordinating tasks
which involve more than one departments ?
Yes / / No /j
(3) Is there any corruption in the Upazila
Administration ?
Yes / / No f7
If your answer is 'yes' please state the nature of
corruption :
Misuse of development funds L7 Corruption in
decision making Lu / Contractors are the relatives of
influential Representatives Lull
(c) What extra benefits accrue to people from the
Upazila Administration compared to Thana
Administration ? please state :
Institutions are on the door step /_/ More income and
employment opportunities L/ Better social
facilities UI
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What is your comment on the committment of Upazila
Parishad staff :
(i) To people :
Seriously committed	 Moderately committed /_J
Not committed /7
(ii) To work :
Seriously committed £7 Moderately committed /_/
Not committed /J
(d) In your	 opinion, what major administrative
problems do the Upazila Parishad face now ?
Lack of coordination /_/ Lack of responsibility 47
Power and status between Chairman and UNO /_J Lack of
sincerity and mutual trust /_/ Lack of respect for
rules and regulations fj
(e) Is decision-making in the Upazila Parishad
independent in practic, of the government ?
Yes f_/ No j7
Do you notice any indirect/unofficial influence on the
Upazila Parishad by the higher authority ?
Yes / /
	
No /J
(f) Do you see in Upazila Parishad a decentralised
authority ? Please state your opinion.
Yes f__/ No //
Do you think that the Upazila Parishad system provides
a bottom-up decision-making process. Please give your
opinion.
Yes LJ/ No L1117
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Does the Upazila Parishad offer equal opportunities for
income and employment generating in different parts of
the Upazila ?
Yes L_J No £117
(c) Do you see the Upazila Parishad facing any
particular problems in the management of economic
activities ?
Yes /_I No L117
If your answer is 'yes', please give details.
Lack of coordination /_I Lack of resources /J Lack
of effincy in planning and implementation LIIJ
(d) What is your comment on the economic planning
process of the Upazila Parishad, as compared with
Thana Parishad ?
Good f7 Better /_/ Worse
On paper O.K. but not in practice LJ
(e) Do you think that the Upazila town centre is
developing as a potential growth centre ?
Yes /_/ No /_/
(f) Do you think that the rural development process
has been improved as compared •with Thana
Administration period?
Yes /J	 No L1117
(g) In your opinion is the Upazila Administration
playing a role in meeting basic human needs ?
More community development oriented projects I I More
income and development generating projects /7
Extension of technical services /7 The Upazila
Administration is not aware of such needs L117
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(h) What is your comment on the role of NGOs at
Upazila level 7
They are performing better than Upazila Administration
/ 1 They are performing same as Upazila
Administration /_/ Their performance is worse compared
to Upazila Administration r_I They are making local
administration dependent L7 They hold identical!
Parallel power structure 	 T7
IV.	 Social Environment -
(a) What is your comment on the general social
environment of your Upazila, since 1982 ?
It has improved [/ It has not improved I 1 It has
deteriorated /7 Same as before //
Not predictable /J
(b) What is your comment on the freedom of expression
and association for people at the Upazila level,
since 1982 ?
Better than before L J Same as before /_I Worse than
before I / Cannot judge L117
Do you think that the association of agricultural
labourers should get trade union rights 7
Yes L_i No /7
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(c) What is your opinion about political repression at
Upazila level ?
There is dominance by ruling party i7 There is
dominance by all strong /influential groups f I There
is dominance by corrupt persons fI7 There is no
political repression [7
(d) Do you believe that poor people are obtaining
justice from the Upazila Judiciary ?
Yes Li No £7
S
Have you ever noticed any pertiality or corruption in
judicial department ?
Yes LJ No L7
(e) Do you think that the police station is playing an
appropriate role in security ?
Yes L7 No LTJ
(f) Does the police station cooperate with the Upazila
Magistrate to control crime ?
Yes f7 No /7
(g) Are there any social/religious/ethnic conflicts in
your Upazila ?
Social conflicts I I Religious conflicts I I Ethnic
conflicts /_j None L I
(h) If you have any comment to improve the social
environment of your Upazila, please state.
Moral values need to be upgraded /_J Political system
should be strengthened I / Strict law order to be
maintained L7 Cooperation among law and order
enforcing agencies is necessary L7
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V.	 Natural Disasters e.q. famine, flood
(a) Do you think that the Upazila Administration is
capable of solving the problems of natural
disasters ?
Yes J7 No LT7
(b) Do you feel that a national flood control
programme is necessary to solve the Upazila level
flood problems ?
Yes LJ No L7
(c) Do you feel that local flood control programmes
would minimise the flood problems at Upazila
level?
Yes / J No J
(d) Do you think that the Upazila Administration could
have substantially helped the flood victims during
the last two flood ?
Yes /_/ No 17
(e) If you have any other comment related to Upazila
administration, please state :
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Questionnaire B
For reseach only
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON BASIC NEEDS
Name of the Respondent : 	 Upazila :
Age of the Respondent :
	
Union :
Interviewer :	 Village
Date of Interview :
I. General Household Information
Household Age Sex Marital Occupation Income
Member	 (year) (M/F) Status	 (Major!	 monthly
(Sl.No.)	 (M/Um)	 Subsidiary) (Taka)
II. Food and Nutrition
(a)	 What are your major sources for food ?
Crops/vegetables on own land /j Fish in own pond /7
Family poultry /_/ Purchase of some food items from
market // Purchase of most of the food items from
market /j
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What quantity of land you have at present (acres/decimal) ?
Is it the maximum quantity of land you ever have had ?
Yes /7	 No LE7
If No, when did you have the highest quantity of land ?
Year____________	 Quantity ____________
(b) Did you sell any land after 1982 ?
Yes LJ	 No L7
If yes, why did you sell your land ?
For: food purchase L/ repairing houses LJ
buying clothing /7 health treatment 17
marriage of a family member /TT7 family education /_I
settling any disputes with others fJ other :
To whom did you sell your land ?
Money lender L 7 Rich man f/ Village member L /
Bank /Th'	 Other :	 Quantity sold :
Did you ask for any help from the local public
authorities (Upazila/Union Parishad) ?
Yes /
	
No /7
If yes, what help did you receive ?
Cash loan fl	 grants ITIJ	 help in kind J7
advice to bank for credit f7 other :
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If No, why ?
You were not aware of the system L/ You feared to
approach them /J you were aware that you would not
get any help / J Upazila/Union parishad has no
resources to help in such circumstances /_7 You
would be required to pay a bribe L 117	 other :
(C) How many times do you have meals in a day ?
Breakfast LJ7 lunch /7 supper /_/
other times L117
Do you find yourself physically sound ?
Yes /_I No!_7
Do you think that you would be physically better if you
could take more food ?
Yes 1T7 No LJ
If yes, why don't you take more food ?
You cannot afford to L7 You are on a controlled diet
L_/ Other :
Does your health permit you to undertake regular work?
Yes	 / No L/
Do you stop working any day because of physical
weakness due to?
Overwork /_j Less food/nutrition /J Disease /7
Other :
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III.	 Shelter and clothing
(a) Is this your own house ?	 Yes LJ No /7
If no, who is the owner ?
Relatives/friend L_I	 Employer /17
	 Other:
Do you pay any rent ?
	
Yes /17
	 No/17
If yes, monthly amount in taka
What is your homestead area (acres/decimals)?
(b) Please state your housing facilities (number of
units) :
Residential :
	
Kitchen :	 Sitting/reading :
Cattle shed :
	
Other :
Have you carried out any improvement to your housing
unit in last 6 years ?
Yes /17 No £17
If yes, what improvements ?
Unit :	 Cost :	 Year :
Have you received any help for improving your housing
from Upazila/Union Parishad ?
Yes / / No /117
If you have received any help, which department
provided you help and what was the amount in taka ?
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Please also state if you have received any bank loan :
Has there been any improvement for house loan
facilities since the Upazila system was introduced ?
Yes I__J
	
No L7
(c) Are you satisfied with your present housing
facilities ?
Yes	 No LT7
If No, what is the Problem with present housing ?
Need more room L_J Needs improvement I I Other :
you
How dc think that you will solve this problem ?
Don't know /
_/ If I get money I I	 Children will
make improvements in the future f_/ God knows r /
I will think about this in the future I / Other /J
(d) Do you have clothing for all of your family
xnenthers?
Yes f__I	 No /7
(e) Do you face any problems because of shortage of
clothing ?
Yes L__J No LT7
If yes, please indicate your problems :
Prevents us working I J Prevents us meeting people
/ / Prevents social gatherings /7 Prevents
schooling for the childrens /111_/ The children become
angry /_J Other :
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Do you borrow clothing from anybody for any of the
reasons stated in (e) above ?
Yes Ti No LE7
(f) What type of clothes you generally buy from the
market ?
New clothes L_/ Old clothes /	 Both /7
Has your financial ability increased over the last few
years, for buying clothing ?
Yes L_J No L7
W ere you financially better off, able to buy clothing
for your family members, before the formation of
Upa z 11 a?
Yes L7 No L7
IV.	 Primary Health Care
(a) What major health facilities do you generally use ?
Upazila Health Complex /7 Graduate private doctor
L/ Kabiraj L7 Village doctor 17
Other (Missionary Health Service, etc.) :
(b) Are you satisfied with the service of the Upazila
Health Complex ?
Yes I /	 No 17
Do you get free treatment from the Health Complex ?
Yes	 No L..J
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Dose the hospital service of the Health Complex provide
the necessary treatment facilities for the in-patients?
Yes L_/	 No £117
If no, how do you generally manage the cost of
treatment ?
You reduce other expenditure £117 You leave treatment
for some time £17 Other :
What changes do you generally make for managing the
cost of treatment ?
You reduce quantity of food /_I You reduce quantity
of clothing /_/ You stop taking nutritious food [_j
Other :
(C) Have you had any major treatment for any of your
family member in recent time ?
Yes I / No L117
If yes, did you get free treatment from the Upazila
Health Complex ?
Yes /1/ No fT7
If no how did you manage the cost of treatment ?
From savings /7 By borrowing /117 Other :
If you have borrowed money, what was the source(s) ?
Bank /_/
	
Money lender /7 Relatives/Friends I I
Other :
Did you ask UZP or any of your local representatives
for help ?
Yes //
	
No /-_11:7
Did you receive any help ?	 Yes /_/
	
No /7
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(d) If you generally use private doctors, why do you
prefer them ?
Their services are better FJ	 They take more care
about patients L7 They are your relatives £7
Their locations are closer I 7 Public doctors are not
reliable L7 other :
(e) Do you received free treatment for your children
from public health services ?
Yes L_/	 No L7
Do you get regular vaccinations for cholera, small pox,
after disaster ?
Yes /_1 No /J
(f) Do you get mothercare facilities from public health
services ?
Yes / /
	
No f7
Have you ever visited public health personnel to
consult about your family health affairs ?
Yes LJ No LJ
If no, why don't you visit them ?
You are not aware of any public health facility in the
Upazila /J You fear to approach them L7 You need
payment for consultation £117 Public health service is
not good /_1 Other :
(g) Do you know the public doctors and health officials
of your Upazila ?
Yes f I No 1T117
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Do you know the tJpazila Social Welfare Officer ?
Yes L7 No £L7
Have you ever gone to him for any of your family
problem ?
Yes L7	 No /JJ/
(h) Do you know whether the public doctors/health
officials visit villages for any health work?
Yes f7 No	 J
If you have any comment on health aspects, please
state.
V. Literacy and Access to Information
Literacy
(a)	 General Information :
Household	 Level of	 Institution attended
MemberEducation	 __________________________
(SI. No.)	 Formal	 Informal
(b) Do you want to see your children educated ?
Yes [/
	
No [J
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Are you able to maintain the educational expenditure of
your children ?
Yes f7	 No L7
(C) Have you ever received any help for your children's
education from local public authorities ?
Yes f7 No L7
Have you ever met your education officer ?
Yes fJJ	 No L7
(d) Are you aware that the Upazila Parishad/ Union
Parishad is responsible for the expansion and
improvement of literacy in your village ?
Yes L_/ No I J
Had there been any initiative for universal primary
education in your village ?
Yes /_ J No f7
(e) Do you want to contribute if any programme on
Universal primary education and mass literacy is
undertaken ?
Yes /_I No /7
Access to Information on Government Policies
(a) Are you aware of everyday national affairs ?
Yes /_I No LJ
Are you aware of everyday Upazila affairs ?
Yes U No C7
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If your answer is yes to either or both of the above
questions, how do you get Information ?
Own radio /7 Others radio LJ7 Own TV L7
Other's TV L/ Newspapers L7 Friends/Relatives L7
Others :
How often do you use these communication media ?
Daily /_I Weekly L7 Fortnightly J7
Occasionally f7
(b) What information are you generally interested in ?
Politics	 j Development /_I Other (cinema, music,
crime, etc.) LIIJ
(c) Do you get information about the officials and
representatives of Upazila administration ?
Yes /E7 No LT7
If yes, whom are you best informed of ?
Village/ward Member L7 Union Chairman L/ Upazila
Chairman /7 Upazila Nirbahi officer /117 Other
(d) Do you know all the officials of the Upazila
administration ?
Yes / I No /7
Have you ever met any of the following officials ?
Upazila Chairman r I UNO /17 Upazila Magistrate /111
Union Chairman L7
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Have you ever talk1to ny of them ?
Yes	 I7 No L7
(e) Have you attended any meeting organised by the UZP
rfticials ?
Yes /7 No L7
What information did you gather from that meeting ?
Agricultural information LE7 Price of commodities LIIJ
Credit facilities I	 /	 Government policies on
development /J Functions of Upazila Parishad I /
Other :
(f) Did you know any previous Thana officials ?
Yes J7 No f7
Was is easy to meet them ? 	 Yes	 J No LJ
Have you attended any programme organised by the Thana
officials ?
Yes L__f	 No [7
Do you know whether they have visited yours or other
villages ?
Yes /J	 No L_I
(g) What is your comment on the performance of the UZP
official and representatives ?
They are performing better than Thana officials £7
They are doing same as Thana officials were doing L7
They are performing worse than Thana officials /J7
I can not predict yet J7 Other :
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(h) Do you now have better information about government
policies at Upazila than previous time of Thana
administration ?
Yes L7	 No L7 I can not judge /7
If your answer is yes, please state why ?
Presence of more officials i7 More development
activities L7 Movement and efficiency of the
officials have increased L7 Local democratic
procedure has been a cause for diseminating information
LJ Political activities have increased L/ Other :
(i) Has there been a greater degree of communication
after the introduction of Upazila administration ?
Yes L7	 No LJ
(j) What is your comment on the future of the Upazila
administration ?
It should continue L7 It should not continue LIT7
It should be changed /J7 I don't know ij Other :
(k) Are you aware of the planning process of the
Upazila Parishad ?
Yes L.J No I /
(1) Do you think that corruption in Upazila
administration has decreased ?
Yes / / No L7 Same £7
Do you think that misuse of money by Upazila level
-	 official has decreased ?
Yes ri No Lf Same £7
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(in) Do you think that the number of corrupt middlemen
has decreased after the introduction of the
tJpazila administration ?
Yes L7 No L7 Same £7
VI.	 Aspects of Natural Hazards
(a) Have you lost anything during the last two floods ?
Yes LT7 No /T7
If yes, what have you lost ?
HuinanUves	 Yes/No
Houses	 Yes/No	 Price :
Crops & animals	 Yes/No	 Price :
(b) Have you received any help for flood damage ?
Yes ,7	 No U
If yes, what have you received ?
In Kind :	 In Cash :
(C) Did the Upazila/ Union Parishad help you any way ?
Yes L/ No L_J
Please indicate who distributed the flood relief in
your area/village :
Upazila Parishad /iiJ Union Parishad LL7 Village
member r I Other :
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Who decided the amount/quantity of help ?
Village member /7 Union Chairman /7 Committee among
the people /_I An Officer of the UZP L7 Other :
(d) Do you think that the distribution of flood relief
was fair and responsible ?
Yes LE7 No L7
If your answer is no, please state why ?
There was partiality in the distribution /_I The
distributors misused flood relief r I The relatives
and friend of the distributors received more L7
other :
(e) If the UZP did not help you, please state why ?
The UZP had no resources for flood relief /J The UZP
had not enough resources to distribute among all flood
victims /_/ They were not willing to help 7 They
neglected your village /_/ You are not aware of the
facts IT I Other :
(f) Did people receive help at the time of their need?
Yes LI
	 No L__I
(g) Do people receive any help from the UZP in the time
of other natural disasters ?
Yes L./ No LJ
(h) Do you know the UZP Officer who is in charge of
looking after victims during natural disasters ?
Yes 17 No J7
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Do you know the Project Implementation Officer (PlO) ?
Yes L7 No LEI7
If yes , have you seen him to visit the areas damaged
by natural disasters ?
Yes LJ No /7
(i) Do you think that the present Upazila
administration has been more favourable to
solving problems of natural disasters ?
Yes L7 No
(j) If you have any other comment related to the
problem of natural disasters in your Upazila,
please state.
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Appendix 8.3 :
	 Tables.
Tables - Chapter 8
Results are shown in percentages, for three
categories of respondents,
	
i, ii, and III (I
represents Administrators, ii stands for
Representatives, and III for Local Educated Elites).
Percentages are given for the ratio of the number of
respondents answering the question in specified way,
to the total number of respondents. The actual number
of resporidants answering as specified is shown in
parentheses. Where any exceptions are made, notes are
provided in the appropriate Table.
Total
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Table 8.1 : Problems of Thana Administration
Respon- Lack of
	
Lack of lack of	 Lack of Aloofness
dents	 authority staff	 resources Partici- of staff,
for deve-	 pation	 lack of
lopmerit interest
in local
problems
I	 21.43
(18)
II	 5.95
(5)
III	 13.09
(11)
Total	 40.48
(34)
	21. 3	 13.09	 7.14	 5.95
	
(18)	 (11)	 (6)	 (5)
	
11.90	 11.90	 5.95	 1.19
	
(10)	 (10)	 (5)	 (1)
	
19.05	 14.29	 7.14	 5.95
	
(16)	 (12)	 (6)	 (5)
	
52.38	 39.29	 20.24	 13.10
	
(44)	 (33)	 (17)	 (11)
Table 8.2 : Advantages of Thana Administration
Respon-	 Honesty	 Neutrality	 No external
dents	 of staff	 of sytem	 influence
I
II
III
7.14
(6)
5.95
(5)
10.71
(9)
23.81
(20)
	
15.48	 4.76
	
(13)	 (4)
3.57
(3)
	
7.14	 1.19
	
(6)	 (1)
	
26.19	 595
	
(22)	 (5)
36].
Table 8.3 : Whether the Upazila is the most appropriate
level for local development administration in
Bangladesh
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 36.90	 5.95	 -
	
(31)	 (5)
II	 26.19	 2.38	 -
	
(22)	 (2)
III	 23.81	 4.76	 -
	
(20)	 (4)
Total	 86.90	 13.10	 -
	
(73)	 (11)
Table 8.4 : Opinion of respondents on the viability of the
"Upazila Administration" for local development
Respon- Substantially Moderately Not 	 No
dents	 optimistic	 optimistic optimistic response
I	 15.48
(13)
II	 5.95
(5)
III	 5.95
(5)
Total	 27.38
(23)
	
21.43	 3.57	 2.38
	
(18)	 (3)	 (2)
	
19.05	 3.57	 -
	
(16)	 (3)
	
14.29	 8.33	 -
	
(12)	 (7)
	
54.76	 15.48	 2.38
	
(46)	 (13)	 (2)
Whether	 respondents	 see the Upazila
Administration as a decentralised authority
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Table 8.5 :	 Independence of the "Upazila Parishad" in
decision-making
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I
II
III
Total
Table 8.6 :
	
32.14	 9.52	 1.19
	
(27)	 (8)	 (1)
	
25.00	 1.19	 2.38
	
(21)	 (1)	 (2)
	
19.05	 7.14	 2.38
	
(16)	 (6)	 (2)
	
76.19	 17.86	 5.95
	
(64)	 (15)	 (5)
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I
	 25.00	 5.95	 11.90
	
(21)	 (5)	 (10)
II
	 19.05	 1.19	 8.33
	
(16)	 (1)	 (7)
III
	 16.67	 5.95	 5.95
	
(14)	 (5)	 (5)
Total	 60.71	 13.10	 26.19
	
(51)	 (11)	 (22)
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Table 8.7 : Whether respondents see the Upazila
Administration a bottom-up approach of the
central government
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 19.05	 3.57	 20.24
	
(16)	 (3)	 (17)
II	 8.33	 -	 20.24
	
(7)	 (17)
III	 15.48	 2.38	 13.09
	
(13)	 (2)	 (11)
Total	 42.86	 5.95	 51.19
	
(36)	 (5)	 (43)
Table 8.8 : External influence on the Upazila Parishad
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 11.90	 27.38	 3.57
	
(10)	 (23)	 (3)
II	 10.71	 15.48	 2.38
	
(9)	 (13)	 (2)
III	 15.48	 9.52	 3.57
	
(13)	 (8)	 (3)
Total	 38.10	 52.38	 9.52
	
(32)	 (44)	 (8)
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Table 8.9 : Whether the central government asks the Upazila
Administration for any suggestions in matters
of policy changes at the Upazila level.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 10.71	 23.81	 8.33
	
(9)	 (20)	 (7)
II	 2.38	 21.43	 4.76
	
(2)	 (18)	 (4)
III	 2.38	 20.24	 5.95
	
(2)	 (17)	 (5)
Total	 15.48	 65.48	 19.04
	
(13)	 (55)	 (16)
Table 8.10 : Whether the Upazila Parishad in practice can
reject any central decision.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 -	 35.71	 7.14
	
(30)	 (6)
II	 -	 27.38	 1.19
	
(23)	 (1)
III	 -	 25.00	 3.57
	
(21)	 (3)
Total	 -	 88.10	 11.90
	
(74)	 (10)
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Table 8.11 : Presence of conflicts between the
representatives and the government
executives.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 30.95	 11.90	 -
	
(26)	 (10)
II	 28.57	 -	 -
(24)
III	 28.57	 -	 -
(24)
Total	 88.10	 11.90	 -
	
(74)	 (10)
Table 8.12 : Nature of conflicts between the
representatives and the government
executives.
Respon-	 Power	 Decision- Personal	 Ideological
dents	 and	 making	 clash!
status	 rivalry
I	 23.81	 19.05	 1.19	 -
	
(20)	 (16)	 (1)
II	 27.38	 21.43	 5.95	 -
	
(23)	 (18)	 (5)
III	 27.38	 22.62	 4.76	 -
	
(23)	 (19)	 (4)
Total	 77.38	 63.09	 11.90	 -
	
(65)	 (53)	 (10)
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Table 8.13 : Conflicts among the representatives.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 19.05	 17.86	 5.95
(16)	 (17)	 (5)
II	 11.90	 16.67	 -
(10)	 (14)
III	 25.00	 2.38	 1.19
	
(21)	 (2)	 (1)
Total	 55.95	 36.91	 7.14
	
(47)	 (31)	 (6)
Table 8.14 :	 Nature of conflicts among the
representatives.
Respon- Power Decision- Personal	 Ideological
dents	 and	 making	 clash!
status	 rivalry
I	 2.38	 14.29	 5.95	 2.38
(2)	 (12)	 (59	 (2)
II	 5.95	 13. 09
	
(5)	 (11)
III	 11.90	 17.86	 3.57	 2.38
	
(10)	 (15)	 (3)	 (2)
Total	 20.24	 45.24	 9.52	 4.76
	(17)	 (38)	 (8)	 (4)
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Table 8.15 : Conflicts between the Upazila Chairman and
the Upazila Nirbahi Officer.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 29.76	 13.09	 -
	
(25)	 (11)
II	 21.43	 4.76	 2.38
	
(18)	 (4)	 (2)
III	 27.38	 1.19	 -
	
(23)	 (1)
Total	 78.57	 19.05	 2.38
	
(66)	 (16)	 (2)
Table 8.16 :
	 Presence of conflicting issues in the job-
description of staff of the Upazila
Parishad.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 16.66	 25.00	 1.19
	
(14)	 (21)	 (1)
II	 8.33	 10.71	 9.52
	
(7)	 (9)	 (8)
III	 17.86	 2.38	 8.33
	
(15)	 (2)	 (7)
Total	 42.86	 38.10	 19.04
	
(36)	 (32)	 (169
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Table 8.17 : Current problems of the Tipazila Administration.
Respon- Lack of Lack of Conflict Lack of Lack of
dents	 coopera- respon- between mutual respect
tion	 sibility Chairman trust 	 for rules
and UNO
I	 25.00	 8.33
	
(21)	 (7)
II	 10.71	 8.33
	
(9)	 (7)
III	 14.29	 13.09
Total	 50.00	 29.76
	
(42)	 (25)
7.14
(6)
2 • 38
9 • 52
(8)
4.76	 9.52
(4)	 (8)
7.14	 4.76
(6)	 (4)
10.71	 -
22.62	 14.29
(19)	 (12)
Table 8.18 :	 Corruption in the Upazila Administration.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 33.33	 3.57	 5.95
	
(28)	 (3)	 (5)
II	 27.38	 1.19	 -
	(23)	 (1)
III	 28.57	 -	 -
(24)
Total	 89.29	 4.76	 5.95
	
(75)	 (4)	 (5)
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Table 8.19 : Nature of corruption in the Administration.
Respondents	 Financial	 Corrupt	 Undue privilege
misuse	 decision- to some people
I	 23.81	 13.09	 4.76
	
(20)	 (11)	 (4)
II	 22.62	 5.95	 -
	
(19)	 (5)
III	 25.00	 10.71	 1.19
	
(21)	 (9)	 (1)
Total	 71.43	 29.76	 5.95
	
(60)	 (25)	 (5)
Table 8.20 : Problems of cooperation and coordination
within individual departments.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 8.33	 34.52	 -
	
(7)	 (29)
II	 11.90	 15.48	 1.19
	
(10)	 (13)	 (1)
III	 14.29	 14.29	 -
	
(12)	 (12)
Total	 34.52	 64.29	 1.19
	
(29)	 (54)	 (1)
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Table 8.21 : Problem of coordination among several
departments.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 21.43	 21.43	 -
	
(18)	 (18)
II	 23.8].	 4.76	 -
	
(20)	 (4)
III	 23.81	 2.38	 2.38
	
(20)	 (2)	 (2)
Total	 69.05	 28.57	 2.38
	
(58)	 (24)	 (2)
Table 8.22 : Benefit to the people from decentralisation.
Respon- Closeness 	 More income Better Social No
dents	 of the	 and employ- facilities 	 responseinstitution ment
I	 32.14	 3.57	 7.14	 -
	
(27)	 (3)	 (6)
II	 21.43	 3.57	 1.19	 2.38
	
(18)	 (3)	 (1)	 (2)
III	 23.81	 -	 1.19	 3.57
	
(20)	 (1)	 (3)
Total	 77.38	 7.14	 9.52	 5.95
	
(65)	 (6)	 (8)	 (5)
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Table 8.23 : Coininittinent of the staff of the Upazila
Administration, to the people.
Respondents Substantial Moderate None	 No response
I	 4.76	 29.76	 5.95	 2.38
	
(4)	 (25)	 (5)	 (2)
II	 1.19	 17.86	 9.52	 -
	
(1)	 (15)	 (8)
III	 4.76	 9.52	 14.29	 -
	
(4)	 (8)	 (12)
Total	 10.72	 57.14	 29.76	 2.38
	
(9)	 (48)	 (25)	 (2)
Table 8.24 : Opinion of respondents on democratic practice
in the Upazila Administration.
Respon- It should It should not It requires No response
dents	 continue continue	 reforms
I	 28.57	 3.57	 8.33	 2.38
	
(24)	 (3)	 (7)	 (2)
II	 23.81	 1.19	 3.57	 -
	
(20)	 (1)	 (3)
III	 16.67	 9.52	 2.38	 -
	
(14)	 (8)	 (2)
Total	 69.04	 14.29	 14.29	 2.38
	
(58)	 (12)	 (12)	 (2)
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Table 8.25 : Opinion of respondents on whether they are
satisfied with the Union and the Village
level institutions.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 25.00	 15.48	 2.38
(21)	 (13)	 (2)
II	 20.24	 8.33	 -
(17)	 (7)
III	 9.52	 19.05	 -
(8)	 (16)
Total	 54.76	 42.86	 2.38
(46)	 (36)	 (2)
Table 8.26 :	 Comment on local administrations within the
Upazila.
Respon- Democratic Union!	 Upazila Dual No response
dents	 pratice is village Adminis- admn
not ensured should	 needs	 cannot
yet	 be stren- more	 continue
gthened authority
I	 13.09	 3.57	 -	 4.76	 21.43
	
(11)	 (39	 (4)	 (18)
II	 8.33	 7.14	 -	 1.19	 11.90
	
(7)	 (6)	 (1)	 (10)
III	 17.86	 -	 -	 1.19	 9.52
	
(15)	 (1)	 (8)
Total	 39.29	 10.71	 -	 7.14	 42.86
	
(33)	 (9)	 (6)	 (36)
--------------------------------------------------
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Table 8.27 : Political participation of the people at the
Upazila level.
Respon- Increasing 	 Decreasing Same as No response
dents	 before
I	 16.67	 17.86	 8.33	 -
	
(14)	 (15)	 (79
II	 4.76	 14.29	 9.52	 -
	
(4)	 (12)	 (8)
III	 1.19	 19.05	 8.33	 -
	
(1)	 (16)	 (7)
Total	 22.62	 51.19	 26.19	 -
	
(19)	 (43)	 (22)
Table 8.28 : Impact of decentralisation on the local
political environment.
Respon- Impro-	 Not	 Worse-	 Not	 No
dents	 ving	 impro-	 ning	 predic- response
ving	 table
I
II
III
Total
11.90
(10)
2.38
(2)
3.57
(3)
17.86
(15)
	
17.86	 7.14
	
(15)	 (6)
	
14.29	 10.71
	
(12)	 (9)
	
11.90	 11.90
	
(10)	 (10)
	
44.05	 29.76
	
(37)	 (25)
5.95
(59
1. 19
(1)
1.19
(1)
8.33
(7)
III
III
7.84
(52)
8.90
59)
6.03
(40)
9.50
(63)
9.05
(60)
11.16
(74)
1.51
(10)
7.39
(49)
1.2].
(8)
14.33
(95)
11.76
(78)
11.31
(75)
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Table 8.29 : Local pol_cical pressure on the TJpazila
Administration.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 27.38	 15.48	 -
	
(23)	 (13)
II	 21.43	 7.14	 -
	
(18)	 (69
III	 22.62	 5.95	 -
	
(19)	 (5)
Total	 71.43	 28.57	 -
	
(60)	 (24)
Table 8.30 : Nature of political pressure on the tJpazila
Administration.
Respon- political political local 	 poor!
dents	 party	 leaders	 elites	 unemployed
Total	 29.32	 36.90	 22.47	 9.97
(197)	 (248)	 (151)	 (67)
Note : Figures in parentheses are scores.
'75
Table 8.31 : Nature of political repression/supression at
the Upazila level.
Respon- By ruling By locally Corrupt	 None No
dents	 party	 dominant	 persons	 response
groups
I	 10.71	 4.76	 3.57	 3.57	 20.24
	
(9)	 (4)	 (3)	 (3)	 (17)
II	 5.95	 13.09	 -	 2.38	 7.14
	
(5)	 (11)	 (2)	 (6)
III	 9.52	 8.33	 3.57	 1.19	 5.95
	
(8)	 (7)	 (3)	 (1)	 (5)
Total	 26.19	 26.19	 7.14	 7.14	 33.34
	
(22)	 (22)	 (6)	 (6)	 (28)
Table 8.32 : Opinion of respondents on whether the
agricultural labourers should get trade
union right.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 34.52	 4.76	 3.57
	
(29)	 (4)	 (3)
II	 22.62	 4.76	 1.19
	
(19)	 (4)	 (1)
III	 23.81	 -	 4.76
	
(20)	 (4)
Total	 80.96	 9.52	 9.52
	
(68)	 (8)	 (8)
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Table 8.33 : Comment of respondents on the general social
environment at the Upazila level.
Respon- Has
	 Has not Has dete- Same as No
dents	 improved improved riorated before	 response
I	 16.67	 7.14	 9.52	 9.52	 -
	
(14)	 (6)	 (8)	 (8)
II	 1.19	 5.95	 10.71	 10.71	 -
	
(1)	 (5)	 (9)	 (9)
III	 2.38	 7.14	 13.09	 4.76	 -
	
(2)	 (6)	 (1].)	 (4)
Total	 20.24	 20.24	 33.33	 25.00	 -
	
(17)	 (17)	 (28)	 (21)
Table 8.34 : Whether the rural poor are obtaining justice
from the Upazila Judiciary.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 25.00	 17.86	 -
	
(21)	 (15)
II	 15.48	 13.09	 -
	
(13)	 (11)
III	 11.90	 16.67	 -
	
(10)	 (14)
Total	 47.62	 52.38	 -
	
(40)	 (44)
III
III
m
Table 8.35 : Wheter there is any corruption in the
delivery of justice.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
Total
	
27.38	 14.29
	
(23)	 (12)
	
26.19	 2.38
	
(22)	 (2)
	
23.81	 2.38
	
(20)	 (2)
	
77.38	 19.05
	
(65)	 (16)
1.19
(1)
2.38
(2)
3 .57
(3)
Table 8.36 : Whether respondents have seen any external
influence in the delivery of justice.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 19.05	 7.14	 16.67
	
(16)	 (6)	 (14)
II	 21.43	 3.57	 3.57
	
(18)	 (3)	 (3)
III	 23.81	 1.19	 3.57
	
(20)	 (1)	 (3)
Total	 64.29	 11.90	 23.81
	
(54)	 (10)	 (20)
2.38
(2)
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Table 8.37 : Opinion of respondents on whether the police
are playing a proper role in security.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 16.67	 22.62	 3.57
	
(14)	 (19)	 (3)
II	 5.95	 22.62	 -
	
(5)	 (19)
III	 1.19	 27.38	 -
	
(1)	 (23)
Total	 23.81	 72.62	 3.57
	
(20)	 (61)	 (3)
Table 8.38 : Whether police cooperate with the Upazila
Nagistracy in controlling crime.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 33.33	 7.14
	
(28)	 (6)
II	 26.19	 2.38
	
(22)	 (2)
III	 19.05	 9.52
	
(16)	 (8)
Total	 78.57	 19.05
	
(66)	 (16)
2.38
(2)
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Table 8.39 : Suggestions of respondents on how the social
environment can be improved.
Respon- Moral
	 Political Law and Cooperation No
dents	 values system	 order to is needed 	 response
to be
	 to be	 be stren- among all
upgraded improved gthened
I
	 2.38	 5.95	 4 • 76	 3 .57	 26.19
	
(2)	 (5)	 (4)	 (3)	 (22)
II
	 5.95	 8.33	 5.95	 8.33
	
(5)	 (7)	 (5)	 (7)
III	 4.76	 9.52	 7.14	 -	 7.14
	
(4)	 (8)	 (6)	 (6)
Total	 13.09	 23.81	 17.86	 3.57	 41.67
	
(11)	 (20)	 (15)	 (3)	 (35)
Table 8.40 : Qualifications of the Upazila Administration
to better manage the local economic
development, compared to Thana Administration.
Respon- Increased Increased More	 Democratic Increased
dents authority staff	 resource Participa- awareness
tion	 of staff
I	 16.67	 19.05	 7.14	 11.90
	(14)	 (16)	 (6)	 (10)
II	 14.29	 25.00	 5.95	 7.14
	(12)	 (21)	 (5)	 (6)
III	 15.48	 21.43	 5.95	 4.76
	
(13)	 (18)	 (5)	 (4)
Total	 46.43	 65.48	 19.05	 23.81
	
(39)	 (55)	 (16)	 (20)
11.90
(10)
4.76
(4)
3.57
(3)
20.24
(17)
III
III
Total
13.09
(11)
4.76
(4)
2.38
(2)
20.24
(17)
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Table 8.41 : Whether the Upazila Administration is an
improvement over the Thana Administration
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I
II
III
Total
	
36.90	 3.57	 2.38
	
(31)	 (3)	 (2)
	
28.57	 -	 -
(24)
	
21.43	 3.57	 3.57
	
(18)	 (3)	 (3)
	
86.91	 7.14	 5.95
	
(73)	 (6)	 (5)
Table 8.42 : Contribution of the Upazila Administration to
greater participation in the development
process.
Respon- Substan- Marginally Not	 Same as Worsening
dents	 tially	 contribu- contri- before
contri- ting	 buting
butirig
	
20.24	 3.57	 2.38	 3.57
	(17)	 (3)	 (2)	 (3)
	
14.29	 7.14	 2.38	 -
	
(12)	 (6)	 (2)
	8.33	 8.33	 3.57	 5.95
	
(7)	 (7)	 (3)	 (5)
	
42.86	 19.05	 8.33	 9.52
	
(36)	 (16)	 (7)	 (8)
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Table 8.43	 Whether there is spatial equality in
investment for development.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 8.33	 29.76
	
(7)	 (25)
II	 2.38	 26.19
	
(2)	 (22)
III	 1.19	 25.00
	
(1)	 (21)
Total	 11.91	 80.95
	
(10)	 (68)
4.76
(4)
2.38
(20
7.14
(6)
Table 8.44 : Opinion of respondents on whether the Upazila
Administration seeks equity in income and
employment distribution.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 8.33	 30.95	 3.57
	
(7)	 (26)	 (3)
II	 2.38	 26.19	 -
	
(2)	 (22)
111	 -	 26.19	 2.38
	
(22)	 (2)
Total	 10.72	 83.33	 5.95
	
(9)	 (70)	 (5)
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Table 8.45 : Whether the Upazila Headquarters is
a potential growth centre.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 29.76	 11.90	 1.19
	
(25)	 (10)	 (1)
II	 20.24	 8.33	 -
	
(17)	 (7)
III	 11.90	 14.29	 2.38
	
(10)	 (12)	 (2)
Total	 61.91	 34.52	 3.57
	
(52)	 (29)	 (3)
Table 8.46 : Whether the rural development process is
improving.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 29.76	 11.90	 1.19
	
(25)	 (10)	 (1)
II	 14.29	 14.29	 -
	
(12)	 (12)
III	 3.57	 22.62	 2.38
	
(3)	 (19)	 (2)
Total	 47.62	 48.81	 3.57
	
(40)	 (41)	 (3)
III
III
Total
	21.43	 16.67
	
(18)	 (14)
	
21.43	 4.76
	
(18)	 (4)
	
21.43	 4.76
	
(18)	 (4)
	
64.29	 26.19
	
(54)	 (22)
4.76
(4)
2.38
(2) -
2.38
(2)
9.52
(8)
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Table 8.47 : Whether the Upazila Administration is facing
problems in development administration.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
Table 8.48 : Current problems of the Upazila Administration
in development planning.
Respon-	 Lack of	 Lack of	 Lack of efficiency
dents	 coordination	 resources	 in planning and
implementation
I	 4.76	 8.33	 11.90
	
(4)	 (7)	 (10)
II	 11.90	 4.76	 4.76
	
(10)	 (4)	 (4)
III	 7.14	 1.19	 13.09
	
(6)	 (1)	 (11)
Total	 23.81	 14.29	 29.76
	
(20)	 (12)	 (25)
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Table 8.49 : Comment of respondents on the current planning
process.
Respon-	 Good	 Better	 Worse On paper
	
No
dents	 all right	 response
but not in
practice
I
II
III
Total
	
10.71	 8.33	 8.33	 5.95	 9.52
	
(9)	 (7)	 (7)	 (5)	 (8)
	
14.29	 4.76	 5.95	 2.38	 1.19
	
(12)	 (4)	 (5)	 (2)	 (1)
	
4.76	 2.38	 9.52	 9.52	 2.38
	
(4)	 (2)	 (8)	 (8)	 (2)
	
29.76	 15.48	 23.81	 17.86	 13.09
	(25)	 (13)	 (20)	 (15)	 (11)
Table 8.50 : Opinion of respondents on the NGO functions at
the Upazila level, compared to the functions of
the Upazila Administration.
Respon-	 Better	 Same	 Worse	 No response
dents
I	 27.38	 3.57	 -	 11.90
	
(23)	 (3)	 (10)
II	 22.62	 3.57	 -	 2.38
	
(19)	 (3)	 (2)
III	 21.43	 -	 -	 7.14
	
(18)	 (6)
Total	 71.43	 7.14	 -	 21.43
	
(60)	 (6)	 (18)
---------------------------------------------------
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Tables - Chapter 9
In each table, results are shown for three
categories of respondents, i.e. I, II and III( I is for
the low income group, II for the medium income group,
and III for the high income group). Groups I and II, in
the context of rural Bangladesh, form the rural poor.
Results are shown in numbers and percentages (The
Numbers are shown in parenthesis). Percentages are
shown as a ratio to the total.
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Table 9.1 : Information on whether rural people are
aware of everyday national affairs.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 6.52	 31.88	 9.42
	
(9)	 (44)	 (13)
II	 13.77	 13.77	 1.45
	
(19)	 (19)	 (2)
III	 15.22	 7.25	 0.72
	
(21)	 (10)	 (1)
Total	 35.51	 52.90	 11.59
	
(49)	 (73)	 (16)
Table 9.2 : Information on whether rural people are
aware of everyday affairs in the "Upazila
Administration".
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 12.32	 16.67	 18.84
	
(17)	 (23)	 (26)
II	 14.49	 6.52	 7.97
	
(20)	 (9)	 (11)
III	 14.49	 3.62	 5.07
	
(20)	 (5)	 (7)
Total	 41.30	 26.81	 31.88
	
(57)	 (37)	 (44)
4.35
(6)
2 . 17
(3)
32.61
(45)
Table 9.3 : Means of getting information to rural
people.
Respon- Own
	 Other's Own Other's News- Friends!
dents	 radio radio	 TV TV
	
paper relatives
I	 11.59	 2.90	 -	 2.17	 1.45	 26.09
(16)	 (4)	 (0)	 (3)	 (2)	 (36)
II	 8.70	 3.62	 -	 1.45	 3.62
	
(12)	 (5)	 (0)	 (2)	 (5)
III	 15.94	 1.45	 4.35	 5.80	 3.62
	
(22)	 (2)	 (6)	 (8)	 (5)
Total	 36.23	 7.97	 9.42	 8.70
(50)	 (11)	 (13)	 (12)
Table 9.4 : Frequency of using communication media by
rural people.
Respon- Daily Weekly Fort-	 Occa-	 No
dents	 nightly sionally response
I	 9.42	 0.72	 0.72	 8.70	 28.26
(13)	 (1)	 (1)	 (12)	 (39)
II	 10.14	 -	 -	 6.52	 12.32
(14)	 (0)	 (0)	 (9)	 (17)
III	 11.59	 1.45	 -	 3.62	 6.52
(16)	 (2)	 (0)	 (5)	 (9)
Total	 31.16	 2.17	 0.72	 18.84	 47.10
(43)	 (3)	 (1)	 (26)	 (65)
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Table 9.5 : Types of information rural people are
generally irterested in.
Respondents Politics Development Others (cinema,
music, crime, etc.)
I	 11.59	 15.94	 20.29
	
(16)	 (22)	 (28)
II
III
Total
9.42
(13)
13.04
(18)
34.06
(47)
13.77	 12.32
(19)	 (17)
7.97	 5.80
(11)	 (8)
37.68	 38.41
(52)	 (53)
Table 9.6 : Whether rural people get information on the
officials and representatives of the
"Upazila Administration".
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 3.62	 39.13	 5.07
(5)	 (54)	 (7)
II	 6.52	 16.67	 5.80
(9)	 (23)	 (8)
III	 10.87	 10.87	 1.45
(15)	 (15)	 (2)
Total	 21.01	 66.67	 12.32
-	 (29)	 (92)	 (17)
Table 9.7 : Information for rural people about
important personnel in the "Upazila
Administration".
Respondents Village/Ward Union	 Upazila	 UNO
	
Member	 Chairman Chairman
I	 6.52	 5.07	 5.07	 2.90
	
(9)	 (7)	 (7)	 (4)
II	 13.04	 9.42	 8.70	 4.35
	
(18)	 (13)	 (12)	 (6)
III	 21.01	 13.04	 15.22	 13.77
	
(29)	 (18)	 (21)	 (19)
Total	 40.58	 27.54	 28.99	 21.01
	
(56)	 (38)	 (40)	 (29)
Table 9.8 : Whether rural people know all the Upazila
level officials.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 0.72	 42.03	 5.07
(1)	 (58)	 (7)
II	 2.17	 25.36	 1.45
(3)	 (35)	 (2)
III	 7.97	 13.77	 1.45
(11)	 (19)	 (2)
Total	 10.87	 81.16	 7.97
(15)	 (112)	 (11)
10.87
(15)
2.90
(4)
36.23
(50)
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Table 9.9 : Whether rural people have ever met or
talked to any officials of the "Upazila
Administration".
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 5.07	 20.29	 22.46
(7)	 (28)	 (31)
II	 11.59	 6.52
(16)	 (9)
III	 18.84	 1.45
(26)	 (2)
Total	 35.51	 28.26
(49)	 (39)
Table 9.10 : Whether rural people have attended any
meetings organized by the officials of
the "Upazila Administration".
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 6.52	 36.23	 5.07
(9)	 (50)	 (7)
II	 7.97	 19.57	 1.45
(11)	 (27)	 (2)
III	 10.14	 12.32	 0.72
(14)	 (17)	 (1)
Total	 24.64	 68.12	 7.25
	
(34)	 (94)	 (10)
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Table 9.11 : Whether rural people know officials of
"Thana Administration".
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 2.90	 -	 1.45
(4)	 (60)	 (2)
II	 6.52	 19.57	 2.90
(9)	 (27)	 (4)
III	 11.59	 10.87	 0.72
(16)	 (15)	 (1)
Total	 21.01	 73.91	 5.07
(29)	 (102)	 (7)
Table 9.12 : Whether rural people find it easy to meet
officials of the "Thana Administration".
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 Same as	 No
now	 response
I	 -	 17.39	 4.35	 26.09
	
(0)	 (24)	 (6)	 (36)
II
	 0.72	 3.62	 7.97	 16.67
	
(1)	 (5)	 (11)	 (23)
III
	 2.17	 2.17	 2.90	 15.94
(3) (3)	 (4)	 (22)
Total	 2.90	 23.19	 15.22	 -
(4) (32)	 (21)	 (81)
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Table 9.15 : Whether rural people have better
information about government policies
at the Upazila level.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 Cannot	 No
judge	 response
I	 4.35	 8.70	 33.33	 1.45
(6)	 (12)	 (46)	 (2)
II	 6.52	 7.97	 12.32	 2.17
(9)	 (11)	 (17)	 (3)
III	 10.87	 6.52	 5.07	 0.72
(15)	 (9)	 (7)	 (1)
Total	 21.74	 23.18	 50.72	 4.35
(30)	 (32)	 (70)	 (6)
Table 9.16 : Opinion of respondents on the future of
the "Upazila Administration".
Respondents It should It should Don't No
continue	 not	 know	 response
continue
I	 34.78	 7.25	 0.72	 5.07
(48)	 (10)	 (1)	 (7)
II	 15.22	 10.87	 -	 2.90
(21)	 (15)	 (0)	 (4)
III	 20.29	 1.45	 -	 1.45
(28)	 (2)	 (0)	 (2)
Total	 69.57	 19.57	 0.72	 9.42
(96)	 (27)	 (1)	 (13)
Table 9.17 : Whether rual people are aware of the
planning process of the "Upazila
Parishad".
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 -	 46.38	 1.45
(0)	 (64)	 (2)
II	 1.45	 24.64	 2.90
(2)	 (34)	 (4)
III	 4.35	 13.77	 5.07
(6)	 (19)	 (7)
Total	 5.80	 84.78	 9.42
	
(8)	 (117)	 (13)
Table 9.18 : People's knowledge of corruption in the
"Upazila Administration".
Respondents Has
	 Same as Has	 No
decreased before
	 increased response
I	 -	 -	 45.65	 2.17
(0)	 (0)	 (63)	 (3)
II	 0.72	 0.72	 26.09	 1.45
(1)	 (1)	 (36)	 (2)
III	 1.45	 -	 19.57	 2.17
(2) (0)	 (27)	 (3)
Total	 2.17	 0.72	 91.30	 5.80
(3) (1)	 (126)	 (8)
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Table 9.19 : People's knowledge of increase or decrease
in corruption.
Respondents Has
	 Same as Has	 No
decreased before	 increased response
I	 -	 0.72	 45.65	 1.45
(0)	 (1)	 (63)	 (2)
II	 0.72	 -	 26.09	 2.17
(1)	 (0)	 (36)	 (3)
III	 -	 -	 22.46	 0.72
(0)	 (0)	 (31)	 (1)
Total	 0.72	 0.72	 94.20	 4.35
	
(1)	 (1)	 (130)	 (6)
Table 9.20 : Use of health facilities by rural people.
Respondents Health Private Village others
complex doctors quacks 	 (Missionary)
I	 13.04	 6.52	 36.23	 3.62
	
(18)	 (9)	 (50)	 (5)
II	 15.22	 11.59	 23.19	 1.45
	
(21)	 (16)	 (32)	 (2)
III
	 9,42	 18.84	 7.97
	
(13)	 (26)	 (11)	 (0)
Total	 37.68	 36.96	 67.40	 5.07
	
(52)	 (51)	 (93)	 (7)
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Table 9.21 : Whether rural people are satisfied with
the services they receive from the
tJpazila Health Complex (UHC).
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 2.17	 44.20	 1.45
	
(3)	 (61)	 (2)
II	 1.45	 26.81	 0.72
	
(2)	 (37)	 (1)
III	 4.35	 18.84	 -
	
(6)	 (26)	 (0)
Total	 7.97	 89.86	 2.17
	
(11)	 (124)	 (3)
Table 9.22 : Whether the UHC has the necessary
resources to provide health services to
rural people.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 2.90	 42.75	 2.17
(4)	 (59)	 (3)
II
	 0.72	 24.64	 3 • 62
(1)	 (34)	 (5)
III
	 1.45	 18.12	 3 . 62
(2)	 (25)	 (5)
Total	 5.07	 85.51	 9.42
(7)	 (118)	 (13)
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Table 9.23 : Whether rural people get treatment free of
costs from the UHC.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 2.90	 44.93	 -
(4)	 (62)	 (0)
II	 7.25	 17.39	 4.35
(10)	 (24)	 (6)
III	 5.80	 13.77	 3.62
(8)	 (19)	 (5)
Total	 15.94	 76.09	 7.97
(22)	 (105)	 (11)
Table 9.24 : What people do in the case of their
failure to afford cost of treatment
for diseases.
Respondents Cut in other Leave treatment No
expenses for for certain
	 response
treatment	 period
I	 1.45	 27.54	 18.84
(2)	 (38)	 (26)
II
	
0.72
	 14.49	 13.77
(1)	 (20)	 (19)
III
	 18.12	 5.07
(0)	 (25)	 (7)
Total	 2.17	 63.04	 37.68
(3)	 (83)	 (52)
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Table 9.25 : Whether rural people 	 receive free
treatment for their children.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 2.17	 42.03	 3.62
	
(3)	 (58)	 (5)
II
	 0.72	 25.36	 2.90
	
(1)	 (35)	 (4)
III	 17.39	 5.80
	
(0)	 (24)	 (8)
Total	 2.90	 84.78	 12.32
(4)	 (117)	 (17)
Table 9.26 : Whether the UHC provide mother care
services.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 2.17	 41.30	 4.35
(3)	 (57)	 (6)
II	 1.45	 26.81	 0.72
(2)	 (37)	 (1)
III
	 1.45	 21.74
(2)	 (30)	 (0)
Total	 5.07	 89.86	 5.07
(7)	 (124)	 (7)
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Table 9.27 : Whether people get regular vaccinations.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 18.12	 26.81	 2.90
(25)	 (37)	 (4)
II	 12.32	 13.04	 3 .62
(17)	 (18)	 (5)
III	 18.84	 4.35
(26)	 (6)	 (0)
Total	 49.28	 44.20	 6.52
Table 9.28 : Reasons for using private doctors by rural
people.
Respon-	 Better Closer	 Personally	 Nore
dents	 service location known!	 reliable
relatives
I	 26.81	 2.90	 -	 0.72
(37)	 (4)	 (0)	 (1)
II
	 25.36	 2.17	 1.45
	
(35)	 (3)	 (0)	 (2)
III	 21.01	 1.45	 0.72
	
(29)	 (2)	 (0)	 (1)
Total	 73.19	 6.52	 -	 2.90
(101)	 (9)	 -	 (4)
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Table 9.29 : Whether people visit public health
officials/doctors to consult on health
matters.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 -	 44.20	 3.62
(0)	 (61)	 (5)
II	 2.90	 24.64	 1.45
(4)	 (34)	 (2)
III	 4.35	 15.94	 2.90
(6)	 (22)	 (4)
Total	 7.25	 84.78	 7.97
(10)	 (117)	 (11)
Table 9.30 : Reasons for not visiting the public
doctors by rural people.
Respon- Unawareness Fear to
	 need to
	 No
dents	 of facility approach spend	 response
I	 11.59	 1.45	 5.07	 29.71
(16)	 (2)	 (7)	 (41)
II	 2.90	 12.32	 13.77
(4)	 (0)	 (17)	 (19)
III	 1.45	 13.04	 8.70
(2)	 (0)	 (18)	 (12)
Total	 15.94	 1.45	 30.43	 52.17
	
(22)	 (2)	 (42)	 (72)
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Table 9.31 : Whether rural people see the public
health officials/doctors visiting
rural villages.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 5.80	 30.43	 11.59
(8)	 (42)	 (16)
II	 2.90	 23.91	 2.17
(4)	 (33)	 (3)
III	 5.07	 15.94	 2.17
(7)	 (22)	 (3)
Total	 4.35	 79.71	 15.94
(19)	 (110)	 (22)
Table 9.32 : Whether rural people know their public
doctors.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 2.17	 40.58	 5.07
(3)	 (56)	 (7)
II	 4.35	 18.12	 6.52
(6)	 (25)	 (9)
III	 5.80	 16.67	 0.72
(8)	 (23)	 (1)
Total	 12.32	 75.36	 12.32
	
(17)	 (104)	 (17)
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Table 9.33 : Loss of properties by rural people in the
flood of 1988.
Respondents	 Had	 Had not	 No response
lost	 lost
I	 28.99	 -	 18.84
(40)	 (0)	 (26)
II	 -	 0.72	 12.32
	
(22)	 (1)	 (17)
III	 -	 1.45	 2.90
	
(26)	 (2)	 (4)
Total	 63.77	 2.17	 34.06
	
(88)	 (3)	 (47)
Table 9.34 : Help/relief received by victims of floods.
Respondents	 Had	 Had not	 No response
received	 received
I	 2.90	 27.54	 17.39
(4)	 (38)	 (24)
II	 1.45	 13.77	 13.77
(2)	 (19)	 (19)
III	 0.72	 15.94	 6.52
(1)	 (22)	 (9)
Total	 5.07	 57.25	 37.68
(7)	 (79)	 (52)
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Table	 9.35	 :	 Fairness/unfairness 	 in	 relief
distribution.
Respondents	 It was	 It was not	 No response
fair	 fair
I	 -	 23.91	 23.91
(0)	 (33)	 (33)
II	 1.45	 10.14	 17.39
(2)	 (14)	 (24)
III	 0.72	 16.67	 5.80
(1)	 (23)	 (8)
Total	 2.17	 50.72	 47.10
(3)	 (70)	 (65)
Table 9.36 : Types of unfairness in relief
distribution.
Respondents	 Partiality	 Misuse	 No response
I	 10.87	 1.45	 35.51
	
(15)	 (2)	 (49)
II	 15.94	 -	 13.04
	(22)	 (0)	 (18)
III	 18.84	 0.72	 3.62
	
(26)	 (1)	 (5)
Total	 45.65	 2.17	 52.17
	
(63)	 (3)	 (72)
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Table 9.37 : Reasons for not extending any help by the
"Upazila Administration".
	
Respon- It had	 It was	 It neglec- Not
	
dents little	 not willing ted some	 aware
or no	 to help	 villages	 of the
resources	 facts
I	 2.90	 13.04	 5.07	 2.17
	
(4)	 (18)	 (7)	 (3)
II	 6.52	 4.35	 2.90	 1.45
	
(9)	 (6)	 (4)	 (2)
III	 5.80	 3.62	 0.72	 0.72
(8)	 (5)	 (1)	 (1)
Total	 15.21	 21.01	 8.70	 4.35
(21)	 (29)	 (12)	 (6)
Table 9.38 : Whether people receive help from the
"Upazila Administration" at the time of
other natural disasters.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 -	 27.54	 20.29
(0)	 (38)	 (28)
II	 12.32	 16.67
(0)	 (17)	 (23)
III	 17.39	 5.80
(0)	 (24)	 (8)
Total	 (0)	 57.25	 42.75
	
-	 (79)	 (59
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Table 939 : Whether rural people know relevant
officers who are in charge of looking
after the problem of natural disasters.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 1.45	 26.81	 19.57
	
(2)	 (37)	 (27)
II	 3.62	 15.22	 10.14
	
(5)	 (21)	 (14)
III	 5.07	 15.94	 2.17
	
(7)	 (22)	 (3)
Total	 10.14	 57.97	 31.88
	
(14)	 (80)	 (44)
Table 9.40 : Whether rural people know of the Upazila
Project Implementation Officer (UPIO).
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 10.14	 36.23	 1.45
	
(14)	 (50)	 (2)
II	 12.32	 15.94	 0.72
	
(17)	 (22)	 (1)
III	 15.22	 7.97	 -
	
(21)	 (11)	 (0)
Total	 37.68	 60.14	 2.17
	
(2)	 (83)	 (3)
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Table 9.41 : Whether rural people see the UPIO visiting
villages or people affected by natural
calamities.
Respondents	 Yes	 No	 No response
I	 -	 28.99	 18.84
(0)	 (40)	 (26)
II	 2.17	 13.04	 13.77
(3)	 (18)	 (19)
III	 7.97	 7.25	 7.97
(11)	 (10)	 (11)
Total	 10.14	 49.28	 40.58
(14)	 (68)	 (56)
Table 9.42 : Opinion of rural people on whether the
"Upazila Administration" has been more
helpful in looking after problems of
natural disasters at the Upazila level.
Yes	 No	 No response
I	 9.42	 28.26	 10.14
(13)	 (39)	 (14)
II
	 10.14	 10.87	 7.97
	
(14)	 (15)	 (11)
III
	 5.07	 5.07	 13 • 04
	
(7)	 (7)	 (18)
Total	 24.64	 44.20	 31.16
(34)	 (61)	 (43) - -
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